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1. N rRoDucrt ON
The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in the use, in criminal cases, both by
the prosecution and the defense, of evidence of psychiatric or psychological "syn-
dromes."' One of the most important of these syndromes, and one that has been the
subject of substantial litigation during the last three years, is "rape trauma syndrome." 2
"Rape trauma syndrome" is a term that was coined in 1974 by a psychiatric nurse
and a social scientist as a result of a research project studying women who sought
treatment claiming to have been raped.' During the ensuing eleven year period this
syndrome has been the subject of extensive social science and medical research.' Basically,
behavioral scientists' assert that there exists a set of physical and emotional symptoms
experienced by rape victims which arc so prevalent and consistent that they constitute a
"syndrome" that most rape victims can be expected to experience. Researchers claim
that the symptoms are distinctive enough that diagnosis of the syndrome is possible.
Aker the syndrome is diagnosed, treatment can then proceed. 6
"Rape trauma syndrome - evidence entered the rape prosecution arena in the early
1980's. Prosecutors became aware that when consent is an issue in a rape case, that is,
when the defendant admits t hat the intercourse occurred, but claims that the complainant
consented to the intercourse, testimony from an expert that the complainant suffered
from rape trauma syndrome would be evidence of lack of consent, because the syndrome
does not result from consensual intercourse.' Such expert testimony was admitted in
some rape prosecutions, and in mid- i 982 the question of whether such testimony should
be admitted began reaching state appellate courts.
Rape trauma syndrome has been met with widely varying treatment in state appellate
courts. Two courts have held the evidence to be admissible on the issue of consent, but
Examples of syndromes the use of which has been urged by the prosecution include battered
child syndrome, see, e.g., People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 505-06, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 920
(1971), and battering parent syndrome, see, e.g., State v. Loehach, 310 N.'IN.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981).
Examples of syndromes that have been urged as defenses or mitigating factors by defendants
include battered woman syndrome, see, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 631 (D.C.
1979), and Vietnam veteran's syndrome, see, e.g., United Stales v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146, 1151—
52 (4th Cir. 1982).
2 "Rape" is traditionally defined as: "[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a female without her
consent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY /134 (5th ed. 1979). This definition is acceptable for purposes
of this article, although it is possible that the symptoms of"rape trauma syndrome" can result from
other nonconsensual intimate sexual activity, such as oral or anal sex, as well as from the noncon-
sensual vaginal intercourse that traditionally has been the focus of legal definitions of rape.
Aspects of the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence arc discussed in the following
authorities: Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its
implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. Rev. 396 (1985); Raum, Rape Trauma
Syndrome as Circumstantial Evidence of Rape, II J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 203 (1983); Ross, The Overlooked
Expert in Rape Prosecutiom, 14 U. Tot.. L. Rev. 707 (1983); Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape
Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 Am. U.L. REV. 417
(1984); Recent Developments: Rape Trauma Syndrome, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1984).
Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 981, 982 (1974).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61.
" The term "behavioral scientists" as used herein refers generally to persons who study and
report on human behavior, including psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, social workers, and soci-
ologists. The term "behavioral science" will be used to refer to the study of human behavior.
"See infra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61.
7 See id.
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to varying degrees. 5 Four courts have held the evidence to he inadmissible on the issue
of consent," although one of these courts has created an exception for "unusual" cases
involving children or mentally retarded complainants,'" One of the courts that has
rejected the evidence on the issue of consent has indicated that such evidence could be
admissible to explain unusual behavior of the complainant." Meanwhile, the first court
to hold such testimony admissible is now divided as to whether that initial decision was
correct.' 2 Important appellate decisions concerning rape trauma syndrome are now being
handed down on a regular basis.''
The admissibility of evidence concerning rape trauma syndrome is of great interest
due to the seriousness of the crime involved and the serious consequences 0 a defendant
if' the testimony is improperly admitted. Further, rape trauma syndrome is an evidence
scholar's dream because virtually every major evidentiary objection can be plausibly
made to its admission. 14 Given the importance of the topic, the divergent judicial treat-
ments of it. are unhelpful and unsatisfactory.
This article will begin examination of the admissibility of evidence concerning rape
trauma syndrome by exploring research results of behavioral scientists.'' Next, the
judicial precedents that existed with respect to similar evidence before behavioral sci-
entists coined the term "rape trauma syndrome" will be outlined."' Against this back-
ground, the article will scrutinize the "first generation" of cases dealing with rape trauma
syndrome evidence, Slate v. Marks'' and Slate v. Saldand.' 8 The article will then study the
'State v. Marks, 231 Kan, 045, 653-54, 647 P,2c1 1292, 1298-1300 (1982); State v. Liddell,
Mont. ___, 685 P.2d 918, 922-23 (1984).
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 245-47, 681 P.2d 291, 297-98, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450. 456-
57 (1084); Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, 514-16, 487 A.2d 664, 669-70 (1985); State s'.
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240-42 (Mo.
1984).
'" Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298-00, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58.
State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984).
Courts are also dealing increasingly with expert testimony on a similar subject — child sexual
abuse syndrome. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984); State v. Matile,'35
Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983). Despite the fact that rape trauma syndrome and child sexual
abuse syndrome are similar subjects for expert testimony, they arise Front entirely separate bodies
of behavioral scientific studies. Rape trauma syndrome studies deal with adults who have been forcibly
raped. See infra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61. Child sexual abuse syndrome studies
deal mainly with children who are victimized without physical force or threat of force. An in-depth
analysis of child sexual abuse syndrome is beyond the scope of this article. It will be mentioned
later, however, for the purposes of showing how courts have dealt differently' with that syndrome
than with rape trauma syndrome (see infra text accompanying notes 283-85) and how courts
sometimes confuse the two syndromes (see infra note 230).
14 The objections include that: it violates the Frye rule regarding scientific evidence, see infra
text accompanying notes 252-350; it is irrelevant, see infra text accompanying notes 351-61; the
witness is not qualified as an expert, see infra text accompanying notes 374-87; it is unfairly
prejudicial, see infra text accompanying notes 388-99; it improperly holsters the complainant's
credibility, see infra text accompanying notes 400-05; it is hearsay, see infra text accompanying notes
406-12; and it is contrary to a rape shield statute, see infra text accompanying notes 413-17.
' 5 See infra text accompanying notes 22-63.
'fi See infra text accompanying notes 64- 104.
17 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
' 8 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982). For a discussion of these two cases, see infra text accompanying
notes 105-39.
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progress of rape trauma syndrome in behavioral scientific circles, and in the courts,' 9
since Marks and Saldana. Next, an analysis of the various evidentiary objections that have
been raised to the use of such evidence and suggestions as to the resolution of such
objections will be presented. 2° Finally, the article will explore the relatively new concept
of the use of rape trauma syndrome evidence by a criminal defendant. 2 ' The article will
conclude that expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome should, in most cases,
be admissible because it is reliable evidence tending to prove the element of lack of
consent in a rape case, it may be helpful to a jury in overcoming certain prevalent
misconceptions that can stand in the way of rational decisionmaking, and it is not violative
of any rule of evidence.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME PRIOR TO MARKS AND SALDANA
A. In Behavioral Scientific Research
Amazingly, the study of the effect of rape on its victims did not begin in the United
States until 1970. 22 The first study was conducted by two public health crisis workers
who, after interviewing thirteen rape victims, concluded that specific, predictable re-
sponses to rape existed. The common responses were found to occur in three phases.
Phase One, called the Acute Reaction, encompassed the victim's'immediate reaction to
the rape and was characterized by feelings of shock, disbelief and fear. Phase Two, called
Outward Adjustment, was described as a period of pseudo-adjustment during which the
victim made attempts to return to normalcy while denying or suppressing feelings evoked
by the trauma. Finally, Phase Three, called Integration and Resolution, was the period
during which resolution of the feelings about the rape usually occurred. This phase
might be precipitated by a specific event such as diagnosis of pregnancy or realization
of facing a police line-up, or any number of incidents which result in a deterioration
and breakdown of the defenses successfully employed by the victim in Phase Two. A
common characteristic of the Integration and Resolution phase was depression, which
was described as psychologically normal for most young women who have been raped.
While the authors concluded by stating that their findings indicated a clear pattern of
response among young adult rape victims, the validity of the conclusion was questionable
due to the small sample size and the demographic similarities. The authors of this initial
study utilized their findings as an aid in developing supportive intervention techniques
for mental health workers. 29
19 See infra text accompanying notes 140-61 and 162-238, respectively.
2° See infra text accompanying notes 239-417.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 418-25.
22 Sutherland & Scherl, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
503 (1970).
23 I n 1973, two less empirical articles dealing with the trauma of rape were published. The first
article addressed the issue of contributing factors to the trauma experienced by the rape victim.
Weis & Borges, Victimology & Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, 8 Issues IN CRIMINOLOGY 71
(1973), reprinted in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY (L. Schultz ed. 1975). The authors suggested that the
identifiable patterns of response among rape victims could arise from having to deal with the
emotional conflicts that result from the decision whether to relate the experience to others or keep
the rape a secret. The less closely a woman's rape experience coincided with the "rape myth" that
dominated American society — that women are usually raped by men they do not know, and not
September 1985] 	 RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME	 1147
The term "rape trauma syndrome" was coined in 1974 by Ann Wolbert Burgess
and Linda Lytle Holmstrom to describe the occurrence of certain specific symptoms of
rape victims. 24 The research which resulted in the coining of the term "rape trauma
syndrome" involved a study of ninety-two adult rape victims who sought treatment at a
Boston hospital. The researchers concluded that "rape trauma syndrome is the acute
phase and long-term reorganization process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or
attempted forcible rape. This syndrome of behavioral, somatic, and psychological reac-
tions is an acute stress reaction to a life-threatening situation." 25 The authors explained
rape trauma syndrome as a two-stage reaction: the acute phase, during which the victim's
life style was completely disrupted; and the long-term phase, which required a complete
reorganization of the victim's disrupted life style.
The authors described the two phases more precisely. The acute phase was com-
prised of impact, somatic, and emotional reactions. The impact reactions encompassed
feelings of shock and disbelief which were exhibited in either an express manner (fear,
anger, and anxiety were displayed), or in a controlled manner (feelings were masked).
The somatic or physical reactions included soreness, bruising, and other physical symp-
toms relative to the area of the body which was the focus of the attack. Loss of appetite
and sleep pattern disturbances were also common. The primary emotional reactions
were fear and self-blame. The authors stated that, lilt is this main feeling of fear that
explains why victims develop the range of symptoms we call the rape trauma syndrome.
Their symptoms are an acute stress reaction to the threat of being killed." 26 The second
phase, or long-term reorganization process, began two or three weeks after the rape and
was characterized by changes in lifestyle (including change in residence), dreams and
nightmares, and a multitude of phobias. 27
Even between these two early rape studies, clear patterns began to emerge. Both
studies noted definite time frames for the common reactions, evidenced by the charac-
terization of the responses in phases: immediate, days and weeks following the attack in
which a victim appears paralyzed by feelings of shock, fear and disbelief; and long term,
by men they do know, such as dates or acquaintances — the greater would be her degree of
traumatization. Therefore, the decision to reveal or not to reveal the rape was viewed as increasing
the relative degree of trauma experienced when the rapist and the victim were not strangers.
Also appearing in 1973, along with recognition of the trauma, was research regarding the need
to educate the criminal justice system to the needs of rape victims. Prince George's County (Maryland)
Task Force to Study the Treatment of the Victims of Sexual Assaults (1973) (task force report), reprinted in
I. DRAPKIN & E. VIAND, VICTIMOLOGY (1974). The findings of a task force specifically organized to
study the treatment of victims of sexual assault revealed that, despite outward appearance or
behavior, all rape victims suffered trauma. The study also indicated that crisis intervention should
be available to victims and that persons providing treatment should be knowledgeable about the
trauma experienced by the victims.
24 See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 3, at 981.
26 Id. at 982.
26 A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE! VICTIMS OF CRISIS (1974).
27 Id. The authors also found two distinct variations of rape trauma syndrome. "Compounded
reaction" to rape was defined as the exhibition of additional symptoms by victims (including
depression, substance abuse, and suicidal or psychotic behavior) who had past psychiatric or behavior
problems. "Silent reaction" to rape was seen in victims who had not reported or revealed the rape
to anyone. The symptoms of this variation of rape trauma syndrome included increased anxiety,
sudden marked changes in sexual behavior or sudden marked irritability, as well as persistent
feelings of paranoia, loss of self-confidence or violent dreams and nightmares.
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commencing some months after the attack, during which the victim begins to resolve
the emotional conflicts left by the rape experience."
In 1976, several articles viewed rape as a medical "crisis" and studied it in terms of
crisis theory. The authors concluded that, to understand a victim's reaction to rape, it is
essential to understand the typical stress reaction. One author noted four clinical phases
of stress reaction: 1) anticipatory or threat phase; 2) impact phase; 3) recoil phase; and
4) post-traumatic phase." Among the fairly predictable responses to crisis reactions were:
disruption of normal patterns of functioning (including eating and sleeping disturb-
ances); regression to a state of dependency; and gradual openness to outside interven-
tion. These responses to stress, although varying in intensity and duration, were also
found in rape victims.
While the authors of these crisis theory studies 30
 accepted the findings of the re-
searchers who coined the term "rape trauma syndrome," the authors of one study
suggested that generally the patterns of response were predictable, but the uniqueness
of each victim's response depended on various psychodynamic considerations such as
victim's age, personality style, life situation, and responses of supportive others. Despite
these differing circumstances, feelings of guilt and shame emerged as virtually universal
in all rape victims."
Another study supporting the theory that rape victims exhibited similar as well as
identifiable responses to rape cons pared the responses of rape victims to rape resistors."
The study was based on responses to questionnaires and sought to examine differences
between these two groups in two areas: emotions expressed during the assault; and
personal social assessment. The results indicated that victims were significantly more
depressed, fearful, and anxious than resistors and that they perceived themselves as less
self-confident, less assertive, and more socially inept than did resistors.
25 In 1975, Susan Brownmiller wrote an influential feminist book in which she addressed one
of the primary factors contributing to women's response to rape. S. BROWNM I 1.I.ER, AGAINST OUR
WILL (1975). She opined that American society, abundant with stereotypes and prejudices about
the rape victim and rape itself, created a hostile climate fin' rape victims. Rape was glamorized and
mythified by attitudes and beliefs that pervaded American culture to the extent that sexual assault
was accepted. Id.
29 E. FILL.RERMAN, f HE RAPE VICTIM (1976).
1 " Id. N (Arnim & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Con,sideratioms, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
408 (1976),
31
 Viewing rape in terms of a crisis prompted the development of crisis intervention programs
to meet the needs of rape victims. See, e.g., McCombie, liassuch, Savity & Pell, Development of a
Medical Center Rape Crisis Intervention Program, 133 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 418 (1976). It appeared that
the prevailing attitude that rape was a sexual rather than a violent crime had prevented recognition
of the trauma experienced by rape victims and, therefore, the development of resources to treat
victims suffering from the trauma was stagnant until the mid-1970's. Crisis intervention programs
were based on the premise that early intervention could prevent development of psychological
disturbances in rape victims. It appeared that by the late 1970's "progress [had] been made in
establishing rape as a legitimate health issue and in including the care of rape victims among the
repertoire of services provided within a medical center." Id. at 421. In 1978, a survey of 500
psychiatrists' views on rape indicated "increased psychiatric knowledge and concern about rape
victims." Sexual Survey #11: Current Thinking on Rape, Medical Aspects of Human Sexuality 125, 126
(1978) (commentary by F,. Benedek, M.D.). Eighty percent of the doctors surveyed believed that
victims exhibited psychiatric symptoms following the rape. Id.
"Selkin, Protecting Personal Space: Victim & Resistor Reactions to Assaultive Rape, 6 J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOLOCY 263 (1978). A "rape resistor" is a woman who laced the threat of being raped but.
somehow managed to escape.
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The first study to examine the long term effects of rape appeared in 1978. 33
 This
study focused upon the effects of prior life stress on length of recovery time. The study
was based on a follow-up interview four to six years after the attack of the same ninety-
two rape victims studied by Ann Wolbert Burgess and Linda Lytle Holmstrom in their
1974 study.• Four specific stresses were examined and responses were categorized into
three areas: recovery within months; recovery within years; and not yet recovered at
four to six years post rape. The results indicated, in general, that the greater the amount
of prior life stress a victim had experienced, the longer it took the victim to recover
front the rape. However, recent life changes (significant events occurring within six
months prior to the rape) had little or no connection to the victim's length of recovery,
and prior family grief (losing family member through death, divorce, or separation
within two years prior to the rape) had an inverse relationship with the length of recovery.
Fifty-six percent of the victims experiencing this type of stress recovered within months
after the rape, whereas only twenty-four percent of the victims not subject to this
type of stress recovered within the sante time frame. The authors drew an analogy
between the psychological work required in grief resolution and that required in rape
trauma resolution, stating that "Nhe psychological work required by rape victims in-
cludes freeing oneself from the fears caused by rape, acknowledging and bearing the
pain caused by the rape, redefining the feelings of vulnerability and helplessness, and
gaining control of one's life again."'"
The primary conclusion which can be drawn from these early studies is that most
rape victims exhibit some psychological symptoms following the rape, with the primary
reaction being fear. Although the percentage of victims developing the varying symptoms
differed from study to study, the some symptoms predominated in all the studies. These
included: traumatophobia, obsessive thoughts, nightmares, depressive symptoms,
changes in eating and sleeping habits, decreased sexual desire, and guilt, The research
was conducted by a variety of professionals including public health crisis workers, public
health doctors, professors of nursing and sociology, and psychiatrists, indicating a grow-
ing concern by these various professions regarding the trauma experienced by rape
victims and their subsequent needs for professional treatment.
Beginning in 1979, the research on rape victims began to be conducted with more
sophisticated methodology by utilizing control groups and attempting to isolate and
study individual symptoms. 3" One of the first studies to assess individual symptoms
33 Burgess & Holmstrom, Recovery from Rape and Prior Life Stress, 1 RESEARCH IN NURSING &
HEALTH l65 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Burgess & Holmstrom, Life Stresses].
3-1 See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
35 Burgess & Holmstrom, Lifi, Stresses, supra note 33, at 166. See also Ruch. Chandler & Harter,
Life Change and Rape Impart. 21 HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 248 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Life
Change]. These researchers 'Mind that. the degree of rape trauma experienced by a victim is not
reflected solely by the victim's prior emotional state, but also by the degree of prior life change.
The significance of the relationship ['mind to exist between life change and level of rape trauma is
that victims experiencing either a high degree of life change or no life change at all within a year
prior to the rape will be the most severely traumatized, while victims experiencing minor life
changes during this same period may he less traumatized by the rape. Therefore, as regards the
occurrence of identifiable symptoms of rape trauma, this study had no impact. Its usefulness lay in
the area of aiding crisis intervention counselors, who, once made aware of the effect of prior life
changes, could assess why the level of trauma experienced by rape victims may be different.
3" See infra text accompanying note 41 for methodological criticisms that have been leveled
against the earlier studies.
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delineated thirteen areas in which identifiable patterns of adjustment were found to exist
in most rape victims.'' Conclusions were drawn about the causal effect of rape on each
of the specific symptoms or behaviors. Forty-seven percent of 598 victims interviewed
experienced noticeable differences in their eating habits following the rape. Changes in
this area reflected the level of anxiety felt by the victim, with overeating viewed as a
means of self-imposed social ostracism, while undereating represented an attention-
seeking need. Fifty percent of the victims experienced changes in sleeping patterns, with
an inability to sleep indicative of feelings of anxiety and tension, while oversleeping
reflected a desire to avoid interaction with others. Nightmares were another common
occurrence among the victims. The authors stated that the replaying of the trauma
"represents an attempt by the subconscious to integrate the event into the everyday
world."38
Two primary fears were expressed by a majority of the victims interviewed. Fear of
being alone on the street was expressed by sixty-six percent of the victims, which reflected
the victim's feelings of vulnerability and loss of independence. Fear of being alone at
home was expressed by seventy-two percent of the victims who were raped in their
homes. This fear was viewed as persistent when it related to the victim's coping ability
in general. Due to these fears, changes in social activities were experienced by fifty
percent of the rape victims. A curtailment of social activities was viewed as reflective of
a victim's inability to deal with the sexual aspect of rape. A majority of rape victims
experienced negative feelings toward both known men and male strangers as a result of
being raped. These feelings were indicative of a loss of trust in others as well as in the
victim herself.
The researchers noted that the frequency and occurrence of the aforementioned
symptoms and behavior were affected by a number of demographic and personal factors
such as the victim's age, marital status, employment status and prior interpersonal or
intrapsychic problems. The results indicated that with respect to age, an adult victim was
more likely to be confronted with adjustment problems than was a child or adolescent
victim. This phenomenon occurred primarily,because an adult was less likely to receive
the support needed and was unable to retreat to the safe, supportive confines of the
home. Marital status was another factor affecting a victim's coping ability. A married
victim was more apt to have adjustment difficulties than a single woman because of the
inability of the victim's husband to deal with the rape. The researchers found that in
many instances the married victim's "anticipated primary source of emotional support
[her husband] has become her most determined accuser."." The findings of this study,
that a rape victim with certain pre-existing psychological problems is predisposed to
adjustment patterns reflecting these prior problems, is supported by previous literature."
The researchers also stressed that a working victim will have more adjustment problems
than a nonworking victim because of the former's forced interaction with men in the
workplace.
One of the first studies to undertake an in-depth investigation of the fear reaction
common in most rape victims yielded the following results: 1) rape victims were more
" T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE (1979) [hereinafter cited
as AFTERMATH].
38 Id. at 27.
39 Id. at 47.
40 See, e.g., Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 3 (described therein as compounded rape reac-
tion).
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fearful than nonvictims; 2) the pattern and the intensity of victims' fear reactions changed
over time; and 3) situations feared by victims but not by nonvictims were rape-related."
The findings specifically revealed that the victims' fears were higher initially and subsided
over time but were significantly higher than nonvictims' fear during all four assessment
periods after the rape, six to ten days, one month, three months, and six months. Three
specific fears remained paramount throughout all four periods. These were the fear of
being alone, and the fear of being awakened at night, both of which reflect the victims'
sense of vulnerability, and the fear of going out with new people. All three of these fears
represented attack vulnerability cues, suggesting that unique to the rape victim is the
generalized fear of subsequent attack, which, unlike other rape related fears, did not
diminish over time.
Another 1979 study examined a second, though not as prominent, common symp-
tom of rape response — depression..* The researchers analyzed thirty-four rape victims
based on an assessment interview and a self-test questionnaire. The results indicated a
high frequency of depressive symptoms with the three most prevalent symptoms iden-
tified as dysphoria (depressed mood) reported by fifty percent of the victims; extreme
guilt feelings, also reported by fifty percent of the victims; and loss of interest in normal
activities reported by thirty-five percent of the victims. Further analysis of victims whose
test scores indicated that they were suffering from moderate or severe depression re-
vealed that twenty-four percent were suffering from a major depressive disorder.
In 1980, an important event occurred that helped to legitimate rape trauma syn-
drome as a psychiatric diagnosis. The medical profession in general and the psychiatric
profession in particular, gave general acceptance and recognition to a psychiatric disorder
known as "post-traumatic stress disorder" in the basic text relied upon by the profession
for diagnostic purposes, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, third edition, of the
American Psychiatric Association (DSM-I II)." Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was
explained as follows: "the essential feature [of post-traumatic stress disorder] is the
development of characteristic symptoms after the experiencing of a psychologically
traumatic event or events outside the range of usual human experience usually consid-
ered to be normal."'" PTSD is always induced by certain psychological traumas (stressors),
41 Kilpatrick, Veronen	 Resick, Assessment of the Aftermath of Rape: Changing Patterns of Fear, 1
J. BEIIAV. ASSESSMENT 133 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Changing Patterns of Fear]. The research
methods of previous studies were severely criticized by these authors because 1) sampling procedures
were not described; 2) potential sample bias was not addressed; '3) control or comparison groups
were not used; 4) standardized psychometric testing devices were not used; and 5) reliability of the
measuring devices used were not documented. It is important to note, however, that the results of
this and other later, more sophisticated studies did not differ from the conclusions drawn by the
earlier studies regarding patterns of victim response.
In an attempt to compensate fur the previous deficiencies in methodology, the Kilpatrick study,
while examining fear reactions in rape victims, assessed both victims and nonvictims at four time
intervals: six to ten days post-rape; one month post-rape; three months post-rape; and six months
post-rape. To control for the effects of repeated testing, a victim group was also assessed at only
one interval. Extensive documentation of the sampling procedures was also provided, which includes
the fact that the nonvictim sample corresponded demographically with the victim sample to as great
an extent as was possible.
4" Frank, Turner & Duffy, Depressive Symptoms in Rape Victims, 1 J. AFFECTIVE. DISORDERS 269
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Depressive Symptoms].
4 ' See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III].
as Id, at 236.
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among which are natural, accidental, or man-made disasters; and may be experienced
alone, as in the case of rape, or in a group setting, as in the case of military combat. t 5
The authoritative treatise interpreting PTSD immediately recognized that rape trauma
syndrome was a quintessential example of post-traumatic stress disorder.•" DSM-III
describes two types of PTSD — acute and chronic or delayed." A person diagnosed with
the acute form will exhibit the requisite symptoms beginning and ending within six
months after the trauma. The chronic or delayed form is diagnosed when the symptoms
do not emerge until six months after the trauma. In either type, the following are the
essential criteria for diagnosing PTSD: I) existence of a recognizable trauma (stressor)
that would cause distress symptoms in most people; 2) reexperiencing the trauma by
one or more of several means, such as nightmares or recurrent dreams; 3) decreased
involvement with the external world; and 4) exhibition of two or more of several specific
symptorns. 48
The disorder appears to be more severe and longer in duration when the evoking
trauma is induced by human design, as in the case of rape.49 In instances when the
psychological trauma is accompanied by physical trauma, as in the case of rape, the
chances that a person experiencing the trauma will develop PTSD are increased because
physical injury intensifies the nature of the stress. 5 "
Many of the symptoms experienced by a rape victim are synonymous with those
necessary for PTSD diagnosis, for example, depression, anxiety, changes in lifestyle or
residence, nightmares, and sleep disturbance. There remain, however, numerous specific
identifiable symptoms associated with the rape experience which go beyond the general
45 Id,
46 H. KAPLAN & B. SAnDocat, Mom:RN SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/
I 448 (1980) [hereinafter cited as COMPREHENSIVE .FEXTBOOK/iI1].
" DSM-1 1, supra note 43, at 237.
-" The diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder are as follows:
A.Existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of distress
in almost everyone.
B.Reexperiencing the trauma as evidenced by at least one of the following:
(1)recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event,
(2)recurrent dreams of the event,
(3)sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were reoccurring, because of
an association with an environmental or ideational stimulus.
C.Numbing of responsiveness to or reduced involvement with the external world,
beginning some lime after the trauma, as shown by at least one of the following:
(I)markedly diminished interest in one or more significant activities,
(2)sleep disturbance,
(3)guilt about surviving when others have not, or about behavior required for
survival,
(4)memory impairment or trouble concentrating,
(5)avoidance of activities that arouse recollection of the traumatic event,
(6)intensification of symptoms by exposure to events that symbolize or resemble
the traumatic event.
Id. at 238.
49
 COMPREHENSIVE Ts:x'rBOOK/lll, supra note 46, at 448. 11 should be noted that even the most
severe trauma does not produce PTSD in all persons experiencing the trauma. Id. at 447, Also, in
most persons diagnosed as having PTSD, the occurrence of the trauma is a necessary element of
causation, but a variety of psychological, physical, genetic, and social factors may also contribute to
the development of the disorder. Id.
5° Id. at 571.
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symptoms described of PTSD in DSNI-I I I. These rape-specific symptoms include: rape-
related fears (including a generalized fear of subsequent attack, fears of interaction with
the criminal justice system, fears of being alone at home and on the street); changes in
eating patterns; sexual dysfunction; and worsened relationships with men in general.
Another area of rape research that was undertaken in 1980 concerned examination
of the underlying attitudes and beliefs of most Americans which result in perpetuation
of the "rape myth" that women are usually raped by strangers and not by men they
know. 5 ' The research tested and confirmed hypotheses that certain aspects of American
culture, such as sex role stereotyping, adversarial sexual beliefs, sexual conservatism,
and acceptance of interpersonal violence, directly relate to acceptance of the "rape myth"
by many Americans. The results indicated that because rape attitudes arc strongly related
to other deeply held attitudes, reeducating the general public to understand that a rape
victim is indeed a victim of personal violence, is a difficult but necessary objective. 57
Despite the development of PTSD, some researchers continued to adhere to the
belief that rape trauma was more properly explained in terms of crisis theory." They
argued that the common symptoms of rape response could be best understood by
analyzing them in terms of common stress reactions induced by a crisis.
Crisis reactions occur in two phases — initial reactions and subsequent reactions."
In that regard, rape trauma syndrome encompasses a set of specific reactions to each
phase which are experienced by almost all rape victims. The intensity and duration of
the reactions, however, may depend on a victim's individual characteristics. The reactions
occurring in rape victims immediately following the attack were viewed as "typical crisis
reactions." In fact, most crisis counselors have been instructed to he aware that during
this phase of initial reactions victims may appear to be in a controlled state, thereby
masking underlying feelings. 5 ' This "characteristic presentation" behavior is "highly
significant" because: 1) it is contrary to most people's expectations; 2) it hides the
emotional trauma experienced by the victim; '3) it reinforces the common tendency to
disbelieve the victim; and 4) it increases the victim's vulnerability because her immediate
need for support May be overlooked. 56
5 ' Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 381 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 217 (1980).
See also Weis & Borges, supra note 23 (definition of "rape myth").
52 Burt, .supra note 51.
53 See generally A. BURGESS & B. BALowiN, CRISIS INTERVEIS"EION THEORY AND PRACTICE — A
CLINICAL HANDBOOK (1981); C. WARNER, RAPE & SEXUAL ASSAULT-MANAGEMENT AND INTERVENTION
(1980) [hereinafter cited as WARNER].
5-1
	 supra note 53, at 144.
" Id. at 146.
5' Id. This finding that counselors need to be educated to suppress effects of societal condition-
ing, i.e. the victim is not agitated, therefore the rape was not traumatic and was probably brought
on by the victim's behavior, is highly significant. If crisis counselors have to be educated that one
of the common reactions among rape victims is to mask their feelings, then, arguably, testimony
about rape trauma syndrome should be admitted to educate the jury in much the same manner.
In her work with rape victims, one researcher noted an almost universal victim reaction which
characterizes the secondary phase of subsequent reactions as the "why me?" response. Id. at 148.
The researcher's analysis of this reaction lends support to the idea that a victim's self-blame may
be the underlying factor behind many of the patterned rape responses.
Most advocates of crisis theory, while disputing that rape trauma syndrome should be charac-
terized as PTSD, do not dispute the validity of rape trauma syndrome. See id.; Norman & Nadelson,
supra note 30. In analogizing rape reaction to the phases of crisis reaction, one researcher concluded
that while the psychological response of rape victims is similar to the sequence of reactions occurring
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Other researchers rejected the crisis theory explanation. In one study, sixty-one rape
victims were interviewed, all of whom had been raped within one month to three years
prior to the interview. 57 The researchers found that the degree of trauma experienced
did not differ according to time but that instead, some degree of disequilibrium, that is,
emotional and behavioral changes in the victims prior to and following the rape, existed
in all victims. They concluded that this finding negates one of the basic tenets of crisis
theory — that by definition, crises are time-limited, with the total length of time between
the occurrence of the crisis and resolution thereof lasting only four to six weeks. 58 The
researchers suggested that rape can be reconceptualized as a prolonged crisis because
for the most part, rape victims do not reestablish a pre-crisis state of functioning. Instead,
they experience fundamental behavioral and emotional changes which tend to make
them more defensive and self-protective. It is still unknown at this time if victims ever
overcome the residual effects of the rape experience. 55
A recent attempt to measure the effects of rape on immediate and long-term social
adjustment of rape victims is documented in another 1981 study. 8° In this study, ninety-
three rape victims were assessed at six intervals ranging from two weeks to one year
post-rape. Their reactions were compared with a matched control group of nonvictims
as well as three additional victim groups who were assessed only once to control for the
effects of repeated testing. Overall social adjustment indicated that victims had signifi-
cantly more problems adjusting to day-to-day social concerns than did nonvictims during
the first two months following the rape, A comparison between the victims revealed a
greater degree of difficulty in social adjustment among the latter victims. This tended
to suggest that repeated assessment had a therapeutic effect and that rape victims who
do not receive follow-up counseling may be impaired for a longer period of time in the
area of social adjustment.
By four months post-rape, normal levels of response were seen in most victims, with
the exception being in the area of work. The items measured on this subscale were level
of functioning at work, interest in work, and relationships with others at work. Above-
in other crisis states, "specific [only] to rape trauma syndrome is the rape work [a victim must go
through] to resolve the crisis." WARNER, supra note 53, at 128. See aLsa Burgess & Holmstrom, Life
Stresses, supra note 33. Rape work has three distinctive characteristics: 1) the victim experiences a
breakdown of her usual existential denial of environmental threats, i.e. the victim's vulnerability
and feelings of helplessness cause her to be overly cautious about undertaking normally routine
activities; 2) the victim experiences a loss of integrity of bodily boundaries because of the rapist's
invasion of personal space, i.e. the victim must regain a sense of independence and control over
her body; and 3) the victim must confront power relations between men and women in our society,
i.e. the victim must reassess and come to terms with her relationship with men while remaining
aware of society's perception, both of her as a rape victim and of women in general. WARNER, supra
note 53. While the first of these three characteristics could also arguably be classified as indicative
of PTSD, the second and third are unique to the rape experience and are therefore distinctive
characteristics of rape trauma syndrome.
57 J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT — RAPE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES (1981).
58 Id. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
Ss
	 of interest in the Williams and Holmes study were the findings of the researchers that
a victim's race or ethnicity significantly affected the degree of crisis or level of rape trauma
experienced. Mexican-Americans were found to experience the greatest degree of crisis, while
Anglo-Americans experienced a slightly lesser degree, with Black victims experiencing the lowest
degree of crisis. J. WILLIAMS K. HoLmEs, supra note 57, at 107.
6° Resick, Calhoun, Atkeson & Ellis, Social Adjustment in Victims of Sexual Assauli, 49 J. CONSULT-
ING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 705 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Social Adjustment).
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normal levels of adjustment problems in these areas continued for as long as eight
months post-rape. The results indicated that while a victim's level of social functioning
is initially disrupted by the rape with the disruption continuing for as long as four
months after the rape, the only area where significant adjustment difficulties are long-
lasting is in the victim's work environment.
Another 1981 study sought to determine whether the occurrence of four common
rape-related factors identified by most rape victims were related to adverse psychological
impacts. 6 I The four predictor variables studied were: 1) reporting versus nonreporting
of the rape; 2) victim vulnerability to claims of responsibility; 3) presence of understand-
ing others; and 4) severity of the attack. The impact variables measured were: 1) psy-
chosomatic symptoms; 2) decreased sexual satisfaction and frequency; and 3) seclusive-
ness. The data obtained for the study was based on questionnaire responses by 179 rape
victims. The basic conclusion of the study was the more severe the attack, the greater
the frequency of occurrence of psychosomatic symptoms. 62
An important factor that continually reemerged in rape victim studies was the need
to educate the public in general and the criminal justice system in particular about the
common reactions of the rape victim and her subsequent needs as a result of being
attacked. In conjunction with this, one study ascertained the extent to which a victim's
emotional style affected the reactions of outside observers to her status as a rape victim. 62
The participants in the study (college students) were asked to assess the rape victim's
credibility, the degree of the victim's social acceptance, and the degree to which the
observers believed the victim found the rape to be unpleasant. The first phase of the
study asked for observer assessment based on written descriptions of the rape victim's
emotional state, while the second phase elicited observer's responses based on videotapes.
In both phases, two types of victim responses were presented: controlled and expressed.
The results of the study revealed that a victim's emotional response immediately after
the rape significantly effected her perceived credibility. Those victims who exhibited the
expressed form of reaction were seen as substantially more credible. These findings
supported the views of many that a lack of emotional reaction, previously documented
as common behavior during the acute phase of rape trauma syndrome, is inconsistent
with society's perception of the credible rape victim.
In summary, the later studies confirmed the results of the earlier studies: most rape
victims experience severe, predictable psychological symptoms for at least two months
after the rape. The general symptoms are fear, depression, and guilt. These general
symptoms are manifested by more specific symptoms: negative reactions to environments
similar to that in which the rape occurred, changes in eating and sleeping habits,
nightmares, unease at work, curtailMent of normal social activities, and decreased sexual
desire. The occurrence of these symptoms among rape victims is far greater than among
women who have not been raped. This extensive body of research was available to the
61 Norris & Feldman -Summers, Factors Related to the Psychological Impacts of Rape on the Victim,
90 j. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 562 (1981).
62 Id. The results of this study suggested that the presence or absence of various psychological
impacts of rape, as well as their severity, were related to certain common factors identified in most,
if not all, rape victims. Therefore, ascertaining from the victim whether she feels responsible for
the rape, whether she feels she has the support or understanding of others, and the severity of the
attack, could aid counselors in their treatment of rape victims.
63 Calhoun, Cann, Selby & Magee, Victim Emotional Response: Effects of Social Reaction on Victims
of Rape, 20 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 17 (1981).
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first courts that had to address the issue of the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome
evidence.
III. THE STATus OF THE LAW REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE POST-RAPE CONDITION OF A COMPLAINANT PRIOR TO MARKS AND SALDANA
It is important to examine the legal environment that existed in the late 1970's and
early 1980's, at. the time prosecutors first sought to introduce rape trauma syndrome
testimony in rape prosecutions. Evidence regarding the complainant's condition after
the rape was not a new concept at the time Marks and Saldana were decided. The cases
concerning the complainant's condition after the rape can be divided into three cate-
gories: those not involving expert opinion as to the cause of the complainant's condition;
those that did invoke expert opinion as to the cause of the complainant's condition; and
those where the evidence bore on the complainant's credibility.
Generally, evidence concerning the post-rape condition of the complainant not in
the form of expert opinion as to the cause of she condition, was admissible prior to
Marks and Saldana 64 Indisputably, pure physical evidence concerning the complainant's
condition, such as bruises, swelling, and abrasions was admissible as showing that the
intercourse had been forcible rather than consensual. 65 Courts sometimes went further
and allowed testimony describing the physical manifestations of the complainant's emo-
tional state such as crying, nervousness, and disorientation." Such evidence usually
concerned the period immediately following the rape and was admitted on the theory
that such physical symptoms of emotional distress also evidenced lack of consent. Some
courts went even further and held that physical manifestations of an emotional condition
which took place long after the rape were admissible as some evidence that a crime had
occurred, because the physical manifestations would not have taken place had a crime
not occurred. For example, in one case it was held that evidence that one of the victims
of a "gang" rape had dropped out of a beauty college after the incident and that another
had moved to another state was relevant to the sexual activities testified to because such
changes would not have been made if the activities had been consensual. 67
The second category concerning the condition of the complainant after the alleged
rape is evidence involving expert opinion as to the cause of the complainant's condition.
The only type of such evidence that was consistently held to be admissible was the
diagnosis of an examining physician shortly after the incident, based purely on physical
evidence, such as bruises, swelling, and abrasions, that the intercourse had been forced
and not consensual.""
Once the expert ventured past the purely physical basis of opinion and began to
base the diagnosis on the emotional state of the complainant and statements made by
the complainant to explain the incident, the majority of courts held that the attending
64 See infra text accompanying notes 65-68.
6' See Smelcher v. State, 385 So. 2d 653, 659-60 (Ala. Crim. App, 1980); People v. Weaver, 8
III. App. 3d 299, 306, 290 N.E.2d 691, 696 (1972); State v. Mitchell, 339 Mo. 228, 232-33, 96
S.W.2d 341, 343-44 (1936).
" See Collins v. State, 365 So. 2d 113, 115 (Ala, Crim. App. 1978); Lang v. State, 230 Miss.
147, 159, 87 So. 2d 265, 269, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 936 (1956).
fi' State v. Johnson, 637 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
68 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 550-54, 117 N.W.2d 447, 451-53 (1962); State v.
Ring, 54 Wash. 2d 250, 254-56, 339 P.2d 461, 464-65 (1959).
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physician's opinion was inadmissible. 69 The predominant basis upon which the courts
held such evidence to be inadmissible was that the physician was not competent to base
a diagnosis concerning the cause of the complaint on anything other than purely physical
symptoms." It followed, then, that the jury was equally capable of forming an opinion
as to the cause of the complaint, and that the expert testimony was not helpful." Two
courts also reasoned that the physicians' opinions constituted improper bolstering of the
complainant's credibility. 72 One court, on the basis of peculiar state evidentiary rules,
also held that the physician's recitation of what the two complainants had told him was
inadmissible hearsay, and that the physician's opinion was improper because it concerned
the "ultimate issue" in the case."
Although these cases constituted the weight of authority, there were isolated in-
stances where expert opinion testimony concerning the cause of the complainant's con-
dition based on other than purely physical evidence was allowed. In the 1978 Oregon
case of State v. Len run, the first case to reach an appellate court, the prosecution had
used rape trauma syndrome testimony in a rape prosecution." In that case, a "rape
victim advocate" testified that the complainant's emotional state comported with that of
most women who came to the hospital complaining of rape." The defendant's sole
objection to the testimony was that the witness was not qualified to give such an opinion."
The court noted that the qualifications of an expert to testify is a matter that rests
primarily in the trial court's discretion and thus would not hold that the trial court had
abused its discretion in view of the substantial experience of the rape victim advocate."
The case is of limited importance in the developnient of the law of admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome testimony because the defendant raised a very limited objection to the
testimony enabling the appellate court to dispose of the issue on a very narrow ground.
Although not specifically mentioning rape trauma syndrome, a Michigan court in
the 1981 case of People v. LaPorte admitted testimony somewhat similar to rape trauma
syndrome testimony." In this case the examining physician arrived at his opinion that.
the complainant had been raped on the basis of both the victim's physical and emotional
conditions. Sonic of these emotional conditions were conveyed to him through statements
by the complainant." The Michigan Court of Appeals held the testimony to be admissible
because the examination had occurred within hours after the alleged incident. Moreover,
the court noted that the physician had testified that he always approached with skepticism
any victim's version of an alleged rape, and rather based his opinion on his own inde-
69 See, e.g., Farley v. State, 324 So. 2d 662, 663-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth
v. Gardner, '350 Mass. 664, 665-66, 216 N.E.2d 558, 559-60 (1966); People v. McGillen, 392 Mich.
278, 284-85, 220 N.W.2d 689, 692-93 (1974); State v. Castore. _R.I. 435 A.2d 321, 326 (1981);
Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 516, 518-19, 248 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1978).
70 See, e.g., Earley, 324 So. 2d at 663; Gardner, 350 Mass. at 665-66, 216 N.E.2d at 560; ,McGillen,
392 Mich. at 284-85, 220 N.W.2d at 692-93; Castore, R.I._ 	 at _, 435 A.2d at 326.
71 See, e.g., Gardner, 350 Mass. at 666, 216 N.E.2d at 560; Castore_R.I. at _, 435 A.2d at 326;
Cartera, 219 Va. at 518-19, 248 S.E.2d at 786.
"McGi.//en, 392 Mich. at 285, 220 N.W.2d at 693; Castore, _R.I. at —, 435 A.2d at 326,
" Cartera, 219 Va. at 518-19, 248 S.E.2d at 786.
74 37 Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1078).
75 /d. at 415, 587 P.2d at 1047.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 415-16, 587 P.2d at 1047.
7" 103 Mich, App. 444, 303 N.W.2d 222 (1981).
79 1d. at 452, 303 N.W.2d at 225.
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pendent observations of the victim's physical and emotional conditions." The court then
stated that most importantly, the physician had given no testimony as to whether or not
the victim had been raped by the defendant who was on trial."' Thus the court held that
"on this record," the testimony of the attending physician was admissible." It is clear,
however, that had the physician's examination taken place a substantial time after the
alleged rape, as most rape trauma syndrome examinations do, the Michigan Court of
Appeals would not have held the evidence to be admissible.
The third category of evidence relating to the post-rape condition of the complainant
that had received judicial scrutiny prior to Marks and Saldana was evidence offered for
the explicit purpose of bolstering the credibility of the complaining witness. The general
rule is that opinion evidence, other than by reputation or opinion by people familiar
with a witness who has already testified, is not admissible to bolster the credibility of a
witness." In the 1978 case of People v. Izzo,84 the Michigan Court of Appeals dealt with
testimony of a psychiatrist who stated that he believed that a rape complainant whom
he had examined had not been faking answers, and had been answering quite honestly.
The court held that the prosecution was, in effect, presenting a "human lie detector" 85
to give a "stamp of scientific legitimacy to the truth of the complaining witness' factual
testimony concerning the rape."86 Such testimony was ruled to be improper bolstering
of the complainant's testimony.
On the other hand, during this time period a minority of courts took the position
that expert testimony concerning the credibility of a complaining witness in a rape
prosecution was admissible where the credibility of the complainant had been attacked.
The Hawaii Supreme Court in the 1982 case of State v. Kim," while recognizing that the
credibility of witnesses was solely for the jury to decide, was reluctant to categorically
preclude all such testimony since it agreed with the "virtually unanimous opinion of
commentators that under certain circumstances expert testimony may reveal to the trier
of fact characteristics or conditions of the witness which may assist the jury's assessment
of credibility." 88 Thus the Hawaii court held that the lower court had not erred in
admitting the opinion of a qualified child psychiatrist and pediatrician who found the
child sexual abuse complainant's account to be believable."
Probably of more importance for the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evi-
dence than the isolated cases allowing similar testimony in criminal cases prior to Marks
and Saldana was the very favorable treatment that rape trauma syndrome was receiving
in legal contexts other than rape prosecutions. In fact, the very first mention of the term
"rape trauma syndrome" in an appellate court opinion was in White v. Violent Crimes
Compensation Board," decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1978. In that case,
sa Id. at 452-53, 303 N.W.2d at 226.
1 Id.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wertis,
505 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045 (1975).
84 90 Mich. App. 727, 282 N.W.2d 10 (1979).
" Id. at 730, 282 N.W.2d at 11.
"Id.
87 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982).
" Id. at 602, 645 P.2d at 1334.
"Id. at 609-10, 645 P.2d at 1339.
80 76 N.J. 368, 388 A.2d 206 (1978).
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White, a rape victim, filed for compensation with the Violent Crimes Compensation
Board. The Board denied compensation on the basis that the claim had been filed
fourteen months after the crime when the statutory limitation for filing such a claim was
twelve months. White argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to her
incapacity resulting from the rape. The court agreed that the limitation period should
be tolled, because in addition to the public embarrassment suffered by the victim due to
severe facial injuries suffered during the attack, she also had an emotional disablement
resulting from the attack which incapacitated her from filing within the statutory period.
The court explained that emotional disablement as follows:
Moreover, it has been observed that a frequent component of the "rape
trauma syndrome" rather consistently encountered in rape victims is a so-
called "global fear of everyone" which is often marked by withdrawal from
social relationships in reaction to that most dehumanizing of all crimes. See
A. Burgess and L. Holmstrom, Rape: Victims of Crisis, 37-50 (1974); see also
A. Burgess and L. Holmstrom, "Rape Trauma Syndrome," The American
Journal of Psychiatry, September, 1974. We do not doubt that the totality of
these factors effectively incapacitated plaintiff from normal social functioning
for an extensive period of time.'
By this passage the New Jersey Supreme Court, in effect, judicially noticed both the
existence and validity of rape trauma syndrome. 62
Another affirmation of the validity of rape trauma syndrome in a civil context is
found in Redmond v. Baxley," decided by the United States. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan in 1979. In that case a male sued the state, claiming damages as a
result of a rape that occurred while he was a prison inmate. On the issue of damages,
the plaintiff presented a behavioral scientist who was not a physician to testify to the
severe personality changes wrought by the rape. The defendant objected that such
evidence could only be given by a medical doctor. The court rejected this contention,
holding that although the expert would perhaps not be qualified to testify about diag-
nosing or treating the illness, he was qualified to discuss the links between the trauma
of rape and its medical ramifications." The court characterized the expert as a "well
qualified and believable"" one who gave the jury valuable information concerning "sig-
nificant harm resulting from the rape." 96 Although the court did not use the term "rape
91 Id. at 388, 388 A.2d at 216.
J2 It should be noted that the judicial notice taking place in this case was in the nature of taking
notice of a "legislative" fact for appellate purposes, rather than taking notice of an "adjudicative"
fact for trial purposes. "Adjudicative" facts are facts about the particular immediate parties to the
case and "legislative" facts are all others. Ninety-nine percent of the time, "legislative" facts are facts
used for making law and policy. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE Law TREATISE § 15:3 (2d ed. 1980).
It will be seen below that courts have been much more refuctant to judicially notice rape trauma
syndrome for trial evidentiary purposes than the White court was to judicially notice them in
determining policy questions on appeal. See infra text accompanying notes 118-38, 164-76, 180-
86, and 219-23.
95 475 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
94 Id. at 1122.
g' Id.
96 Id.
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trauma syndrome," it did use the term "medical ramifications of the rape tratima," 97
which would appear to be the same thing.
The strongest affirmation of the validity of rape trauma syndrome prior to Marks
and Saldana was presented by justice Larsen of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in his
dissenting opinion in In the Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape. 98 While representing
the views of only one member of the Pennsylvania court, Justice Larsen's comments have
been quoted' with approval in many subsequent cases. 99
 The question in that case was
whether there existed or should be created a privilege to allow a rape counseling clinic
to refuse to allow a defendant charged with rape to examine the clinic's files concerning
the rape complainant. The majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that no
such privilege existed and that none should be created. In dissent, Justice Larsen ex-
plained at length the origin and symptoms of rape trauma syndrome as part and parcel
of his argument that a privilege was necessary." Like the position of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Board, 101 Justice Larsen's position
in In 77te Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape constituted judicial notice of rape trauma
syndrome.
While the aforementioned cases dealt with the use of evidence to establish lack of
consent, there is another impo -rtant line of authority that began before Marks and Saldana
that addresses the use of expert testimony regarding a complainant's post-rape condition
or behavior to explain seemingly unusual behavior of a complainant after the alleged
crime. The case which was the beginning of this line of authority was State v. Harwood, 102
decided by the Oregon Court of Appeals in 1980. In that case the child complainant
testified that the illegal sexual acts occurred while she was asleep. This was obviously
unusual testimony, since if she had been asleep, how would she have known the attacks
occurred? To refute this argument, the state called a social worker with substantial
experience working with sexually abused children to testify that it was not uncommon
for children to perceive and remember that sexual acts occurred during sleep. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that the testimony constituted an impermissible expert bolstering
of the complainant's credibility. The court held that expert testimony can be admissible
if it goes to the ability of the witness to perceive, remember or relate, which this evidence
did. Moreover, the court found that the evidence was helpful to the average juror because
such juror would not have experience dealing with sexually abused children.m 3 Although
this case involved a child complainant, evidence to explain unusual behavior of an adult
complainant has been met with judicial approval. 1 °1
0 Id. One glaring defect in the court's analysis is that the psychological trauma of rape for a
male has never been systematically studied. There is no support for the claim that a male can suffer
from rape trauma syndrome, although it intuitively seems likely that a male would suffer similar
symptoms.
98 494 Pa. 15, 38-43, 428 A.2d 126, 138-40 (1981) (Larson, J., dissenting).
99 See, e.g., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 n.1 (Minn. 1982); State v. Middleton, 294
Or. 427, 436 n.8, 657 P.2(1 1215, 1220 n.8 (1983).
100
 494 Pa. at 38-43, 428 A.2d at 138-40 (Larson, J., dissenting).
11' 1 76 N.J. 368, 388, 388 A.2d 206, 216 (1978).
102
 45 Or. App. 931, 609 P.2d 1312 (1980).
0, Id. at 939-40, 609 P.2d at 1317.
104 The State u. Harwood line of authority also appears to have been used as authority for the
admission of testimony regarding the typical characteristics of sexually abused children,
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IV. STATE V. MARKS AND STATE V. SALDANA: THE FIRST GENERATION OF CASES
The question of the admissibility of expert testimony concerning rape trauma syn-
drome on the consent issue was first fully examined at the appellate level in two cases
in different jurisdictions in the summer of 1982. The first case was State v. Marks,'"
decided by the Kansas Supreme Court on July 16, 1982. The second case was Stale v.
Saldana,m decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court on August 31, 1982. The question
appears to have been assessed independently by the two courts, since the Saldana court
did not cite the Marks case in its decision. 107 The cases reached diametrically opposite
results, with the Kansas Supreme Court in Marks holding that such expert testimony is
admissible,'" and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Saldana deciding that the testimony
is not admissible except in "unusual cases" such as sexual assault cases where the alleged
victim is a child or is mentally retarded,'"
In the Marks case, the defendant was charged with rape and aggravated sodomy.
His defense was that the complainant had consented to the sexual activities. Two weeks
after the alleged rape the complainant was examined by a doctor who, in addition to
practicing psychiatry and teaching, was board certified in psychiatry, forensic psychiatry
and neurology. The state called this doctor as a witness at trial. The doctor testified that
rape trauma syndrome was a specific type of post-traumatic stress disorder' 10 and out-
lined the symptoms of the syndrome. He then testified that he was of the opinion that
the complainant had been the victim of "a frightening assault, an attack" 111 and that. she
was suffering from the post-traumatic stress disorder known as rape trauma syndrome.
The defendant objected on two bases: first, that the testimony invaded the province of
the jury; and second, that the opinion was based on inadmissible hearsay. 112
The court rejected the argument that the testimony invaded the province of the
jury. First, the court stated that if the presence of rape trauma syndrome is detectable
and reliable as evidence that a forcible assault occurred, then it is relevant evidence when
a defendant argues that the victim consented to sexual activities. Thus, according to the
Kansas court, the admission of rape trauma syndrome evidence does not invade the
province of the jury since it is merely offered as any other evidence, with the expert
105 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
" 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
L 07 Indeed, it is clear that the Saldana court was unaware of the Marks decision, because the
Saldana court stated that the only case it discovered where no error was found in admitting similar
evidence was State v. Le Brun, 37 Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978). See Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at
230 n.3.
'"" 231 Kan. at 654-56, 647 P.2d at 1299-1300.
l" 324 N.W.2d at 230-31.
11 " See supra text accompanying notes 43-50 for a discussion of post-traumatic stress disorder.
"' Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
The resolution of the hearsay question is not of as much interest as the resolution of the
invading the province of the jury objection inasmuch as the hearsay objection was based upon a
peculiarity of Kansas law which does not exist under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Kansas,
physicians may only base their opinions upon matters within their personal knowledge, or upon
evidence otherwise admissible in the case, Klein v. Wells, 194 Kan. 528, 539, 400 P.2d 1002, 1012
(1965), unlike under the Federal Rules where an expert can base an opinion upon otherwise
inadmissible hearsay. FED. R. Evil). 703. The Marks court held that the history given to the doctor
by the complainant, upon which he relied, was independently admitted through the testimony of
the complainant and thus did not violate the Kansas rule. 231 Kan. at 655, 647 P.2d at 1300.
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subject to cross-examination, and the jury left to determine its weight." 3
 The second
stage of the court's reasoning answered in the affirmative the question of whether rape
trauma syndrome was detectable and reliable. The Kansas court noted that even though
the identification of rape trauma syndrome is a relatively new psychiatric development,
examination of the literature "clearly demonstrates" that rape trauma syndrome is gen-
erally accepted to be a common reaction to sexual assault.'" After citing seven sources
constituting the "literature"" 5
 that it was relying upon, the court held, "[a]s such, qual-
ified expert psychiatric testimony regarding the existence of rape trauma syndrome is
relevant and admissible in a case such as this where the defense is consent."" 9
The Marks decision is remarkable for the brevity of its discussion and the seeming
ease with which the Kansas Supreme Court reached its holding on this important, novel
evidentiary issue. Subsequent courts which discussed the issue have found the resolution
of it far more difficult than did the Marks court. In part, this has resulted because as the
issue has become more well known, defense counsel have begun to develop more per-
suasive arguments against the admissibility of the testimony.
A month and a half after Marks, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Saldana in
which it held that except possibly in extraordinary cases where the complainant is a child
or mentally retarded, rape trauma syndrome testimony is inadmissible."? In that case,
Saldana had been charged with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. Ten days
after the alleged assault, the complainant began counseling with the director of a victims'
assistance program, who held a bachelor's degree in psychology and social work. This
counseling -continued for approximately ten weeks. At trial the defendant admitted that
the intercourse had taken place, but claimed that it had been consensual. In rebuttal the
state presented the testimony of the counselor. The counselor explained symptoms of
rape victims generally and described the complainant's reactions as she had observed
them. She then testified that it was not unusual that the complainant did not report the
incident until the following day and stated that the complainant was the victim of
"acquaintance rape." Finally, she testified that she did not believe that the complainant
had fantasized or made up the story. The exact objections raised at trial by the defendant
to this testimony are not apparent from the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision. 18
In examining the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence, the court began
its analysis with Rule 702 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, which is identical to
Federal Rule 702. The court stated that to be admissible under that rule, expert testimony
must be helpful to the jury." 9
 It then noted that if the jury is in as good a position to
reach a decision on the issue in question as is the expert, the testimony is not helpful. 120
For the next step in the analysis, the court relied on Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403,
which is identical to Federal Rule 403, and which provided that even if the testimony
would be helpful, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfairly prejudicing, confusing or misleading the jury. 12,
 Having set
115 231 Kan. at 654, 647 P.2d at 1299.
"4 Id.
"5 Id.
' 16 1d.
117 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
lig See id. at 229.
" 2 Id.
' 2° Id.
121 Id.
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forth the standards for analysis the court then discussed separately three facets of the
counselor's testimony: first, the general discussion of rape trauma syndrome; second,
the opinion that the complainant had been raped; and third, the opinion that the
complainant had not fantasized the rape. 12
As to the counselor's general testimony about rape trauma syndrome, the court held
that it was improperly admitted."' The court's reasoning is based on a combination of
four different evidentiary objections. First, although couched in terms of "helpfulness"
rather than relevancy, the court decided that the testimony was not relevant "because
evidence of reactions of other people does not assist the jury in its fact finding func-
tion." 124 That is, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, simply because other people
who have been raped have experienced these symptoms, this fact does not make it any
more or less likely that the reason the complainant was suffering from these symptoms
was because she had been raped. Second, the court found that the evidence was of no
help to the jury since the jury was in as good a position as the expert to decide whether
a rape had occurred.' 25 Third, the court concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice
was great because of the scientific nature of the evidence creating an "aura of special
reliability and trustworthiness." 126 Finally, on the basis of the Minnesota version of the
Frye rule, 127 which requires scientific evidence to be generally accepted in the scientific
community before being admissible, the court held that the syndrome "is not the type
of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has occurred."' 28
The court stated that the syndrome was "not a fact finding tool, but a therapeutic tool." 129
It then held, "[t]he scientific evaluation of rape trauma syndrome has not reached a level
of reliability that surpasses the quality of common sense evaluation present in jury
deliberations.""° The court cited no literature in support of this conclusion. The one
specific criticism which the court leveled at rape trauma syndrome evidence was that:
"[t]he characteristic symptoms may follow any psychologically traumatic event. American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 236 (3d ed.
1980). At best, the syndrome describes only symptoms that occur with some frequency,
but makes no pretense of describing every single case."'"
The Minnesota court then moved to the second segment of the counselor's testimony,
her opinion that the complainant had been raped. The court again stated that the
primary criterion for admissibility is helpfulness, but then pointed out that the advisory
committee note to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 704, which allows an opinion on the
ultimate issue, states that opinions involving a legal analysis or mixed questions of law
l" Although the counselor had not used the term "rape trauma syndrome," the court noted
that her testimony essentially was an explanation of rape trauma syndrome. Id.
'" Id. at 230.
' 24 Id.
125 Id .
126 Id.
in Id. The famous Frye "general acceptance" rule was articulated in Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.G, Cir. 1923). For an in-depth discussion of the Frye rule, see infra text accompanying
notes 252-350. Minnesota adopted the Frye rule in State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209,220-21,52
N.W,2d 458,464-65 (1952).
1" 324 N.W.2d at 229.
' 29 Id. at 230.
'so
' 3 ' Id. at 229-30.
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and fact are deemed to be of no use to the jury. 192 The court then reviewed authority
on this issue, stating that a majority of courts that had considered the issue had held
that the admission of a doctor's opinion that rape or sexual assault had occurred is
error,'" while courts in a few other jurisdictions had permitted a doctor who had
physically examined a complaining witness shortly after the alleged rape to give an
opinion that the sexual intercourse was not voluntary. , " The court then noted that the
counselor's testimony constituted error under the majority rule and further, because the
counselor was not a physician and had never physically examined the complainant, and
did not meet the complainant until ten days after the alleged rape, the admission of the
testimony constituted error even under the minority rule.'"
Having reached the conclusion that the evidence was inadmissible on the basis of
this authority, the court then went on to discuss together three reasons why the evidence
was not admissible under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. First, the evidence was not
helpful because the jury was equally capable of considering the evidence and coming to
its own opinion)" Second, because the testimony was a legal conclusion, it was of no
use to the jury. 137 Finally, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value
because of the "stamp of scientific legitimacy" that the opinion gave to the truth of the
complaining witness's testimony.'"
The court then moved to the third segment of the counselor's testimony, her opinion
that the complainant had not fantasized the rape. The court categorized this testimony
as an expert opinion concerning the complainant's credibility and stated the general rule
that expert opinions on. the credibility of witnesses are not allowed except in "unusual
cases" such as when a sexual assault case involves an alleged victim who is a child or
mentally retarded. Having set forth this general principle, the court held the testimony
inadmissible for three reasons: first, this was not an "unusual case" falling within the
exception; second, the counselor had no medical education or training to enable her to
determine whether a person was fantasizing; and third, the counselor was simply stating
her opinion that the complainant had been telling the truth, the determination of which
is within the sole province of the jury. 139
The Saldana decision is curious in two respects. The first is the lack of citation of
scientific literature prior to the court's reaching the conclusion that rape trauma syn-
132 Id, at 230.
i"Id. at 231. The court cited five cases that have already been discussed in this article. Id. at
231 n.5. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
' 14 324 N.W.2d at 231. The court cited three cases that have already been discussed in this
article. Id. at 231 n.6. See supra notes 68,78-81.
' 15 It should be noted that although some of the cases cited do support the court's holding, the
manner in which the cases were analyzed and categorized does not reflect careful legal reasoning.
As already demonstrated, the cases do not appear to establish "majority and minority" positions;
rather, the two lines of cases represent two different conclusions based upon two different types of
fact situations, with one line of decisions holding that a physician's testimony in the form of an
opinion that the complainant had been raped is admissible when based solely upon a physical
examination, and the other line of cases holding that such an opinion is inadmissible if also based
upon the emotional condition of the complainant or statements made to the physician by the
complainant.
sb 324 N.W.2d at 231.
'" Id,
sa Id.
Id. at 231-32.
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drome was not generally accepted in the scientific community. The second is the way in
which the court revealed the conclusion that the testimony was inadmissible. While it is
clear from the Minnesota court's opinion that it was strenuously opposed to the admission
of rape trauma syndrome evidence, the reasoning of the court is unclear, conclusory,
and reveals no in-depth analysis of the literature.
In summary, the first set of battle lines regarding the admissibility of rape trauma
syndrome testimony was set by the end of the summer of 1982. Subsequent cases will
show, however, that substantial skirmishes have occurred outside the originally drawn
battle lines.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME AFTER MARKS AND SALDANA
A. Behavioral Scientific Research
Since 1982, behavioral science researchers have conducted more detailed studies of
specific symptoms occurring in rape victims. Moreover, researchers have sought to
determine the most descriptive general labels to attach to these symptoms that are more
specific than the general description of PTSD, but also, due to the long lasting effects
of rape trauma, do not fall neatly into the category of crisis theory.
During 1982 three studies appeared, all of which dealt specifically with the long
term effects of rape. One analyzed the persistence of overall effects on the victim one to
two and one-half years after the rape, 140 while the other two focused on the persistence
of specific symptoms — fear and depression."'
The first study was based on follow-up interviews of forty-one rape victims one to
two and one-half years following the rape.'" Based on the researchers' analysis of the
literature which discussed rape response in terms of crisis theory, they concluded that
crisis theory is useful only for analyzing the initial period of disequilibrium associated
with rape. The long-term consequences are more easily comprehended when equated
with post-traumatic stress disorder because "the effects of exposure to a severely stressful
event may persist for many years."'"
Results of this study indicated that seventy-five percent of the victims still experi-
enced feelings of fear and distrust of others. Fifty percent continued to fear being alone;
forty-one percent expressed persistent depressive feelings; and one quarter of the more
than fifty percent who complained of having current sexual problems reported complete
avoidance of any sexual relationship since the rape.' 44
The second study, which focused on fear and anxiety reactions of victims, supported
the findings of previous studies that fear reactions can be severe and long lasting,
becoming chronic in nature.'" In fact, the study indicated that they may be the longest
Nadelson, Notman, Zackson & Gornick, A Follow-Up Study of Rape Victims, 139 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1266 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Follow- Up Study].
141 See Calhoun, Atkeson & Resick, A Longitudinal Examination of Fear Reactions in Victims of Rape,
29 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 655 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fear Reactions]; Atkeson, Calhoun,
Resick & Ellis, Victims of Rape: Repeated Assessment of Depressive Symptoms, 50 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 96 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Repeated Depressive Symptoms].
'" Follow - Up Study, supra note 140.
14 s /d. at 1267.
144 Id.
149 Fear Reactions, supra note 141.
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lasting of all the associated after-effects of rape. Data for the study was based on the
participants' scores on the Modified Fear Survey Schedule. In this study, one hundred
fifteen victims were assessed at six intervals ranging from two weeks to one year post-
rape and their scores were compared with those of a matched control group of nonvictims
as well as three additional victim groups assessed only once to control the effects of
repeated testing."" The results showed that the overall fearfulness of victims was signif-
icantly higher than that of nonvictims at each of the assessment intervals, although the
differences between the groups had decreased by one year post-rape. Repeated testing
had little effect on the participants' scores, suggesting that even if testing had some
therapeutic effect, fear reactions of rape victims remain high regardless of the number
of times they are tested.
The assessment measure administered also provided a score for "rape fears," based
upon responses to forty-two items on the Modified Fear Survey Schedule. The fears
indicated by the rape victims were significantly higher than for nonvictims. The test
scores were also analyzed to ascertain what specific fears were more disturbing to victims
than nonvictims. During the early assessment intervals, highly feared items were those
classified as rape cues and attack vulnerability cues, including weapons, male genitals,
darkness, and being alone. Over time, rape-precipitated concerns such as fear of venereal
disease and pregnancy, and fear of testifying in court, became the most highly feared
items. 147 •
The results of this study were significant first because they provided more sophis-
ticated research support For prior findings that fear is a common reaction among rape
victims. Second, they identified specific fears unique to rape trauma, which persist over
time, thereby adding credence to the argument that rape trauma syndrome is a specif-
ically identifiable form of PTSD.
The same participants in the foregoing study were assessed in the third significant
1982 study, which focused on depressive symptoms in rape victims. 148 The structure of
the study was identical to the fear reaction study except that the results were based on
the scores which were derived from two assessment measures and an interview with the
participants. In addition to assessing the incidence, severity, and duration of depressive
symptoms, the researchers also examined various demographic, assault, and pre-rape
functioning variables in an attempt to ascertain their predictive ability with respect to
the occurrence of depressive symptoms. The results indicated that most rape victims
exhibit significantly greater depressive symptoms than do nonvictims during the initial
assessment periods. While the symptoms of most victims return to normal levels by four
months post-rape, some victims continue to exhibit depressive symptoms even one year
after the rape. 16
' 45 1d.
147 Id.
18 Repeated Depressive Symptoms, supra note 141.
149
 The external variable analysis indicated that this persistence of depressive symptoms can be
predicted. Specifically, age and socioeconomic status predict that older and poorer victims may
continue to experience depression even one year following the rape. Pre-rape functioning variables
tended to he good predictors of continued depressive symptoms, with the results of the study
suggesting that victims with prior psychological problems are more apt to exhibit signs of depression
longer and with greater severity than other victims. Also of interest is that depressive symptoms
diminished more quickly in victims who were assessed at all six intervals than in single testing
victims. This suggests, once again, that repeated assessment may have a therapeutic effect and one
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An article summarizing the research on the long term effects of rape found that
while there were very few studies that examined symptoms appearing during or con-
tinuing into the second phase or long term reorganization process of rape trauma
syndrome, such studies began to show the emergence of coping patterns in rape victims
as well as to provide a framework for understanding the victim's trauma, thereby en-
hancing her recovery.'" The article discussed and provided an analysis of several studies
which were conducted between 1979 and 1982 by various researchers,''' and stated that:
Idlespite differences in focus, design, sample size, and population, the studies typically
report that 20 to 30 percent of the victims recover within a month [following the rape]
... while 70 to 80 percent experience problems attributable to the rape for varying
periods of time, sometimes lasting many years."I 52 With respect to specific areas of focus,
the studies indicated that rape-related fears and sexual dysfunctioning are two symptoms
unique to rape trauma which continue to persist in many victims after the attack.
In 1983 a study was undertaken to determine whether the level of trauma experi-
enced by rape victims during the acute phase of rape trauma syndrome is affected by
attack variables, victim's demographics and social support systems, or prior life stresses.'"
Results were based on interviews with 326 rape victims during their initial visit to a rape
treatment center. While ninety-eight percent of the victims were emotionally traumatized
as a result of the rape, the degree of trauma varied considerably according to the effect
of the different variables.'" The sexual assault variables revealed that only physical
injury is significantly related to the degree of the trauma experienced. The preexisting
life stresses variable supported the findings of previous research in this area that signif-
icant life changes or no life changes prior to the rape evoke more severe trauma, while
minor life changes facilitate coping behavior. The nature of the victim's support system
variable revealed that married women were the most severely traumatized, with single
women living alone constituting the second highest trauma level group. An analysis of
the demographic variables indicated that older, noncaucasian, married victims were the
most highly traumatized.'"
might conclude that the sooner and more frequently a rape victim receives counseling, the quicker
the incidence and severity of depressive symptoms will subside.
' 5° Ferris, Long-Term Consequences of Adult Rape, RESPONSES, Jam—Feb. 1983, at 5.
' 3 ' Most of these studies have already been discussed in this article. See AFrEumATH, supra note
37; Follow-Up Study, supra note 140; Changing Patterns of Fear, supra note 41; Burgess & Holmstrom,
Life Stresses, supra note 33.
1 " Ferris, supra note 150, at. 6.
153 Ruch & Chandler, Sexual Assault Trauma During the Acute Phase: An Exploratory Model and
Multivariate Analysis, 24 J, HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 174 (1983).
' 54 Id.
' 55 Id. This study was significant because its results indicated the emergence of several types of
high-risk victims. A secondary, but perhaps more important aspect of the study was that it tends to
negate prevailing stereotypes about rape victims: 1) that the trauma experienced is, or should be,
greater when the rape involves strangers, multiple assailants, or weapons; and 2) that "marriage
[is] a protective harbor for women." Id.
The debate concerning whether rape trauma syndrome is more properly characterized as
PTSD or in terms of a crisis theory continued during this period. However, none of the disputants
questioned the validity of rape trauma syndrome. Recognition by the medical profession of PTSD
has prompted some researchers to suggest alternative methods for treatment of rape victims other
than crisis intervention. See Koss, The Scope of Rape: Implications for the Clinical Treatment of Victims,
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST Summer 1983, at 88; Kilpatrick, Rape Victims: Detection, Assessment & Treat-
ment, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Summer 1983, at 92. Because rape is defined as a stressor causing
1168	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:1143
A recent survey of 2000 women revealed that forty-four percent of those who were
rape victims had at one time seriously contemplated suicide.' 56 This revelation supported
the finding that, among crime victims, rape "cause[es] the most severe mental conse-
quences." 157 Psychological damage to victims is suffered in direct proportion to the
amount of personal violation that occurs. Therefore, the victims of sexual assaults, and
rape in particular, usually suffer the greatest amount of psychological damage when
compared with other crime victims.
The 1985 edition of a major psychiatric textbook utilized by the psychiatric
prolession 158 reemphasized the recognized status of PTSD, noting that official recogni-
tion of the disorder by the medical profession in general "has been minimal, late in
arriving and long overdue." 159 The text also stated, in describing the effects of rape on
the rape victim, that "[m]any women experience the symptoms of a post traumatic stress
disorder." 16° As a result of the assault "[t]he victim experiences a physical and psycho-
logical trauma . . .." 161
The research since 1982 supports the basic findings emerging from the early studies
that rape causes a trauma in its victims that is characterized by commonly occurring
symptoms, namely, fear, depression, and guilt, as manifested by more specific symptoms
such as eating and sleeping disturbances and more difficulty in social interaction. Indeed,
although the early studies suffered from methodological deficiencies, their conclusions
have been abundantly supported by every subsequent, more sophisticated study. It is
fair to conclude that rape trauma syndrome is commonly accepted by that segment of
the scientific community that is ultimately involved with rape victims. The medical
PTSD and because rape victims exhibit many of the symptoms of that disorder, it has been suggested
that clinicians familiarize themselves with PTSD and be alert that many of the common symptoms
appearing in rape victims which are associated with PTSD may not emerge until many months or
even years after the rape. See Koss, supra, at 88. While an understanding of PTSD is obviously
helpful to persons treating rape victims, it does not speak to some of the rape-specific symptoms
suffered by victims. As has been previously noted, rape victims appear to experience a multitude
of identifiable characteristics, many of which are unique to the rape experience.
One researcher expressly rejects the idea that rape evokes a crisis reaction. Resick, The Trauma
of Rape and the Criminal Justice System, 9 jusT. Sys. J. 52 (1984). Her analysis of the rape victim
research, particularly the recent studies on long-term effects of rape, leads her to believe that crisis
theory is both inadequate and inaccurate to describe the common rape response. Because crisis
theory predicts emergence and resolution of the symptoms associated with a crisis reaction within
six to eight weeks of the trauma, it cannot be utilized to explain the persistence of symptoms beyond
this limited time frame. Also, crisis theory fails to explain the pattern of symptoms most frequently
occurring in rape victims — fear, anxiety. depression, sexual dysfunction, and loss of self-esteem.
This is because crisis theory is conceptualized as including only three interrelated factors: 1) a
hazardous event posing a threat to an individual; 2) an inability to adequately cope with the threat;
and 3) a resultant temporary disturbance in the threatened person's normal pattern of functioning.
In support of her rejection of crisis theory, the researcher proposes instead a cognitive-behavioral
theory upon which the common rape reaction can be based. However, research supporting this
theory (which focuses on classical conditioning as a possible explanation for why certain symptoms,
such as fear and anxiety, continue unabated for long periods after the rape) is minimal.
185 Stack, The Psychological Aflennath, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1985, at 48.
157 Id.
i " H, KAPLAN & B. SADDOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/
IV (1985).
156 1d. at 335.
' 50 1d. at 470.
161 Id.
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profession as a whole, through DSM-I II, has recognized rape trauma syndrome on the
more general level as a type of PTSD.
B. The Judiciary
1. On the Issue of Consent
After the decisions in Marks and Saldana, there was a lull in appellate court activity
regarding the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence on the issue of consent.
The only 1983 case decided on this issue was People v. Bledsoe 162 by the California Court
of Appeals. In this case the defendant admitted that intercourse had occurred but
claimed that it had been consensual. In rebuttal, the prosecution called a rape counselor
who explained the general characteristics of rape trauma syndrome and then opined
that the complainant was definitely suffering from that syndrome. With no citation of
authority, the court of appeals concluded that the testimony was relevant on the issue
of whether the rape occurred. The court noted that while the opinion undoubtedly
bolstered the testimony of the complainant, its main purpose was to impeach the defen-
dant's account of the incident and therefore the testimony was properly admitted. 1 "3
Even though the last half of 1982 and all of 1983 was a lull period for rape trauma
syndrome cases on the issue of consent, the year of 1984 was the beginning of a "boom"
period for such appellate decisions, the end of which is not in sight. This dramatic
increase in judicial scrutiny of the rape trauma syndrome issue began with the decision
of the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Taylor in January, 1984. 164 In that case the
prosecution presented during its case-in-chief the testimony of a psychiatrist who ex-
plained the general characteristics of rape trauma syndrome. He then testified that as a
result of his examination of the complainant three months after the alleged rape, she
displayed forty of the fifty recognized manifestations of the syndrome. He further
testified that the complainant was not fantasizing when she described the rape and that
she would not be capable of feigning the symptoms. He concluded by testifying that he
could see no reason why consensual intercourse would cause such symptoms. The
defendant objected to the testimony for lack of foundation, lack of relevance, opinion
based upon inadmissible hearsay, and invasion of the province of the jury.
The Missouri court reviewed the decisions in Marks, Saldana and the California
Court of Appeals decision in Bledsoe. The court then set forth the two-part test to
determine the admissibility of this evidence. The test first examined whether the evidence
was relevant, and second, whether its relevance was outweighed by its tendency to create
undue prejudice in the minds of the jurors. 165 Without citation to case authority, the
court then equated this balancing test with a form of the Frye test for scientific evidence,
stating that the test was "more accurately expressed in terms of the soundness of the
scientific basis on which it rests, rather than its tendency, if taken as true, to prove the
fact in issue." 66
 The court then held that it was apparent that the doctor's statements
162 140 Cal. App. 3d 267 (opinion omitted), 189 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1983).
163
 189 Cal. Rptr. at 730. This decision was subsequently disapproved by the California Supreme
Court in mid-1984. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 1 3 .2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). For a discussion of
the California Supreme Court opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 180-87.
1114 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984).
1 65 Id. at 240.
166 Id.
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were "not sufficiently based on a scientific technique, which is either parochially accepted
or rationally sound, to overcome the inherent danger of prejudice created by his status
as an ex pert."' 67
 The reasons supporting this holding are far from clear and the opinion
itself appears to contain two major contradictions. First, in contradiction to the holding,
the court earlier in its opinion stated, "[Iliterature covering the treatment of the psychi-
atric consequences of rape supports Doctor Amanat's testimony that rape trauma syn-
drome is generally accepted as a commop reaction to sexual assault."'" Second, the court
indicated that the doctor would have been competent to explain the general symptoms
of the syndrome and to have given an opinion that the complainant's symptoms were
consistent with a stressful sexual experience, 169
 while earlier in the opinion the court
had indicated that such limited testimony would not be relevant.'"
Another troublesome aspect of the Taylor court's opinion is that it inferred' that the
psychiatrist's testimony included an opinion that the complainant had been raped by the
defendant, and then held that the expert was not competent to render such an opinion.
The court stated, "Doctor Amanat was permitted to state that the prosecutrix suffered
from rape trauma syndrome and further comment, albeit implicitly, that she was in fact
raped at Mary's Moonlight Lounge.""' Later in the opinion, the court stated, "But it
goes beyond his qualifications to say that she was raped by defendant at Mary's Moonlight
Lou nge."' 12
 Yet from the doctor's testimony it is clear that the doctor did not directly
opine that the complainant was raped at Mary's Moonlight Lounge, or that she was
raped by the defendant. Thus, although one of the court's major conclusions — that the
doctor had no expertise to opine that complainant had been raped at a particular time
and place by a particular person — is undoubtedly correct, it seems that in order to
reach that result the court bad to imply statements that were never made by the witness
from the witness stand.
The court gave several other reasons in support of its holding that the psychiatrist
had gone too far in expressing his opinion that the complainant had been raped by the
defendant in Mary's Moonlight Lounge. First, it found the term "rape trauma syndrome"
to have inherently prejudicial implications in that it suggests that the syndrome may
only be caused by rape, 13 The court also stated that the doctor's conclusion "vouches
too much for the victim's credibility and supplies verisimilitude for her on the critical
issue of whether defendant did rape her." 174
 The court commented that the psychiatrist's
opinion that the complainant did not fantasize the rape was an express opinion about
her credibility and that the testimony had been invested with an illegitimate "scientific
cachet."' 75
 All in all, the court concluded that the "peril of prejudice and confusion
resulting from the opinion testimony substantially outweighs any probative value that it
might have."'"
' 67
 Id.
' 6' Id. at 237.
169 Id. at 241.
' 71) Id. at 240.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 241.
' 73 Id. at 240.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 241.
' 7" Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals relied on Taylor in summarily reversing a conviction in
February, 1984. See State v. Nobles, 665 S.W.2d. 694, 695 (Mo. App. 1984). However, in March,
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Danietskim in June, 1984 dealt directly
with evidence of typical characteristics of sexually abused children and indirectly with
rape trauma syndrome, when it held that testimony regarding "familial sexual abuse
syndrome" was indistinguishable for evidentiary purposes from rape trauma syndrome
and thus was inadmissible on the basis of Saldana.'" The court further noted that this
case did not fall within the exception for "unusual cases" involving children since the
child in this case was now seventeen years old and fully capable of testifying. 19
The next appellate activity regarding rape trauma syndrome is the important opin-
ion by the California Supreme Court in People v. Bledsoe.'" The California Supreme
Court disagreed with the California Court of Appeals' decision approving the admission
of rape trauma syndrome testimony)" The basis for the California Supreme Court's
holding was that rape trauma evidence did not meet the Frye general acceptance stan-
dard. While acknowledging that rape trauma syndrome was generally accepted by the
scientific community from which it arose for therapeutic purposes, the court held that it
was not generally accepted by that community to prove that a rape had occurred, which was
the purpose for which the prosecution offered it at trial.' 82 Thus, unlike fingerprints,
blood tests, lie detector tests, voiceprints, or the battered child syndrome, the court
found that rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the truth or accuracy
of a particular past event.'" The court noted that unlike the battered child syndrome,
rape trauma syndrome "does not consist of a relatively narrow set of criteria or symptoms
whose presence demonstrates that the client or patient has been raped; rather, as the
counselor in this case testified, it is an 'umbrella' concept, reflecting the broad range of
emotional trauma experienced by clients of rape counselors." 184 The court then con-
cluded. by stating that evidence of the severe emotional distress experienced by the
•
1984, the Missouri Court of Appeals let stand a rape conviction where two physicians had testified
in very general terms that rape victims often have psychological damage that may last for a long
ticne..Neither of the physicians had ever examined the complainant. See State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d
138, 140 (Mo. App. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 154 (1984). There was, however, testimony from
the complainarit's mother that the complainant had been suffering mental and emotional problems
over adiree-yea .r period after the alleged rape. The court noted that, lit] is common knowledge
that a violent crime can cause changes in the mental condition of a person. Where, as here, the
evidence shows that the change was caused by the crime, we think it is some evidence that the crime
occurred." Id. at 141. The court then held that the experts' contribution was on such a general
level as to not raise the dangers seen by the Missouri Supreme Court in Taylor, particularly its view
of the fact that the term "rape trauma syndrome" was never mentioned and no opinion was given
that the_ complainant had been raped. Id. at 144. It was the court's opinion that the testimony was
so general that it was "unlikely that this told the jurors any more than they already knew." Id. Thus
the conviction was affirmed. Also in March, 1984, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that testimony
by a detective who testified that he had investigated 200 rapes during his career and that the
complainant's appearance and behavior were consistent with a lot of earlier victims, to which
testimony the defendant did not make proper objection, did not constitute plain error and thus
the conviction would be affirmed. State v. Thompson, 668 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Mo. App. 1984).
177 350 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. App. 1984).
1" Id. at 397,
' 79 Id. at 398.
189 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
"'See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
182 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
' 55 Id. at 249, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
184 Id. at 250, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rpm at 460.
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complainant, both immediately following the attack and in the subsequent weeks, was
admissible. The expert opinion based on that evidence, however, was inadmissible be-
cause the lay jurors were fully competent to consider the evidence and determine whether
a rape had occurred. The court noted that permitting a person in the role of an expert
to suggest that because the complainant exhibits some symptoms of rape trauma syn-
drome the victim was therefore raped, unfairly prejudiced the defendant by creating an
aura of special reliability and trustworthiness. 185
Having held the testimony inadmissible, however, the court held that the error was
not so prejudicial as to require reversal because the prosecution's case against the defen-
dant was very strong, while the rape trauma syndrome testimony "in truth ... did little
more than provide the jury with information that it either already had or that was not
particularly pertinent to the facts of this case." 186 The court did not see fit to explain
how such innocuous evidence could possibly have unfairly prejudiced the appellant, as
was stated earlier in its opinion.'"
The next court to tackle the issue was the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Liddell
in July, 1984. 188 In that rape prosecution, the defendant objected to rape trauma syn-
drome testimony by a psychiatric nurse on the basis that it was not the proper subject
for expert testimony, it was highly prejudicial, it caused confusion and misled the jury,
it was not a proper subject for expert opinion, and the psychiatric nurse was not qualified
to render an opinion as to the defendant's state of mind. The court rejected all of these
arguments and ruled that the evidence had been properly admitted. The court found
that the testimony would aid the jury and thus was a proper subject for expert opinion.' 89
The court held that the evidence did not confuse or mislead the jury, since "[ajny relevant
evidence which tends to support the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue can only
aid the jury determination, not mislead and confuse."' 99 The court found that the only
prejudice to the defendant was that the evidence supported the state's case, which did
not constitute "unfair" prejudice. 19 '
An equally significant aspect of Liddell is the court's rejection of the defendant's
argument that the trial court erred by refusing to compel the complainant to be examined
by the defendant's psychologist. 192 Inexplicably, the Montana Supreme Court resorted
to Rule 35(a) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure 193 and pointed out that the rule
allowed the mental or physical examination only of a party, not of a witness. The court
then added, "[t]he rape-trauma syndrome evidence was admissible as evidence relevant
to the question of whether there had or had not been intercourse without the victim's
'" Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
186 /d. at 252, 681 P.2d at 301-02, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
1 g7 In a companion case decided on the same day, People v. Stanley, 36 Cal. 3d 253, 681 P.2d
302, 203 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1984), the California Supreme Court held that there had been no sufficient
objection to preserve the Frye argument regarding the lack of general scientific acceptance of the
rape trauma syndrome evidence and that even if the objection had been properly made, admission
of the testimony did nut constitute plain error so as to require reversal. Id. at 260-61, 681 P.2d at
307, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
1" 	Mont. __, 685 P.2d 918 (1984).
189 Id. at	 685 P.2d at 923.
190 Id .
poi Id .
192 Id. at	 685 P.2d at 924.
1 " There is no indication in the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure that they are applicable in
criminal cases.
September 1985]	 RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME	 1173
consent. The act was at issue, not the victim's state of mind."'" This last sentence is, of
course, hard to understand since it was not the act of intercourse that was at issue, the
act having been admitted, but rather, the victim's state of mind — consenting or not
consenting — at the time of the act. Nonetheless, the court determined that because the
victim was not a party and her state of mind was not at issue, it was proper for the trial
court to refuse to order her to be examined by the defendant's psychologist.
The majority was taken to task by dissenting Justice Morrison on this last point.' 95
Justice Morrison argued that if rape trauma syndrome testimony is to be allowed then
a full opportunity must be accorded the defendant to rebut the testimony, which would
involve permitting a doctor or other qualified person to examine the complainant and
provide the saute opportunity for testimony that is given to the prosecution. 195
The Kansas Supreme Court revisited the rape trauma syndrome in two cases decided
on the same day in October, 1984, State v. McQuillen' 97 and State v. Bresstaan.'" In State
v. McQuillen the defendant was charged with rape and aggravated sodomy and claimed
consent as a defense. In preparation for trial the state had the complainant examined
by a psychiatrist to determine if she was suffering from rape trauma syndrome.'" The
trial court granted a motion in limine made by the defense to preclude the state's
psychiatrist from testifying concerning the complainant's experiencing rape trauma syn-
drome. The basis for the trial court's ruling was that the Kansas Supreme Court had
been wrong in Marks and that other opinions in other jurisdictions disallowing the
testimony were better reasoned.2" The trial court also held that admission of the testi-
mony would lead to a breach of the Kansas rape shield statute."'
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the trial court had been in error
in precluding the state's expert from testifying. 292 In the process of examining the cases
upon which the trial court had relied, mainly Saldana and Taylor, the court found that
"the common thread""5 in those cases was that the evidence offered by the expert "was
evidence affirming the rape by the defendanOcm as opposed to evidence simply generally
explaining the syndrome or testimony that the complainant had been raped without
specifying that she had been raped by any particular person. 205 The court then went on
to affirm the validity of the holding in Marks. In affirming Marks, the Kansas court
seemed to narrow the holding by intimating that while the psychiatrist could testify that
194 _ Mont. at	 685 IP.2d at 924.
't'' Id. at	 685 1).2d at 925 (Morrison, j., dissenting).
"Id. at	 685 P.2d at 925-26 (Morrisson, J., dissenting).
' 97 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984).
' 98 236 Kart. 296, 689 P.2d 901 (1984).
159 The defendant filed a [notion to compel the victim to submit to a similar examination by
the defendant's psychiatrist and the court granted the !notion. The complainant did not like the
defense psychiatrist, and. was uncooperative in granting interviews. This caused a delay in the
proceedings, which allowed the defendant to argue that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.
The speedy trial question will not be examined in this article.
^'"" McQuillan, 236 Kan. at 168-69, 689 1".2c1 at 827-28.
201 Id. at 169, 689 l'.2d at 828.
2112 Id. at 171, 689 P.2d at 829.
2" , Id. at 170, 689 1).2d at 828.
2*1 Id. at 170,689 1'.2d at 829.
205
 While this is a partially correct reading of Taylor, it is certainly not a correct reading of
Saldana. Saldana clearly held that the testimony is inadmissible even at a general level, and is simply
in contradiction to Marks. See supra text accompanying notes 123-31.
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the complainant was suffering from the traumatic stress disorder known as rape trauma
syndrome, he could not give an opinion that the victim was raped or that the stress
which caused her disorder was a rape. 206
The court next considered whether admitting testimony concerning rape trauma
syndrome would violate the Kansas rape shield statute. The defendant argued that
allowing the prosecution to present rape trauma syndrome evidence and permitting the
defense to have its experts examine the complainant to rebut that testimony would allow
the defense to bring out the prior sexual activity of the complainant through the defense
expert who would examine the complainant's prior sexual history in order to determine
whether she was suffering from rape trauma syndrome. The court's response to this
argument was that such rebuttal evidence would not allow wholesale admittance of the
victim's past sexual conduct unless that information was used by the state's expert to
make his determination of rape trauma syndrome. 207 The court then went on to state
that the defendant could not offer evidence that the complainant was not suffering from
rape trauma syndrome where the state had not first introduced evidence that the com-
plainant was suffering from rape trauma syndrome. The court stated:
There are no statistics to show that there is any value to a negative finding
that the rape trauma syndrome is not exhibited by the alleged victim. Neg-
ative evidence to be admissible must have some probative value. Where
consent is the defense in a prosecution for rape, expert testimony of the
absence of rape trauma syndrome is not-relevant or admissible. 208
The McQuillan opinion is also significant because of the indication by the Kansas court,
in contrast with the Montana Supreme Court in Liddell, that the defendant had an
absolute right to have a complainant examined by a defense expert if the prosecution
chose to use rape trauma syndrome testimony. 204
While the Kansas Supreme Court had been unanimous in its holding in Marks, two
justices dissented form the majority opinion in McQuillen. 21 :1 The two dissenters found
the reasoning in Saldana and Taylor to be more persuasive. Additionally, they disagreed
with the majority holding that a defendant may not present expert evidence that the
rape victim does not display signs of rape trauma syndrome unless the prosecution first
introduces evidence of this condition.
In State v. Bressman2 " the Kansas Supreme Court examined rape trauma syndrome
evidence in a different factual context. In Bressman, the defense was not consent, but
instead that no sexual activity had taken place at al1. 212 The state called an emergency
room doctor who testified that the complainant fell into one of three categories that the
doctor had noticed in treating rape complainants. The doctor's testimony was not in
terms of rape trauma syndrome as researched by behavioral scientists, but rather was
couched in terms of her own observations regarding the rape victims whom she had
counseled. The doctor then stated that in her opinion the complainant had been raped.
206
 McQuillan, 236 Kan. at 171, 689 P.2d at 829,
2"7 Id. at 172, 689 P.2d at 830.
2118 Id.
209 Id. at 167, 689 P.2d at 827.
210 Id. at 182, 689 P.2d at 836 (Miller, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
2" 236 Kan, 296, 689 P.2d 901 (1984).
212 Id. at 298, 689 P.2d at 904.
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The defendant argued that this testimony was without foundation and invaded the
province of the jury. The trial court overruled these objections, allowed the testimony,
and the defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the defendant for several rea-
sons. First, there was no showing that the doctor was an expert in the field of psychiatry. 212
Moreover, according to the court, there was no showing that the bases for her conclusions
were generally accepted in the field of psychiatry. 214 The court also determined that the
jury could properly assess the state of mind and actions of the complainant and therefore
expert testimony was not necessary. 215 Further, according to the court the testimony was
an improper bolstering of the complainant's testimony. 2 ' 6 Additionally, the court consid-
ered evidence of rape trauma syndrome irrelevant where the defense is something other
than consent. 217 Finally, the court found that the expert had gone beyond what was
allowed in Marks when she opined that the complainant had been raped, because Marks
restricted the expert psychiatric testimony to the victim's state of mind and the existence
of rape trauma syndrome. The court therefore reversed the conviction. 2 ' 8
Thus, in Bressman the Kansas Supreme Court clearly limited rape trauma syndrome
testimony to that of a psychiatrist who examines the complainant for the explicit purpose
of determining whether rape trauma syndrome exists, which testimony can only be used
in cases where consent is a defense. Further, there is a basis in the opinion itself to
question how useful rape trauma syndrome evidence will continue to be for the prose-
cution in Kansas in view of the court's holding that testimony was not helpful and the
jury could properly assess the state of mind and actions of the complainant by itself.
Both the Bressman and McQuillen cases show the Kansas Supreme Court struggling to
deal with the ramifications of the Marks decision. Further, both cases indicate a distinct
narrowing of the circumstances in which the court believes that the testimony should be
admissible.
The next state appellate decision to consider the rape trauma syndrome question
was Allewalt v. Stale, decided by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in February,
1985. 219 Again, the defendant's defense was that the complainant had consented to the
intercourse. In rebuttal, the state called a forensic psychiatrist who explained the general
characteristics of PTSD, of which rape trauma syndrome is a subcategory. He testified
that it was his opinion from his examination of the complainant three and one half
months after the alleged rape that she was suffering from rape trauma syndrome and
2 " Id. at 303, 689 P.2d at 907.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 303, 689 P.2d at 908.
516 Id. at 304, 689 P.2d at 908.
217
2 ' 6 1d.
219 61 Md. App. 503, 487 A.2d 664 (1985). Alletuaii was the most recent rape trauma syndrome
case at the time this article was written. Since then, an important rape trauma case has been decided
by the Arizona Supreme Court. A detailed discussion of that case is not undertaken in this article.
In State v. Huey, __Az. 699 P.2d 1290, 1293-94 (1985), the court approved the use of rape
trauma syndrome testimony on the issue of consent, disagreeing with the defense contention that
the testimony improperly invaded the province of the jury. The court based its approval upon its
agreement with the reasoning of the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647
P.2d 1292 (1982).
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that. the cause of this disorder was rape. The defendant objected to the testimony as not
being generally accepted in the pertinent scientific community, and as not relating to a
subject matter on which the jury needed expert assistance. The trial court overruled
these objections, allowed the testimony, and the defendant was convicted.
After reviewing the authorities on the subject, the appellate court held that although
the psychiatrist fulfilled the necessary qualifications to testify as an expert concerning
PTSD, and although the evidence was relevant as tending to support an inference of
lack of consent, the testimony should not have been admitted because its substantial
prejudicial impact outweighed its limited probative value."' The prejudicial impact
identified by the court partook of several evidentiary principles. First, the court reasoned
that although a diagnosis of PTSD does reliably indicate that the victim displays certain
symptoms, it does not reliably prove that those symptoms are a result of forced sexual
intercourse. 221 The court noted that this is particularly true since the evidence relied
upon by the physician in making the diagnosis assumes that the victim related what
actually happened, or at least what in her perception actually took place. The court then
noted that although testimony relaying information given to a doctor by a patient is
admissible under a hearsay exception on the theory that it is reliable because a person
seeking medical care will tell the truth to the doctor, information transmitted to a doctor
by a patient which would result in a diagnosis of PTSD "becomes less reliable because
it is more important that the individual ... believes that it took place. -222 Additionally,
the court stated that the testimony unduly corroborated the complainant's rendition of
the incident so as to lead to confusion of the issue being decided and create the perception
that no further fact-finding was necessary. Thus, the court concluded that admission of
the testimony constituted reversible error. 225 The court then noted that it did not have
to reach the question of whether the F?ye test applies to PTSD evidence. 224 The court's
statement is peculiar, since reliability of the evidence was a major concern of the courts,
and the reliability of scientific evidence is seen by most commentators to also be at the
heart of the Frye test.225
To summarize, expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome on the issue of
consent is admissible in two jurisdictions, Montana and Kansas. 226 In Montana, a properly
qualified expert need not be a psychiatrist, and the expert can testify about the general
characteristics of the syndrome, give the opinion that the complainant is suffering from
those symptoms, and give the opinion that those symptoms are a result of a rape. But
in Montana the defense has no right to a psychological examination of the complainant.
In Kansas, the only proper expert is a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist's testimony is limited
to a general explanation of the syndrome and an opinion that the complainant is
22 0 61 Md. App. at 514, 487 A.2d at 669.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 514 n.8, 487 A.2d at 669 n.8.
2" id. at 516, 487 A.2d at 670.
224
225 See infra text accompanying notes 314-19.
226 Rape trauma syndrome testimony has also been admitted in Oregon in State v. LeBrun, 37
Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978), but it is not possible to assert that the court was expressing
general approval of such testimony, since the only objection that was preserved for appeal was that
the expert was not competent. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. See also dikussion of the
Arizona case of State v. Huey in note 219.
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suffering from it. In Kansas, if the prosecution chooses to use rape trauma syndrome
testimony, the defense has a right to a psychological examination of the complainant.
Expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome on the issue of consent is clearly
bat-red in three jurisdictions: Minnesota, California and Maryland. Missouri also appar-
ently falls into this category, although the bar is less clear due to the Taylor court's
contradictory statements indicating that an expert could be properly qualified to testify
concerning the general characteristics of the syndrome, and that the complainant's
symptoms were consistent with the syndrome, but that such "limited" testimony would
not be relevant. 227
2. To Explain Unusual Behavior of the Complainant
Building on Slate v. florwood, 228 there have been several cases decided after Marks
and Saldana where expert opinion testimony has been admitted to explain unusual
behavior of the complainant. Some of these cases do not "involve true rape trauma
syndrome testimony, but rather testimony about sexually abused children. The cases
involving sexually abused children arc, however, illustrative of types of behavior that are
unusual enough for a court to allow an expert to explain them. 229 For example, when a
child complainant reports sexual abuse but later recants the charges, and is then cross-
examined about the recantation at trial, the prosecution has been allowed to call an
expert to testify that it is not unusual for children to retract such an allegation in the
face of confusion, tear, and mixed feelings about the abuser. 230 Similarly, when a child
complainant who claims that the abuse continued over a substantial period of time is
cross-examined concerning why the abuse was not reported earlier, the prosecution has
been allowed to call an expert to explain that a child victim is often reluctant to reveal
the crime when it is committed in a family setting."'
Two civil cases in which the plaintiffs were seeking damages for an alleged rape by
the defendant, decided in 1982 and 1983, allowed rape trauma syndrome testimony to
explain the seemingly unusual behavior of the complainant. In Delia S. v. Torres, 232 a civil
217 The Allewalt court interpreted Taylor as barring rape trauma syndrome testimony. See 61
Md. App. at 512 n.7, 487 A.2d at 668 11.7.
22"45 Or. App. 931, 609 P.2d 1312 (1980). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 102-04.
22 ' Further, these cases have been cited as authority by one court for allowing such testimony
in rape cases. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247 n.7, 681 P.2d 291, 298 n.7, 203 Cal. Rptr.
450, 457 n.7 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 180-87 for a discussion of the Bledsoe
court's dealing with this issue. See also State v. Middleton, 58 Or. App. 447, 454, 648 P.2d 1296,
1300 (1982), aff'd, 294 Or. 429, 435-38, 647 l'.2d 1215, 1219-21 (1983).
23"Expert testimony explaining a child complainant's recantation of a sexual abuse allegation
was also allowed in People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1984). The case is
interesting because it analyzed the child's recantation as a symptom associated with rape trauma
syndrome. The rape trauma syndrome literature, however, is inappropriate as authority for two
reasons: first, it deals with adults who were forcibly raped; and second, no "recantation" symptom of
rape trauma syndrome has been found.
23 People v. Benjamin R., 103 A.D.2d 663, 669, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (1984). Unlike the
court in People v. Reid, see supra note 230, the court in Benjamin R. recognized that rape trauma
syndrome testimony and child sexual abuse syndrome testimony are not synonymous. 103 A.D.2d
at 669, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
2" 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982).
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action for damages for rape decided by the California Court of Appeals in July, 1982,
the defense was predicated in part on the theory that the actions and responses of the
plaintiff were inconsistent with those of a rape victim. In response the plaintiff presented
testimony of a licensed clinical social worker who had considerable experience working
in rape crisis centers. She testified that feelings of fear, shame, and guilt resulting in a
failure to speak or report the experience are very common reactions for rape victims.
The defendant objected that the testimony improperly bolstered the testimony of the
plaintiff. The court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that rather than improp-
erly "validating" the testimony of the plaintiff, the evidence provided a background
against which the jury could establish the relevance of the defense theory that the
plaintiff's conduct was not typical or expected of a rape victim. 233
Similarly, in Ten-io v. McDonough, 234 another civil damages action for alleged rape in
Massachusetts, the plaintiff had voluntarily returned to the defendant's presence after
the alleged rape because she had locked her keys in her car. The defendant attempted
to use this as evidence that she had consented to the intercourse, because if she had not
consented she would not have returned to his presence. In response the plaintiff pre-
sented the testimony of Ann Wolbert Burgess, Dean of the School of Nursing at Boston
University and one of the two persons who coined the term "rape trauma syndrome" in
the seminal article on the issue in 1974. Burgess testified that it would not necessarily
be remarkable for a rape victim to return to the scene with her attacker or to feel safe
in his company after the event. The court held that the testimony was properly admissible
because it held the promise of assisting the jury in understanding the evidence. 236
Although it rejected rape trauma syndrome testimony on the issue of consent, the
California Supreme Court in People v. Bledsoe approved the use of rape trauma syndrome
testimony to explain the unusual behavior of an adult complainant in a criminal case. 236
The court explicitly recognized the divergent uses of rape trauma syndrome testimony.
That is, on one hand such testimony can be used to prove lack of consent, and on the
other hand to explain unusual behavior of the complainant. The Bledsoe court expressed
its opinion that use of the testimony on the latter point was permissible. 237
In summary, there is unanimous agreement among the courts which have considered
the issue that rape trauma syndrome testimony (and child sexual abuse testimony) is
properly admissible to explain what might otherwise seem to be unusual complainant
behavior. Such testimony is used in rebuttal when the defendant seeks to capitalize on
the unusual behavior by attempting to persuade the jury that a person who had actually
been the victim of a sexual attack would not behave afterwards in the way that the
complainant behaved. 236
233 Id. at 478-79, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
2" 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983).
"5 Id. at 176, 450 N.E.2d at 198.
246 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). For a case allowing very similar
testimony without mentioning rape trauma syndrome, see United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602
(9th Cir. 1984) (in a Mann Act prosecution. PTSD expert allowed to explain why victims did not
flee from the defendant over a period of several months).
2" 36 Cal. 3d at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
238 The focus of the remainder of this article will be on the admissibility of rape trauma
syndrome evidence on the issue of consent. If such evidence is admissible to prove an element of
the charge in the case-in-chief, then a fortiori it is admissible in rebuttal on the issue of the credibility
of a witness.
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VI. EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS CONCERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF RAPE TRAUMA
SYNDROME EVIDENCE WHEN OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION
In continuing the analysis of rape trauma syndrome evidence, the various eviden-
tiary objections raised by the defense will be analyzed to determine whether they provide
a basis for excluding the evidence. Preliminarily, four complicating variables that appear
in the facts of the previously discussed cases need be mentioned. The first of these is
that in some cases the evidence is offered by the prosecution in its case-in-chief-259 and
in other cases it is offered in rebuttal. 240 This difference in when the evidence is offered
is not of major significance. Rape trauma syndrome evidence offered on the issue of
consent, if admissible, should be admissible either in the case-in-chief or in rebuttal. It
is admissible in the case-in-chief because lack of consent is an element of the prosecution's
case and the prosecution should be able to present whatever probative evidence it has
on that point in order to defeat a motion for judgment of acquittal. The evidence should
also be permissible in rebuttal since the prosecution should be able to choose to marshal'
its evidence concerning lack of consent to rebut the defendant's testimony that the
intercourse was consensual.
When the rape trauma syndrome evidence is offered for the purpose of explaining
what would otherwise seem to be unusual behavior of the complainant, the prosecution's
use of the evidence is in theory slightly more restricted. The restriction arises because
generally the testimony of a witness cannot be bolstered before the opponent attacks the
witness' credibility. 241 Thus, the prosecution's case-in-chief could not use rape trauma
syndrome evidence for this explanatory purpose until the veracity of the complainant is
called into question on her cross-examination. As to use in rebuttal, it should be allowed
assuming that the complainant's credibility has been assailed either by cross-examination
or by evidence presented by the defendant in his case-in-chief. Thus, except for the
restriction that the prosecution must wait in its case-in-chief until the credibility of the
complainant has been attacked before offering such evidence, the admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome evidence does not hinge upon whether the prosecution offers it in its
case-in-chief or in rebuttal.
The second variable that merits discussion preliminarily is the differences in the
levels of opinion that can be elicited from a rape trauma syndrome expert. The cases
reveal at least four levels of opinion, ranging from general to very specific. The first
level of opinion is testimony from the expert only regarding the general characteristics
of the syndrome, coupled with testimony of the complainant and/or other witnesses
(usually relatives) concerning the condition and behavior of the complainant, with the
jury left to determine for itself whether the complainant's behavior matches the general
characteristics. 242 The second level of testimony is where the expert testifies to the general
259 See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); People v,
Stanley, 36 Cal. 3d 253, 681 P.2d 302, 203 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1984); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235
(Mo. 1984).
240 See Allewalt v. State, 61 Md. App. 503, 487 A.2d 664 (1985); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d
227 (Minn. 1982); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982). In some important cases it is
impossible to tell from the appellate opinion whether the testimony was offered in the prosecution's
case-in-chief or in rebuttal. See, e.g., State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982); State v.
Liddell, _Mont. _, 685 P.2d 918 (1984).
21 See C. MCCORMICK, McCoRmicx. ox EVIDENCE § 49 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
242 See, e.g., State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 154
(1984). It is unusual for the prosecution to limit the expert's testimony to this level.
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characteristics of the syndrome and then gives an opinion that the complainant's symp-
toms match the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome. 2" The third level of testimony
consists of the expert outlining the general characteristics of the syndrome, opining that
the complainant's match those characteristics, and further opining that the cause of the
complainant's symptoms is rape. 244 The fourth and most specific level of expert testimony
involves the expert testifying additionally in such a manner as to affirm the credibility
of the complainant, such as by stating that she believes the complainant or that the
complainant did not fantasize the incident. 245 In general, as will be seen, objections to
the testimony grow more weighty as the testimony grows more specific.
The third variable that merits preliminary discussion is the two different bases of
expert opinion relied upon by experts with respect to rape trauma syndrome. One basis
of testimony is when the expert compares the symptoms of the complainant with the
symptoms of other rape victims with whom the expert has personally dealt without
invoking a comparison based on rape trauma syndrome in genera1. 246 This basis of
opinion can be characterized as the "personal experience" basis. The second basis f i r
such testimony in rape trauma syndrome cases is when the expert compares the symp-
toms of the complainant with the "textbook" symptoms of rape trauma syndrome,
thereby invoking the expertise of the scientific community. Most rape trauma syndrome
testimony has been given in this form, 247 which will be referred to as the "textbook"
form.
Additionally in many rape trauma syndrome cases the defense raises the objection
that the admission of this type of evidence "invades the province of the jury." 248 This
imprecise objection could refer to any of three specific objections: that the testimony
constitutes an improper bolstering of credibility of the complainant, which is peculiarly
within the province of the jury; 248 that the testimony does not relate to a proper subject
for expert opinion in that it is not helpful to the jury because the jury is in as good a
position to determine consent as is the expert: 259 or that the testimony is unfairly
prejudicial because it overwhelms the jury with an aura of scientific reliability: 15 ' The
"invading province of the jury" objection will not be discussed as such, but rather will
be discussed as appropriate under these three separate and more specific objection
headings.
249 See, e.g., Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 243-44, 681 P.2d at 295-96, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 454.-55; Marks,
231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299; Allewalt, 61 Md. App. at 508, 487 A.2d at 666. Testimony on
this level is sometimes barely distinguishable from that on the third level because if on the second
level the expert testifies that the complainant is suffering from rape trauma syndrome, implicit in
this opinion is that the cause was rape, even if the expert does riot so opine.
244 See, e.g., Saldaria, 324 N.W.2d at 229; Liddell, _Mont. at _, 685 P.2d at 922.
212 See, e.g., Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 237.
240 See, e.g., State v. Bressman, 236 Kan. 296, 301, 689 P.2d 901, 906 (1984); State v. Lefiron,
37 Or. App. 411, 416, 587 1 4.2d 1044, 1047 (1978), cert. denied, 286 Or. 149 (1979).
247 See, e.g., Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 241-44, 681 P.2d at 299-96, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453-55; Taylor,
663 S.W.2d at 236-37.
248 See, e.g., Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2(1 at 1200; Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231; Taylor, 663
S.W.2d at 236; Reid, 123 Misc. 2d at 1085, 475 N.Y.S.2d. at 742.
249 See infra text accompanying notes 400-05.
n° See infra text accompanying notes 373-87.
" 1 See infra text accompanying notes 304- 10.
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A. Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence and the Frye Test
I. Should the Fiye Test Apply to Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence?
Virtually all American jurisdictions approach "scientific" evidence with particular
caution. The traditional manifestation of that caution is the Frye test enunciated by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Frye v. United States in 1923. 252 Frye
established the "general acceptance" test for the admissibility of scientific evidence. The
Frye case involved a rudimentary polygraph device, the results of which the defendant
sought to have admitted at the trial claiming that they tended to show his innocence.
The court held that the trial court had properly refused to admit the evidence, stating:
Just when a scientific principle crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general accep-
tance in the particular field in which it belongs. 253
The threshold requirement with respect to the application of the Frye test is whether
a particular item of evidence is "scientific." If "scientific," it should have to meet the test,
while if not "scientific," it should not have to meet the test. Courts have been inconsistent
in determining the types of evidence "scientific" enough to require application of the
test. 254 Among the rape trauma syndrome cases, however, no such inconsistency exists
— in every reported case in which a defendant has raised the objection that the evidence
when offered on the issue of consent must pass the Frye test (or its state equivalent), the
courts have, without cliscUssion, agreed. 255
The case law regarding the applicability of the Frye test.256 to behavioral scientific
evidence, at a minimum, is perplexing. A listing of the types of behavioral scientific
evidence to which such a test has been applied, when compared with a list of the types
of behavioral scientific evidence to which it has not been applied, does not reveal any
rational pattern of application.
252
	 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
253 1d. at 1014.
254 See Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1219 (1980); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in
the Courtroom?, 38 Mu. L. REV. 539, 556-57 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Comment, The Psychologist
as Expert Witness].
255 See, e.g., Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457; Bressman, 236
Kan. 296, 305, 689 P.2d 901, 908 (1984); Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299; Saldana, 324
N.W.2d at 229 n.30; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
255 The Frye test has been subjected to considerable criticism in recent years. This has resulted
in some courts modifying the test, some abandoning it in favor of other special tests for scientific
evidence, and some abandoning all special tests for scientific evidence, and purporting to treat
scientific evidence like all other expert testimony. These trends are well analyzed in McCormick,
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REv. 879, 886-905 (1982). For
purposes of this article a "special test for scientific evidence" refers to any test that treats scientific
evidence substantially differently than other expert testimony.
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In addition to rape trauma syndrome, a special scientific evidence test has been
applied to the following types of behavioral scientific evidence: battered wife syn-
drome, 257 battering parent syndrome, 258 the psychology of heroin addiction, 259 the sexual
propensities of a defendant in a sex crimes case when offered by the defendant 260 or by
the prosecution 2 6 ' and pathological gambling syndrome. 262 Additionally, there is schol-
arly opinion advocating a special test for scientific evidence which should be more broadly
applied to behavioral scientific evidence than has traditionally been the case. This opinion
ranges from the narrow recommendation of applying the Frye test to predictions of
dangerousness in capital cases, 263 to broader arguments that virtually all psychiatric or
psychological testimony should be subjected to such a test. 264
On the other hand, in general the vast majority of behavioral scientific evidence has
not had to pass a special scientific evidence test. For example, in the traditional areas of
psychiatric and psychological testimony in criminal cases, namely, competency to stand .
trial and sanity at the time of the crime, the courts almost never apply the Frye test.265
Additionally, the following types of behavioral scientific evidence have not been subjected
to the Frye test: PTSD defenses raised by Vietnam veterans, 266 PTSD of a white slavery
victim,267 expert opinion concerning the veracity of another witness, 268 the phenomenon
of repression, 269 Munchausen's syndrome by proxy, 2" susceptibility to inducement, 27 '
257 See, e.g., lbn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637-39 (D.C. 1979); State v. Thomas,
66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981).
25 ' See, e.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64-65 (Minn. 1981).
259 See, e.g., State v. Blea, 101 N.M. 323, 327, 681 P.2d 1100, 1103 (1984).
2" See, e.g., People v. Spigno, 156 Cal. App. 2d 279, 287-91, 319 P.2d 458, 463-65 (1957);
Douglas v. United States, 386 A.2d 289, 295-96 (D.C. 1978); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 516-18,
443 A.2d 1020, 1024-25 (1982).
20] See State v. Fitzgerald, 694 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
262 See United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 618-20 (8th Cir. 1983).
2" See Note, People v. Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness
in Capital Cases, 70 CALIF. L. Rev. 1069, 1084-90 (1982).
264 See I J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 3 (3d ed. 1981);
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 693, 737-38 (1974); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness, supra note 254, at 561.
265 See Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness, supra note 254, at 556-57. Occasionally a
court will apply Frye in the context of an insanity defense. See, e.g., United States v. Lewellyn, 723
F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (pathological gambling evidence inadmissible); Kramer v. United
States, 579 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D. Md. 1984) (Episodic Dyscontrol Sydrome evidence inadmissible).
266 e.g., United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1982); Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1983). In these cases, as in most of the cases cited infra notes 267-74, the courts did not
need to consider the applicability of the Frye test because the appellant did not make the argument
that the Frye test applied. Thus, the decisions do not hold that the Frye test does not apply, but the
decisions are of note nonetheless because they show that counsel, at least some of whom must have
been competent, did not think of making the Frye objection with respect to many kinds of behavioral
scientific evidence, which is indicative of how foreign Frye is to this type of evidence.
267 See United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1984).
268 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hiss, 88 F.
Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951); Holliday
v. State, 389 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Tafoya, 94 N.M. 762, 617 P.2d 151
(1980).
269 See People v. Fisher, 73 A.D.2d 886, 424 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1980), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 907, 423
N.E.2d 53, 440 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1981).
270 See People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1981).
271 See United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981).
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voluntariness of a defendant's actions, 272 absence of a requisite mental state for a crime, 273
and the state of mind of the defendant at the time of a confession- 27'
A graphic illustration of the confusion of the case law with respect to the applicability
of a special test for scientific evidence is presented by cases involving expert testimony
regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. Many courts have applied a special
scientific evidence test to such evidence, 275 and in earlier years the testimony consistently
failed the test, 276 although it now appears to be passing the test in some jurisdictions. 277
On the other hand, the California Supreme Court recently held that expert testimony
regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification is not a type of evidence to which a
special scientific evidence test should be applied. 278 The court held that such evidence
was mere expert evidence, not "scientific" evidence because "scientific" evidence is proof
"derived from an apparently 'scientific' mechanism, instrument, or procedure." 279
 The'
court then stated:
Here, by contrast, no such methods are in issue. We have never applied the
Kelly -Frye rule to expert medical testimony, even when the witness is a psy-
chiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past
state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness, or even the diagnosis
of an unusual form of mental illness not listed in the diagnostic manual of
the American Psychiatric Association .... We see no reason to require a
greater foundation when the witness is a qualified psychologist who will
simply explain to the jury how certain aspects of everyday experience shown
by the record can affect human perception, memory, and through them, the
accuracy of eyewitness identification testimony. 280
The court unconvincingly cited rape trauma syndrome as in the same category of "novel
[scientific] devices or processes" as lie detectors, truth serum, Nalline testing, experi-
mental systems of blood typing, voiceprints, identification by human bite marks, micro-
scopic analysis of gunshot residue, and hypnosis, 281 even though rape trauma syndrome
testimony clearly falls more naturally into the category of expert medical and psycho-
logical testimony to which the court held that the Frye rule should not be applied.
Indeed, one need look no further than rape trauma syndrome and its related
concepts to see the inconsistency in the courts' application of special scientific evidence
tests to behavioral scientific evidence. While the courts unquestioningly apply a special
scientific evidence test to rape trauma syndrome testimony offered on the issue of
consent, no court has applied a scientific evidence test when rape trauma syndrome
22 See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
275
	
United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1980).
274 See United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1981).
2" See, e.g., United States v. Posher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v, Watson,
587 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. United States, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973).
212 See supra note 275 and cases cited therein.
277
 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (fith Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
213 (1984); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (1983).
2" See People v, McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
222 Id. at 372, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51.
2"1d. at 372, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (citing People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d
69, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1981) ("Munchausen's syndrome by proxy")).
I Id.
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evidence or evidence of typical symptoms of sexually abused children has been offered
to explain seemingly unusual behavior of the complainant. 282 Even more strikingly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, which had held that rape trauma syndrome testimony was
inadmissible on the basis of the Frye test in Saldarra, 283 did not apply the Frye test in a
later case when evidence of typical symptoms of sexually abused children was offered to
show that illegal sexual activity had occurred. 2" Thus, while the perceived weakness of
rape trauma syndrome evidence went to the admissibility rather than the weight of the
evidence in Saldarra, the court stated in the child sexual abuse case "Nile reliability of
expert opinion testimony with regard to the existence or cause of the condition goes not
to the admissibility of the testimony but to its relative weight." 28 ' The court did not
attempt to explain this jarring inconsistency between its treatment of the two very similar
types of evidence.
The "weight versus admissibility" distinction shows the difference between how
expert testimony is treated if it is deemed to be "scientific" versus how it is treated if it
is deemed not to be scientific. Basically, when a special test for scientific evidence is
applicable, weaknesses in the evidence tend to be viewed as going to its admissibility
rather than its weight, whereas if the evidence is deemed not to he "scientific" expert
testimony, then weaknesses in the evidence will generally be viewed as going to its weight
and not to its admissibility. Thus, traditional analysis leads to the conclusion that the key
question is whether the type of evidence being offered is evidence the weaknesses of
which should entirely prevent the jury from hearing it, or whether its weaknesses are
such that the jury should be permitted to hear it, allow the opponent an opportunity to
expose those weaknesses to the jury, and then let the jury make its own decision on the
weight to be given such evidence.
But how does a court determine whether the evidence is "scientific" so that its
weaknesses go to its admissibility, or whether it is mere "expert" testimony, the weaknesses
of which go to its weight? With respect to at least behavioral scientific evidence, it is
apparent that the courts have not reached an acceptable answer to this question. Further,
it seems that if intelligent jurists are unable to formulate a satisfactory and consistent
answer to a question, then perhaps the wrong question is being asked. Indeed, the best
scholarly thinking in this area indicates that attempting to separate "scientific" sheep
from "expert" goats and applying different tests to each is not the most profitable line
of inquiry for courts. This thinking is exemplified by the work of Professor Stephen
Saltzburg. 2 w Professor Saltzburg believes that there is no reason to separate "scientific"
evidence from expert testimony generally. 287 Moreover, he finds that both the Frye test
and its emerging major competitor, "relevance analysis," 288 attempt to fulfill the same
282 See supra text accompanying notes 228-38.
28s
	 N.W.2d 227,229-30 (Minn, 1982).
284 State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
285
	 at 6l 1.
Saltzburg, Frye and Alternatives, 99 F.R.D. 208 (1983) (paper presented at the National
Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence) [hereinafter
cited as Saltzburg, Frye and Alternatives).
287 1d. at 216.
288 "Relevance analysis" seeks to treat scientific evidence the same way that other evidence is
treated, weighing its probative value and helpfulness against countervailing dangers. Its earliest
major scholarly proponent was Professor McCormick, see C. MeCoRmicx, McColl:nick's HANDBOOK
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basic goal: to assure that the trier of fact. has a trustworthy basis for crediting or
discrediting evidence offered at trial.'" Professor Saltzburg points out that this goal
accounts for other precepts of the law of evidence, such as the reluctance to admit lay
opinion testimony, limitations of expert testimony generally, and the mistrust of hearsay
evidence. 290 These precepts rest at least partly on the assumption that evidence that
cannot be fairly weighed is more likely to be harmful than helpful and that a rational
system of deciding disputes should avoid rather than rely on such evidence. 29 ' Professor
Saltzburg then points out that the usual means by which a jury is allowed to weigh fairly
evidence is by the weaknesses m the evidence brought out on cross-examination. 292 He
notes that this means of attacking the evidence may be less useful with an expert than
with an ordinary witness because often the expert may claim that his testimony is not
based upon his ability to perceive, remember, and narrate, but on extrinsic data or
principles that the expert claims to he especially reliable. 292 Professor Saltzburg suggests
that if cross-examination appears to he insufficient to allow the trier of fact to understand
and fairly evaluate the data or principles upon which the testimony is based, then more
than the claim of the expert. called to testify is needed to warrant acceptance of the
evidence as valid
Professor Saltzburg suggests that one way in which expert evidence can be suffi-
ciently illuminated for the jury is if some guarantee of reliability exists independent of
the claim of the one called as an expert to testify. 29' The guarantee of reliability called
for by the Frye test is general acceptance in the scientific field in which the evidence
belongs. Basically, the out-of-court acceptance of the validity of the evidence serves to
compensate for the jury's inability to fairly weigh such evidence by assuring that it is not
likely to be misguided by placing reliance on the evidence. This, he says, is the nub of
both the F7ye and the relevance analysis doctrines. 2" Professor Saltzburg points out two
reasons why some guarantee of reliability must exist in such circumstances with respect
to expert testimony when no such guarantee is required with respect to the testimony
of ordinary witnesses. First, unlike ordinary witness testimony, a claim may be made that
the scientific evidence is perfect or close to perfect. Second, unlike the testimony of
ordinary witnesses, an assessment of the value of scientific evidence may become quite
a bit more accurate over titne. 297 Because triers of fact are forced to make final decisions
on the basis of the evidence available and cannot usually reconsider those decisions later
on in light of changing scientific knowledge, the legal system may come to regret allowing
OF THE. LAW or EvibEser 491 (2d ed. 1972). The most influential statement regarding relevance
analysis appears in 31 irVEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE l 702 (1982). This text sets
out seven factors to provide structure and guidance to trial judges, and in doing so arguably
provides the opportunity for creation of another "special" test for scientific evidence. For courts
that have recently embraced relevance analysis, see United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1229 (3d
Cir. 1985); State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 1'.2d 751 (1984).
2
"9 Saltzburg, Frye and Alternatives, 99 F.R.D. at 210.
290 Id. at 210-11.
291 Id. at 211.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 212.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 211.
217 Id. at 212.
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triers of fact to have used scientific evidence which is later shown to be unreliable. 299 in
summary, Professor Saltzburg states:
Courts like the Frye court accept scientific evidence when they are satisfied
that a judge or jury can assess it and that their assessment represents a
reasonable judgment as to the weight it should be given. They hesitate to
admit evidence where a judge or jury cannot independently assess the legit-
imacy of the expert's testimony and the scientific community has not yet
validated the expert's claim for his discovery or principle. 299
Different types of expert evidence raise different issues with respect to whether a
trier of fact has a trustworthy basis for crediting or discrediting the evidence. For
example, some types of expert testimony rely on machines to accurately perform the
analysis on which the probative value of the evidence is based."° With respect to such
evidence, there needs to be a basis for the jury to determine that the machine is in fact
capable of making an accurate analysis. Many types of scientific evidence involve a
comparison of an unknown item with a known item, such as fingerprints, blood group-
ings, ballistics and tire marks. With respect to such evidence, a trier of fact needs to be
able to decide whether such a comparison can accurately be made. Further, with respect
to most types of evidence involving such comparison, there is an additional component
of the testimony explaining why the result of a match between a known and an unknown
are significant. For example, a match between a known and an unknown fingerprint is
significant because fingerprints are unique, or a match between a known and an unknown
blood sample is significant because only a certain percentage of the population has a
particular blood type. When such a comparison is made, the trier of fact must be able
to evaluate whether the underlying statistical basis for comparison is valid."' Other types
of scientific evidence involve a machine producing "hard" data which then requires
subjective rather than objective comparison. The prime example of this type of evidence
is the polygraph. With respect to the polygraph, the trier of fact must have a trustworthy
basis for crediting or discrediting both the ability of the machine to accurately measure
the physical phenomena which it purports to measure and the ability of the examiner
to interpret the data correctly."
298 Id. at 213.
299 Id.
30* Examples of this type of evidence include speed radar and neutron activation analysis.
Neutron activation analysis is a means of measuring the elemental composition of a material by
making it artificially radioactive and then measuring the radioactive decay, which occurs at consistent
rates for specific elements. See Karjala,. The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CALIF.
L. REV. 997,998-1000 (1971). Another example is gas chromatograph analysis, which is a means
of measuring the elemental composition of a material by converting it to a gas, and forcing the gas
through a filtration material which measures the molecular concentration. This measurement is
then converted to electrical impulses which are recorded on a graph, See United States v. Distler,
671 F.2d 954,961-62 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
501 Some types of scientific evidence are a combination of machine analysis and a comparison
with a broad sample to show the significance of the result. An example of this is a gunshot residue
test where a machine determines the level of two elements (barium and antimony) on the skin of a
person believed to have recently fired a gun. If significant levels of those elements are found, it is
then asserted that persons who have not fired guns recently have much lower concentrations of
those elements on their skin. SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 289-341 (E. lmwinkelreid ed. 1981).
"2
 Voiceprint evidence raises similar but not identical concerns to those raised by polygraph
evidence. The jury must have a trustworthy basis for crediting or discrediting the premise that the
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Another major type of scientific evidence that raises yet a different set of questions
involves processes applying a technique to an individual, the result of which is supposed
to be an enhanced testimonial ability. These processes include hypnosis and truth serum.
With respect to these processes, the jury must have a trustworthy basis for crediting or
discrediting that the processes do indeed result in better, not worse, testimonial abilities.
Focusing, as Professor Saltzburg suggests, on whether an item of expert testimony can
be fairly understood and evaluated by the trier of fact directs a court's attention to the
exact questions that exist with respect to each type of evidence. This should be more
helpful to a court than focusing on some across-the-board standards such as "general
acceptance." Such a general standard can cloud a court's perception of the basic problems
that exist with each type of evidence.,
Rape trauma syndrome evidence, like all behavioral scientific evidence, is a type of
expert testimony that falls into a different category than any of those types of evidence
mentioned above. Behavioral scientific evidence consists of one person's subjective com-
parison, without the intervention of any mechanical device, of characteristics of other
persons studied in the past who have exhibited similar characteristics. All of behavioral
science consists of studying human reactions, attempting to find patterns in those reac-
tions, giving names to those patterns, and thereafter examining particular individuals to
see if their symptoms coincide with the symptoms of other people in the past whose
symptoms have given rise to a category of behavior."'
The opinion has been expressed by several commentators that behavioral science
evidence is the least likely type to overly influence the jury, since no machine or myste-
rious process"4 is involved, which is what lends real "scientific cachet" to expert testimony.
The evidence falls into a category which Professor Edward lmwinkelreid characterizes
as "software" evidence and as to which he says:
This is the sort of evidence leaSt likely to overawe the jury. When a layperson
thinks of science, the layperson naturally thinks of sophisticated instruments
capable of precise management. Software techniques are the farthest re-
moved from the layperson's conception of science; and for that reason, in
the minds of many laypersons these techniques hardly deserve the august
title "scientific." The element of subjectivity in these techniques is patent to
any juror.""
And in holding that the Frye test did not apply to testimony regarding the fallibility of
eyewitness identification, the California Supreme Court noted:
When a witness gives his personal opinion on the stand — even if he qualifies
as an expert — the jurors may temper their acceptance of his testimony with
sound waves produced by the human voice can be accurately charted. In addition, it must be able
to believe that an accurate subjective comparison can be made between two charts, and must also
have a basis for crediting or discrediting whether further testimony regarding the significance of
the evidence is valid, that is, whether each person's voice produces a unique print.
"3 Other specific examples of this type of evidence include testimony concerning sanity, com-
petence to stand trial, battered woman syndrome, battering parent syndrome, Vietnam veteran
syndrome, and testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification.
"4 However, some psychiatric and psychological testing techniques, such as the Rorschach
Inkblot test and the Thematic Apperception Test, do seem fairly mysterious. See A. MOENSSENS
F. IrniAu, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.09 (2d ed. 1978).
303 lmwinkelreid, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence — A Primer on Evaluating the
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 283 (1981).
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a healthy sense of skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings
are fallible. But the opposite may be true when the evidence is produced by
a machine: like many lay persons, jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high
degree of certainty to proof derived from an apparently "scientific" mecha-
nism, instrument, or procedure. Yet the aura of infallibility that often sur-
rounds such evidence may well conceal the fact that it remains experimental
and tentative."
In addition to rape trauma syndrome evidence tending not to overawe a jury, other
reasons exist why a jury is likely to have a trustworthy basis for crediting or discrediting
such evidence. First, there exists abundant literature for a defense lawyer to utilize in
developing effective cross-examination of the prosecution's rape trauma syndrome ex-
pert."7 Second, there are experts who can be retained by the defense to testify on the
subject and assist in trial preparation."' Third, the evidence does not raise the two
problems seen by Professor Saltzburg with respect to scientific evidence." It does not
purport to be perfect or nearly so, nor does it appear that the assessment of the value
of the evidence will become substantially more accurate over time. The assessment of
the validity of rape trauma syndrome by the scientific community has remained at a high
level since the seminal article on the issue was published more than a decade ago. Finally,
and very importantly, the evidence is not very far removed from the juror's ordinary
experience and is not clouded in mysterious jargon. The syndrome itself and the test
used to determine its existence are nontechnical and are easily explained and understood.
The fact that testimony is not far removed from the jury's common experience has been
an important factor with respect to other types of expert testimony to which courts have
not applied a special scientific evidence test. 31 "
Thus, without having to consider whether "textbook" rape trauma syndrome evi-
dence is "scientific," it appears to he expert evidence that is a good 'candidate for
admission under the proposed Saltzburg analysis without requiring any out-of-court
validation of it, because the jury can rationally decide what weight to give it. Leaving
Professor Saltzburg's proposed analysis and returning to traditional "weight versus ad-
"5 People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372-73, 690 P.2d 709, 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 251
(1984). Similarly the Colorado Court of Appeals recently discussed whether in a child sexual abuse
case an expert's testimony regarding the truth of children's claims of sexual assault had been
improperly admitted. In holding that the testimony had been properly admitted, the court stated:
People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1981), relied upon by defendants, is inap-
posite because it deals with the inadmissibility of polygraph results. Here, unlike
Anderson, there is no possibility that the jury would have placed an almost "mystical"
reliance on a particular scientific instrument for truth-finding. Rather, cross-exami-
nation of Dr. Cantwell successfully ferreted out the possible Haws of her expert
conclusions in a way in which cross-examination might never be able to pierce the lay
juror's inflated belief in polygraph infallibility.
People v. Ashley, 687 P.2d 473, 475 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
907 See supra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61.
"" The defendants found.expert witnesses in State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822
(1984), and State v. Liddell, 	 Mont. _, 685 P.2d 918 (1984).
See supra notes 286-99 and accompanying text.
31" See, e.g., People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, Ill. 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1975) (expert
testimony comparing human bite marks not far removed from the common experience of the jury);
State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 86 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981) (blood spatter
evidence need not meet a special test for scientific evidence because it could be easily understood
and weighed by the jury).
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missibility" analysis, the same factors mentioned above tend toward the conclusion that
this is not the type of expert testimony to which a special scientific evidence test should
be applied. Its weaknesses should, therefore, go to its weight, not to its admissibility.
With respect to testimony based on personal experience with rape victims rather
than on the textbook symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, that testimony should also
be admissible under the Saltzburg analysis. All of the tools for discrediting that testimony
exist for the defense and the defense does not even have to seek to overcome whatever
"aura of reliability" attaches to the assertion that rape trauma syndrome is recognized
by the scientific community. Similarly, under the "weight versus admissibility" traditional
analysis, if the witness is not basing the personal opinion on a general principle, but
rather merely on personal experience, the jurors are even in a better position, in the
words of the California Supreme Court, to "temper their acceptance of his testimony
with a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings are fallible." 311
In summary then, all expert testimony should be subjected to the same basic test,
which is whether the trier of fact has a trustworthy basis for crediting or discrediting
the evidence. Under that test, rape trauma syndrome evidence should be admissible
unless it violates some other rule of evidence. Even under the traditional "weight versus
admissibility" test rape trauma syndrome testimony does not appear to be the type of
"scientific" evidence the weaknesses of which should go to its admissibility rather than
merely its weight. Accordingly, the courts have erred in requiring rape trauma syndrome
evidence to pass the Frye test in order to gain admission into evidence.
2. Does Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence Pass the Frye Test?
Although application of the Frye test to rape trauma syndrome testimony appears
unwarranted, courts have consistently applied the Frye test to rape trauma syndrome
evidence and may well continue to do so in the future. Accordingly, it becomes important
to ascertain whether rape trauma syndrome testimony passes the Frye test.
The first question that has to be answered is exactly what does the Frye test require
general acceptance of with respect to rape trauma syndrome evidence. This question is
not easily answered by resort to case authority. Commentators have recognized that it is
unclear whether the Frye standard requires general acceptance of the underlying scien-
tific principle, the scientific technique, or both. 312 Indeed, this principle/technique di-
chotomy seems particularly ill-suited to behavioral scientific evidence, because the only
underlying scientific principle involved is the general belief that science can discover
something about human behavior. 313
• McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 372, 690 P.24 at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
311 Gianelli, supra note 254, at 1211; National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, Symposium
en Science and the Rules of Evidence, 9 F.R.D. 208, 230 (1983) (Remarks by Professor Margaret Berger)
[hereinafter cited as Symposium].
' 13 See, e.g., Ibn -Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979). There, with respect to
battered wife syndrome, a majority of the court held that the testimony met the Frye test because
it fell within the bounds of clinical psychology, a field of endeavor the accuracy of which is generally
accepted in the scientific community, and because the expert had employed generally accepted
clinical psychology research methods. Id. at 638. Application of the test in this way could result in
any clinical psychology testimony being admitted as long as the psychologist had followed generally
accepted scientific methodology. This seems to be an incorrect result since it ignores the possible
unreliability of such evidence. As many courts have recognized, the major thrust of the Frye rule is
to filter out unreliable evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25. 33 n.12 (6th Cir.),
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A more profitable line of inquiry is to ask what evidentiary values are promoted by
the Frye rule, and then determine whether the evidence is of a type the admission of
which is consistent with those values. A review of the authorities suggests that the two
basic values promoted by the Frye rule are assuring reliability of evidence"' and assuring
that the opponent will have a fair opportunity to expose the weaknesses in such evi-
dence. 916 It has already been demonstrated that the defendant has the resources available
to have a fair opportunity to discredit the evidence." 6 The question remaining is whether
the evidence is meets Frye's reliability standard.
The meaning of the term "reliable" in this context is more complex than it might
first appear. In using the term, courts often combine two concepts that are correctly
viewed by scientists as separate and distinct. Those two concepts are "validity" and
"reliability" (which to avoid confusion will hereinafter be referred to as "consistency" ). 3 ''
"Validity" refers to a technique's ability to measure what it purports to measure: a
technique's validity is its accuracy.318 "Consistency" refers to the extent to which a tech-
nique leads to the same result in the hands of different examiners." 9 A technique can
be thus "unreliable" in the general way courts use that term either because it does not
accurately measure what it purports to measure, or because even though it can perform
accurately, its performance is so subtle that experts cannot agree on the meaning of the
results. The rationale of the Frye test requires scientific results to have both validity and
consistency.
Another area where the courts have not been as clear as they should be with respect
to the Frye test is the relationship between general acceptance and reliability. Although
general acceptance usually indicates reliability, 320 it has been recognized that scientific
communities are not infallible and may generally accept evidence that is not in fact
reliable. 3" When the general acceptance safeguard breaks down, presumably the unre-
liable evidence should be excluded despite its general acceptance.
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); People v.
Bynum, 192 Colo, 60, 62, 556 P.2d 469, 470-71 (1976); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d
86, 91 (1981). Indeed, these courts have virtually equated the Ftyr test with reliability, which does
violence to that test since it requires both reliability and general acceptance of reliability. See infra
text accompanying note 320.
3 " See supra note 313 and authorities cited therein. See also Gianelli, supra note 259, at 1200—
03.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 286-99.
'I" See supra text accompanying notes 307-08. Certainly the defendant has the "resources" in
terms of theoretically available ammunition, such as literature, with which to cross-examine defense
experts. It is to be doubted that most defendants have the financial resources to make this ammu-
nition actually available to themselves. This imbalance of resources between the prosecution and
defense worries some commentators, as does their belief that many defense lawyers are unwilling
or unable to perform adequate cross-examination of the prosecution's scientific experts. See Sym-
posium, supra note 312, at 221, 232-33 (Remarks of Joseph Nicol, Michael Graham, and Margaret
Berger). This author, although recognizing these concerns, does not believe they warrant precluding
the prosecution from presenting probative evidence.
3" See I mwinkelreid, supra note 305, at 279.
518 Id.
sig
'20 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (2d Cir. 1985). Although rejecting the
Frye test in favor of a relevance analysis, the Downing court noted that general acceptance could still
go far toward showing reliability: "The district court in assessing reliability may examine a variety
of factors in addition to scientific acceptance. In many cases, however, the acceptance factor may
well be decisive, or nearly so." Id.
351 Id. at 1236-37 n.14. See Gianelli, supra note 254, at 1224-26 (describing the general accep-
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Thus, in order for evidence to be reliable under the Frye rule, it must pass three
tests: it must (1) be reliable in the sense of being valid; (2) it must be reliable in the sense
of being consistent; and (3) its validity and consistency must be generally accepted by
the proper scientific community. This three-prong test must be passed by rape trauma
syndrome evidence in order for it to be admissible in a Frye jurisdiction. Further, if more
than one level of rape trauma syndrome testimony is offered, each level must pass each
prong of the test. This is true because each level of testimony involves different psycho-
logical assertions. 322
At the most general level, the expert testifies that certain symptoms collectively
known as rape trauma syndrome follow from rape. The assertion is that rape causes a
certain pattern of after-effects to its victims. The first prong of the Frye test is whether
this assertion is valid. Its validity depends upon whether the symptoms can be accurately
perceived, and upon whether the existence of the symptoms accurately diagnose rape
as the cause of the symptoms. The severe and prominent symptoms of rape trauma
syndrome, including fear, nightmares, depressive symptoms and changes in eating,
sleeping and sexual patterns, 325 can be accurately perceived by the victim, and through
her report of them, by the researchers. Further, there was no doubt that the cause of
the symptoms in the women who were studied by the researchers was anything other
than rape. The research was for the most part conducted by studying women who had
sought treatment as a result of rape. It is highly unlikely that a woman would seek
treatment for rape if she had not actually been raped. There is no evidence that similar
symptoms result from consensual intercourse. Most of the women studied had experi-
enced no other traumas that could account for their changed behavior, and even if they
had undergone other recent trauma, no other trauma causes many of the exact symptoms
experienced by rape victims."'
To pass the second prong of the Frye test, the diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome
must be consistent. Consistency is usually thought of on a smaller scale, for example,
two polygraph examiners independently examining one examinee. An analogous concept
involving consistency on a larger scale would appear to be two, behavioral scientific
researchers examining the same type of research data base and coming to the same
conclusion. It is beyond dispute that several behavioral scientists have conducted rape
trauma syndrome studies and even more behavioral scientists have examined the results
of those studies, and all have come to the conclusion that a rape causes certain specific
symptoms in the victim which can be characterized as rape trauma syndrome. 325 Thus,
it appears that the general syndrome has consistency.
Finally, under the third prong of the test, it must be determined whether the validity
and consistency of rape trauma syndrome on the first level is generally accepted in the
pertinent scientific community. The pertinent scientific community can be viewed as
psychiatrists in general, in which case the recognition of rape trauma syndrome as a
tance of the paraffin test for gunshot residue before any scientific testing had established the test
as reliable).
322 The results of the analysis on all levels will be the same whether based on the scientific
literature in existence prior to Marks and Saldana or on all scientific literature on the subject. The
basic research conclusions were well-established prior to the Marks and Sakicina decisions.
323 See supra notes 25-63 and accompanying text.
324 Moreover, even if some individuals who were studied were faking or had some other cause
of the symptoms, the size of the groups studied and the number of studies done would make the
inclusion of these few individuals statistically unimportant.
325 See supra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61.
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form of PTSD in DSM-III constitutes unequivocal general acceptance. For that segment
of the behavioral scientific community that deals with rape victims, the existence of a
method of treatment based on the occurrence of the syndrome demonstrates conclusively
that it is generally accepted. 32° Accordingly, it seems clear that the general conclusion
that rape causes certain symptoms in its victims is "scientific" evidence that passes the
Frye test.
The second level of expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome is that the
symptoms of the complainant match the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome. It must
also pass the three-pronged Frye test. The first prong involves the question whether such
a diagnosis is valid, that is, whether it can be accurately determined that the symptoms
of the complainant match the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome. In examining this
question, one encounters a substantial body of scholarly research that has developed
over the last decade arguing that psychiatric and psychological diagnoses are notoriously
invalid and have been admitted far too freely in the past."' Thus, an argument can be
framed that not only should no additional psychiatric and psychological areas of testi-
mony be allowed, but those already existing should be subject to drastic cutbacks. How-
ever, while it. is true that many studies indicate that psychological and psychiatric diag-
noses in complex areas such as sanity and competence to stand trial are invalid,s 2° rape
trauma syndrome testimony is substantially different for two reasons. First, diagnosis of
rape trauma syndrome is based in part upon DSM-I I I, which provides objective criteria
upon which to base a diagnosis. 329 Second, rape trauma syndrome is a particularly
uncomplicated diagnosis to make, since the symptoms are distinct and identifiable.
Accordingly, it seems that not only psychiatrists and psychologists, but also trained social
workers and nurses, can validly diagnose a complainant as suffering from symptoms
matching those of rape trauma syndrome. With respect to the second prong of the Frye
test, consistency of such diagnoses, given the distinct nature of rape trauma syndrome
symptoms, it seems likely that two different clinicians, each independently examining
the same complainant, would reach the same diagnosis a large percentage of the time.
Finally, the third prong of the test is also satisfied because it appears to be generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community that victims can be validly and technically
reliably diagnosed as having symptoms that are consistent with the symptoms of rape
trauma syndrome. 33 °
The third level of expert opinion testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome adds
the additional opinion that the cause of the complainant's symptoms is that she was
raped. The question for purposes of determining the validity prong of the Frye test is
whether the existence of the symptoms allows the clinician to accurately extrapolate back
to rape as the cause of the symptoms. This question must be answered in the affirmative.
First, rape causes a unique set of readily identifiable symptoms. These rape specific
symptoms include rape-related fears of subsequent attack and being alone at home or
on the street, sexual dysfunction and worsened relationships with men."' Other post-
"6 See supra notes 28, 54-59 and accompanying text.
s27
	 supra note 264 and authorities cited therein.
328 See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 264, at 697-718.
328 See Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, Clinical Criteria for Psychiatric Diagnosis and	 132 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1187 (1975).
33 ° See supra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61.
33'
	
supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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traumatic stress disorders resulting from other traumas produce similar but not identical
symptoms. Even if the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome were not readily distinguish-
able from post-traumatic stress disorders caused by other traumas, it would still appear
that absent any other major trauma that could have caused the symptoms, the clinician
could accurately identify the cause of the symptoms as rape. With respect to the consis-
tency prong of the Frye test, as already mentioned, two experts independently given the
opportunity to evaluate a complainant, would come to the same diagnosis a large per-
centage of the time. Finally, with respect to the third prong of the test, the ability to
make the diagnosis of the cause of the symptoms as rape is generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community. The literature demonstrates that it is generally believed
that the symptoms resulting from rape are so unique and identifiable that if the symptoms
appear it is reasonable to conclude that rape was the cause of the, symptoms. 332
The fourth level of the possible rape trauma syndrome testimony is an opinion by
the expert that she believes the complainant or believes that the complainant did not
fantasize the rape. In applying the three-prong Frye test to this testimony, there is no
support in the literature which would allow the testimony to pass any of the prongs. The
clinician may indeed believe the complainant and base her opinion on that belief, but
that does not mean that she can opine that that belief is accurate. Evaluating credibility
is a completely different, more complex, and more questionable area of behavioral
scientific endeavor than diagnosis and treatment of rape trauma syndrome. Thus, a
credibility opinion given by a rape trauma syndrome expert is not demonstrably valid
or consistent, and is definitely not generally accepted as such.
The personal experience basis of expert testimony appears less clearly admissible
under the Frye test. If the expert's conclusions based on personal experience correlate
closely with the textbook symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, then they could be held
to pass the Frye test. However, if the expert's conclusions diverge substantially from the
textbook symptoms, then they should be held to fail the Frye test because they would
not be generally accepted.
In summary then, rape trauma syndrome evidence on the first three levels passes
the Frye test, while evidence on the fourth level does not. Personal experience testimony
may or may not pass the Frye test depending on how closely it corresponds to rape
trauma syndrome conclusions. How, then, have four courts determined that rape trauma
syndrome evidence on the first three levels fails the Frye test?" 3 Although the holdings
of the courts are couched in terms of lack of general acceptance, a close review of the
opinions demonstrates that the real problems these courts have with rape trauma syn-
drome testimony is with its validity. More specifically, the courts do not accept the validity
or accuracy of testimony at the level of the general characteristics of rape trauma
syndrome and at the level of opinion that rape was a cause of the symptoms in the
complainant. The courts' basic position is that there is no validity to reasoning backwards
from a complainant's report of the symptoms to rape as the cause of those symptoms.
Courts reason that since rape trauma syndrome does not universally occur among
rape victims, and that when it does occur the symptoms can vary among victims, the
932 See supra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61.
333 See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); Allewalt v.
State, 61 Md. App. 503, 487 A.2d 664 (1985); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982); State
v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984). In Allewalt, although the court said that it did not have to
reach the Fry test, by determining that the evidence was unreliable the court was in fact engaging
in a Frye analysis.
1194	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:1143
existence of the symptoms does not reliably indicate that they were caused by rape. 334
In essence, the courts seem to be requiring one hundred percent accuracy of the evidence
before it can be admitted. This is certainly a higher standard than that to which any
other expert testimony is held. For example, in most other contexts a physician's opinion
as to the cause of an injury is required to be stated with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty.'" Rape trauma syndrome occurs in a large percentage of rape victims, and
although specific reactions vary, there is much greater correlation between the reactions
than there is variance. In virtually any other medical context this would be a more than
sufficient basis upon which a qualified witness could render an opinion as to the cause
of the symptoms.
Courts also have found that because PTSD can occur due to a variety of traumatic
experiences, any diagnosis of a particular complainant's symptoms as resulting from
having been raped is invalid." 6 First, this ignores the fact that rape trauma syndrome is
a particular type of PTSD with specific symptoms that do not occur in other types of
PTSD. Second, even if this were not true, in virtually any other expert testimony context
an expert reasoning from the results of an event to its cause need only express the
opinion to a reasonable degree of certainty. Other possible causes can be explored
through either cross-examination or presentation of the opponent's own expert. Such a
"weakness" in the evidence generally goes to its weight, not to its admissibility. One
commentator has designed a comparison between a "hard" scientific test and rape trauma
syndrome testimony to show the different standard to which rape trauma syndrome
testimony is being held."" The standard test for whether a person has recently fired a
gun is to test the person's skin for barium and antimony, which generally occur as primer
residue from firearms ammunition. An unusually high level of barium and antimony is
an indication that the person has recently fired a gun. Unusually high levels of barium
and antimony can, however, occur from other causes, such as certain occupations, and
conversely, sometimes no residue at all is left on the hand of persons known to have
recently fired a weapon. Nevertheless, gunshot residue testimony is routinely admitted
with these "weaknesses" left open to cross-examination by the opponent. It is difficult to
understand why this should not also be the case with rape trauma syndrome evidence.
Another rationale relied upon by courts in holding that rape trauma syndrome
testimony does not pass the Frye test is that the syndrome was not developed as a fact-
finding tool to determine whether a rape had occurred, but rather as a therapeutic tool
for treating persons claiming to have been raped." 6 Having found this to be the case,
the California Supreme Court in Bledsoe noted that due to the "nonjudgmental" stance
that counselors maintain, they do not probe for inconsistencies in their clients' stories,
or conduct independent investigations to verify the "truth" of the clients' recollections,
or to determine the legal implications of the clients' factual accounts. 3 S 9 Thus, the court
394 See, e.g., Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30.
666 See M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 303 (1983).
"6 See Allewalt, 61 Md. App. at 514-15, 487 A.2d at 669; Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229-30.
937 Ross, supra note 2, at 730.
"6 See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 250, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459; Saldana, 324 N.W.2d
at 230.
999 Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 250, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. It is difficult to see how a
rape counselor could go about verifying the truth of the allegation, especially if the sole issue is
consent and there were no witnesses other than the complainant and the defendant. Certainly the
defendant is not likely to admit the crime at trial if he has not done so earlier.
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held that although rape trauma syndrome was generally recognized or used in the
general scientific community from which it arose, "it is not relied on in that community
for the purpose for which the prosecution sought to use it in this case, namely, to prove
that a rape in fact occurred."34° This holding adds a never before seen twist to the Frye
test: rather than asking whether the scientific evidence is generally accepted, the court
chose to ask whether it is generally relied upon for a particular purpose. Although in
most cases generally accepted scientific principles are utilized for the purpose for which
they were developed, general acceptance can exist with respect to a technique even
though the scientific community does not rely on that technique for the same purpose
for which the legal system may want to rely on it. With respect to rape trauma syndrome,
it is abundantly clear from the literature that it is generally accepted in the scientific-
community from which rape trauma syndrome arose that the symptoms of rape trauma
syndrome are the result of rape. 54 ' The counseling community has no need to use this
conclusion to prove that the cause of the symptoms was rape, because that community
is in the business of treating victims, 'not prosecuting rapists. The "non-proof" use of
the principle, however, does not in any way detract from the general acceptance of the
fact that the cause of the symptoms is rape. 3,12
The California Supreme Court's veiled holding that because rape counselors do not
investigate the "truth" of their clients' allegations, rape trauma syndrome evidence
generally, and a diagnosis of it in a particular complainant, may be unreliable, is dis-
turbing because it demonstrates a holdover of a belief that one would hope would have
disappeared by now: that there are a substantial number of false allegations of rape
made by disturbed women. 343 Implicit in the court's holding is the belief that such false
allegations may render the results of the rape trauma syndrome studies and diagnoses
invalid. Inexplicably, the court seems to be having one last Bing with a famous statement
34° Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 22-63 and 140-61.
34 What the California Supreme Court may have been saying sub silentio is that even though
it is generally accepted by the scientific community that the cause of rape trauma syndrOme
symptoms can be diagnosed as rape, the court does not find this general acceptance to be convincing.
Although general acceptance is usually sufficient proof of reliability, the court may have been saying
that it believes that this is one of the rare circumstances in which the general acceptance does not
equate with reliability. If that is the court's real position, then that too is incorrect because the
evidence is reliable. See supra text accompanying notes 321-32.
Wigmore was one of the main culprits in perpetuating this myth. He used five case histories
of mentally ill girls who had made false sexual allegations against men (none of whom were
subsequently convicted of a crime due to the allegation) to reach the conclusion that modern
psychiatrists "have amply studied the behavior of young girls and women .... [whose] psychic
complexes are multifarious . [so as to establish that] one form taken by these complexes is that
of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men." 3A J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 736
(Chadbourne rev. 1970). Wigmore's conclusion has been cited with approval by reputable sources.
See Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 172, 410 P.2d 838, 846, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 310 (1966);
Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1967); Note, Criminal Law —
Psychiatric Examination of Prosecutrix in Rape Case, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 234, 235 (1966).
Actually, just the opposite is true: rape is such a difficult charge for a woman to make that it
is highly unlikely that false charges will he made. See infra text accompanying notes 346-48. Statistics
indicate that true experts believe that approximately two percent to four percent of rape reports
are suspicious; no higher than for other crimes. See O'Neale, Court Ordered Psychiatric Examination
of a Rape Victim in a Criminal Rape Prosecution — or now Many Times Must a Woman Be Raped?, 18
SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 119, 141 n.132 (1978).
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of Lord Hale's, which had worked its way into the law of many American jurisdictions
in the form of a jury instruction, that although rape was "a most detestable crime, ... it
must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to he proved,
and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho' never so innocent." 341
 The specific
portion of that statement that the court implicitly appears to be embracing is that rape
is an accusation easily to be made." Yet that court itself nine years earlier in People v.
Rincon -Pineda345
 had forcefully rejected this portion of Lord Hale's instruction when it
stated:
The initial emotional trauma of submitting to official investigatory processes,
the fear of subsequent humiliation through attendant publicity and embar-
rassment at trial through defense tactics which are often demeaning, and a
disinclination to encounter the discretion of the police in deciding whether
to pursue charges of rape, especially with regard to what may appear to the
police to be "victim precipitated" rapes, are among the powerful yet common
disincentives to the reporting of rape .... Those victims with the pluck to
disregard such disincentives discover the utter fallaciousness that rape is a
charge easily made: 34"
Thus, it is highly unlikely that false charges of rape will be made and even more unlikely
that they will be made to rape trauma counselors, whose clients were the research subjects
for the various rape trauma syndrome studies: 3" It is impossible to discern why the
California Supreme Court would not again, as it had in Rincon-Pineda, judicially notice
the legislative fact that false reports of rape are very rare. 348
3" See HALE, PLEAS OE THE CROWN, 633, 635 (1680).
945
	 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
54" Id. at 880-81, 538 P.2d at 258-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130-3 I. See also State v. Bashaw, 296
Or. 50, 53-54, 672 P.2d 48, 49 (1983).
515 This is true because if the motive of a woman in falsely reporting a rape is to "get" a
particular male, there is no reason for the woman to report to a rape counselor, Instead, such a
woman would report to the police. And even if somehow the rape trauma syndrome studies did
include complainants who had falsely reported rapes, the percentage of such false reports must
have been so small that for statistical purposes it would not in the least invalidate the studies.
"" The highest court of New York has recently indicated in People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152,
474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), that it would be amenable to taking judicial notice that
false reports of rape are rare. In the context of holding unconstitutional a New York statute which
did not define the crime of rape to include female perpetrators and did not include married men
assaulting their wives within its ambit, the New York Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he stigma and
other difficulties associated with a woman reporting a rape and pressing charges probably deter
most attempts to fabricate an incident; rape remains a grossly underreported crime." Id. at 166 n.8,
474 N.E.2d at 574 n.8, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214 n.8 (citations omitted).
Courts have not hesitated to make liberal use of judicial'notice of legislative facts in other cases.
See, e.g., Sotiriades v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 1018, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (matter of common knowledge
that a woman's undocumented statement of her age is subject to discount); Perkins v. Perkins, 226
Ark. 765, 767, 293 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1956) (matter of common knowledge that there is no love like
a mother's love); Tan v. Tan, 3 Ill. App. 3d 671, 674, 279 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1972) (matter of
common knowledge that. women have recently been emancipated socially and economically); De-
partment of Revenue v. To Your Door Pizza, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (matter
of common knowledge that a pizza is a "meal"). Courts have taken judicial notice of facts of much
more questionable validity than the fact that most reports of' rape are legitimate. See, e.g., United
States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960) (court will take judicial notice that in a normal
family a father has equal love and affection for all his children and provides equal care, guidance.
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Finally, courts which have held that rape trauma syndrome testimony does not meet
the Frye test have found that the testimony is unreliable because in order to reach the
diagnosis, the expert has to rely on the truth of the complainant's story. 349 This is a
particularly specious rationale because virtually all psychiatric and psychological testi-
mony is based upon what a person with interest in the case tells the psychiatrist or
psychologist and a subsequent evaluation by the psychiatrist or psychologist of whether
those statements should be believed. For example, a criminal defendant claiming insanity
has the greatest interest in being found insane, yet there is no question but that a
psychiatrist or psychologist is entitled to rely on the truth of the defendant's statements
in formulating a diagnosis. In similar fashion, a psychiatrist or psychologist should be
entitled to rely on the truth of the complainant's statements in making a rape trauma
syndrome diagnosis. Holding that rape trauma syndrome testimony is unreliable and
therefore inadmissible because in order to come to a diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome
the expert must believe what she has been told by the complainant results in singling
out rape trauma syndrome testimony for special adverse treatment.
In summary, then, it is clear that most rape trauma syndrome testimony, specifically,
testimony about the first three levels of rape trauma — the general existence of the
syndrome, the matching of the complainant's symptoms with the general symptoms, and
the assessment of the cause of the complainant's symptoms as rape — is admissible and
meets the Frye test. All of the rationales put forth by courts for holding that rape trauma
syndrome testimony does not meet the Frye test are incorrect. In fact, the singling out
of rape trauma syndrome for special adverse treatment under the Frye test may stem in
part from the same attitudes that gave rise to increasingly discredited special rape
prosecution doctrines such as corroboration requirements, chastity attacks based on
credibility, cautionary instructions, and court-ordered psychiatric examinations of corn-
plainants. 350 If rape trauma syndrome testimony is treated the same as other evidence
to which the Frye standard is applied, it will pass the test.
B. Is Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence Relevant?
The theory of relevance for rape trauma syndrome evidence on the issue of consent
is simple and straightforward. Women who engage in consensual intercourse do not
experience rape trauma syndrome. Most women who are forced to engage in noncon-
sensual intercourse do experience rape trauma syndrome. Thus, if the complainant is
experiencing rape trauma syndrome, it is because she was raped. The probative value
of the evidence seems patently obvious. Nonetheless, several courts have found the
evidence to be irrelevant or of such limited relevance that its relevance is easily out-
weighed by countervailing considerations such as unfairly prejudicing the defendant,
diverting the jury's attention, and causing confusion.
One court directly 351 and two other courts indirectly have found the evidence to he
irrelevant. 352 Although it couched its holding in terms of "helpfulness," the Saldana court
discipline and support); Snure v. Skipworth, 61 N.M. 340, 300 P.2d 792 (1956) (common knowledge
that a constant loser in gambling game of cards usually drops out of Ihe game).
34 " See, e.g., Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459; Allewalt, 61
Md. App. at 514-15, 487 A.2d at 669.
35° For a critical examination of these doctrines, sec Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A
Feminist View, 11 Am. GRIM. L. REV. 335 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Feminist View].
"' Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
952 Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 252, 681 P.2d at 301-02, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460-61; Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
at 240.
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in fact was making a determination that rape trauma syndrome evidence was irrelevant
when it stated that "evidence of reactions of other people does not assist the jury in its
fact-finding function . . "353 The Taylor court seems to have indirectly held the evidence
to be irrelevant when it stated that a properly qualified expert may testify that the
complainant possesses characteristics consistent with those resulting from a reaction to
a traumatic stress such as rape, but that "there would be no relevancy of that limited
testimony in this proceeding."354 Also, the California Supreme Court in Bledsoe more
indirectly suggested that the admission of the evidence did not require reversal, "in
truth, the testimony did little more than provide the jury with information that it either
already had or that was not particularly pertinent to the facts of this case." 355
The holding of the Saldana court is unsupportable. Again, it demonstrates rape
trauina syndrome testimony being treated differently than almost all other psychological
and psychiatric testimony. Virtually all psychiatric and psychological testimony compares
the reactions of a particular person with the reactions of other people studied in the
past and then proceeds to a diagnosis based on the correlation of the individual's
symptoms with patterns that have been observed in other people in the past. To illustrate,
where the question is whether a defendant is schizophrenic, a psychiatrist or psychologist
will base his opinion on whether the symptoms of the defendant match the symptoms
of the people who have in the past been found to be schizophrenic. This comparison
based upon the "reactions of other people," is indeed helpful to the jury in its fact-
finding function. Likewise, an expert testifying about rape trauma syndrome will com-
pare the victim's symptoms to previously diagnosed victims of rape trauma syndrome.
The indirect holdings of the Taylor and Bledsoe courts, although the reasons for them
are not made explicit, are therefore incorrect.
One court has directly found the evidence to be relevant, but of such minimal
relevance that its probative value is easily outweighed by countervailing considerations. 35°
The Allewalt court held that since a diagnosis of PTSI) does not reliably prove that the
cause of that disorder was rape, "the diagnosis has little probative value in a rape case
in which the ultimate issue is the occurrence of rape, i.e., whether a rape caused the
disorder." 357 It has already been pointed out that it can be reliably determined that the
cause of rape trauma syndrome was rape. 558 It seems clear, then, that although rape
trauma syndrome evidence is not conclusive, it is certainly more than minimally probative
on the issue of whether a rape occurred. Accordingly, it should take more than minimal
prejudice or other countervailing considerations to cause the exclusion of that evidence,
particularly under a rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides for
exclusion of relevant evidence only if its probative value is "substantially" outweighed
by countervailing considerations.
A separate relevance issue is whether rape trauma syndrome evidence is admissible
when the defendant's defense is something other than consent. One court has expressly
'" Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
354
 Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240.
355 Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 252,681 P.2d at 301-02,203 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
356 Allewalt, 61 Md. App. at 515-16,487 A.2d at 669-70.
357 Id, at 515-16,487 A.2d at 670.
956 See supra text accompanying notes 325-32 .
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held,359 and another court has suggested in dictum,'" that rape trauma syndrome evi-
dence is only relevant when the defendant claims that the complainant consented. This
is clearly incorrect. Lack of consent is an element that the prosecution has to prove in
every rape case in order to avoid a directed verdict. The existence of rape trauma
syndrome is probative of lack of consent. Thus, the prosecution should be able to present
evidence of rape trauma syndrome in its case-in-chief whether or not it appears that the
defendant will raise consent as a defense. One can conceive of various fact patterns
where the defendant's defense is something other than lack of consent. The main possible
fact situation in which rape trauma syndrome evidence would be relevant to issues other
than consent is where the defendant admits having been with the complainant but
completely denies that any sexual activity occurred."' This situation arose in State v.
Bressman where the Kansas Supreme Court found rape trauma syndrome evidence to
be irrelevant. In a fact situation like Bressman, the prosecution may well desire to use
rape trauma syndrome evidence to prove that nonconsensual intercourse occurred. The
evidence is clearly probative on two elements of the prosecution's case in such a fact
situation: that intercourse in fact occurred, and that it was nonconsensual. It is impossible
to see why the Kansas Supreme Court found the evidence not to be relevant in Bressman,
C. What is Necessary for a Witness to Qualify as an Expert on Rape Trauma Syndrome?
As to the necessary qualifications to allow an expert to testify regarding rape trauma
syndrome, there has developed a split of authority. Kansas has adopted the position that
the only properly qualified expert is a psychiatrist. 262 On the other hand, Montana has
allowed an expert other than a psychiatrist (specifically a psychiatric nurse) to testify."'
There is support for the Montana position in cases that have rejected rape trauma
syndrome testimony for other reasons, but have had no problem accepting persons other
than psychiatrists, such as nurses and social workers, as properly qualified experts.'"
The Kansas position also is supported by authority. Psychologists have had a long,
uphill battle against the medical profession in order to be considered proper experts to
9 $9 State v. Bressman, 236 Kan. 296, 304, 689 P.2d 901, 908 (1984).
"° State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
361 Another possible fact pattern is where the defendant claims mistaken identity. In such a
case, although the prosecution could theoretically choose to use rape trauma syndrome evidence to
prove that in fact a rape occurred, usually the prosecution would not desire to complicate the case
with rape trauma syndrome testimony since the defendant is not contesting that the complainant
was raped, but is claiming that the rape was perpetrated by someone else.
562 Although the court in Marks did not explicitly state that its holding — that "qualified expert
psychiatric testimony" is admissible — limited the field of proper experts to psychiatrists, State v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653-54, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1984), that clearly appears to he the result
after Bressman, where the court held that even a physician without psychiatric training is not a
properly qualified expert. See Bressman, 236 Kan. at 304, 689 P.2d at 908. To the extent that the
thinking in the concurring opinion in McQuillen reflects the thinking of the court, it also points to
the result that the only proper expert in Kansas is a psychiatrist. In attempting to distinguish Bledsoe,
the concurring opinion stated: "In California the witness called to give testimony was merely a rape
counselor, not a psychiatrist, and therefore would not qualify as an expert under Marks." McQuillen,
236 Kan. at 174, 689 P.2d at 831 (Herd, J., concurring).
565 State v. Liddell, _Mont.	 685 P.2d 918, 922-23 (1984).
364 See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); State
v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
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testify regarding mental conditions. 3" Although psychologists appear for the most part
to have won that battle, it is still not entirely clear in all jurisdictions that a psychologist
can testify regarding mental conditions. 366 With respect to other mental health profes-
sionals, two commentators noted as recently as 1981 that, "[t]he ability of other mental
health professionals to qualify as experts on matters relating to mental health disorders
is less established."367 These commentators noted that the courts are split concerning
social workers, that nurses "have not fared well," and that with respect to other mental
health personnel, a psychology technician with a B.A. in psychology had been found not
to be properly an expert in interpretation of psychological tests and could not express
an opinion on the defendant's sanity.'" Thus, whenever the expert witness is someone
other than a psychiatrist, careful opposing counsel can plausibly and should object that
the expert is not qualified. However, despite the plausibility of the objection and the
support in the case law, a court should not sustain this objection, because a person other
than a psychiatrist can be properly qualified as an expert on this subject.
There exists a better-reasoned line of authority holding that courts should examine
the expertise of the witness rather than merely the degrees held by the witness in deter-
mining whether a person other than a psychiatrist should be allowed to testify regarding
mental conditions. A witness with the requisite expertise can be helpful to the trier of
fact whether or not the witness has a particular title or degree. 3" A recent case has
3"5 See Dix Sc Poythress, Propriety of Medical Dominance of Forensic Mental Health Practice: The
Empirical Evidence, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 961, 961 -63 (1981); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness,
supra note 254, at 544-54.
'66
 Three decisions form the basis of modern authority that psychologists can be proper experts
regarding mental conditions: Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc);
Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1954); and People v. Hawthorne, 293 Mich.
15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940). For a jurisdiction where it is not entirely clear that a psychologist can so
testify, see State v. Peterson, 24 N.C. App. 404, 407-08, 210 S.E.2d 883, 885-86 (1975).
3"7 Dix & Poythress, supra note 365, at 969 n.51.
388 Id.
369
 The correct mode of analysis is demonstrated by Maloney v. Wake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 45 N.C.
App. 172, 262 S.E.2d 680 (1980). Although that case involved the competence of a nurse to give
an expert opinion as to the cause of a physical injury rather than a mental condition, the reasoning
of the opinion is applicable and compelling with respect to all expert medical testimony. The
opponent of the nurse's testimony argued that since she was not a doctor, she could not give an
expert opinion as to the cause of a physical injury. The trial court sustained this objection. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed:
The common law ... does not require that the expert witness on a medical subject
shall be a person duly licensed to practice medicine .... Except as an indirect stimulus to
obtain a license, such a rule is ill-advised, first, because the line between chemistry,
biology, and medicine is too indefinite to admit of a practicable separation of topics
and witnesses, and, secondly, because some of the most capable investigators have
probably not needed or cared to obtain a license to practice medicine.
Id. at 178, 262 S.E.2d 683-84 (quoting 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 569, at 667-68 (3d
ed. 1940)) (emphasis added). The court further quoted Professor Wigmore concerning the "only
true criterion" for determination of an expert's qualifications: "On this subject can a jury from this
person receive appreciable help?" Id. at 178, 262 S.E.2d at 683 (quoting 7 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 1923, at 21 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis added). The court then held:
Since we accept the principle that the giving of expert testimony should not be limited
to those witnesses who are licensed in some particular field of endeavor, nor limited
by whether such witnesses employ their skills professionally or commercially, there is
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affirmed the proposition that a witness other than a psychiatrist can be a proper expert
witness to render a diagnosis regarding psychological conditions.""
Allowing testimony by persons other than psychiatrists is particularly appropriate
where the diagnosis is simple and straightforward, as it is with rape trauma syndrome.
Research on the subject of whether persons other than psychiatrists can make judgments
as reliably as psychiatrists concerning mental condition indicates that even with respect
to complicated diagnoses such as sanity or competence to stand trial, psychologists and
other mental health professionals are at least as accurate as (and often more thorough
than) psychiatrists."' There is no reason to believe that experts other than psychiatrists
would be more prone to err in the relatively simpler diagnosis required with respect to
rape trauma syndrome.
accordingly no basis or justification for treating medical experts differently — for
establishing a preferred or exclusive class among medical expert witnesses.
Id. at 178, 262 S.E.2d at 684. The court then held that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow
the nurse to testify. Id. at 180. 262 S.E.2d at 684.
370 See People v. Cans, 119 Misc. 2d 843, 465 N.Y.S.2d 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983). There the
defendant attempted to call a certified social worker as an expert to testify as to the defendant's
mental capacity to proceed and his competency in the foreseeable future. The prosecution opposed
the social worker's testimony on the basis that the social worker was not properly qualified as an
expert. The trial court ruled that the testimony of the social worker should he admitted, finding
no basis to artificially limit. the range of qualified experts to psychiatrists:
I note that clinical social work, as a profession, is one of the core mental health
disciplines. As arc psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, clinical social workers are
skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders. Psychiatrists, who are
physicians, bring their expertise in the understanding of' organic pathology, psycho-
pharmacology and other somatic treatments to the mental health field. Clinical psy-
chologists, being scientists who study human behavior as well as being non-medical
mental health professionals, bring their particular skills in research and in the study
of behavior to the mental health field. It can be noted that clinical social workers, also
non-medical mental health professionals, bring their expertise in dealing with the
relationship between social and emotional functioning as well as their expertise in
social policy and in environmental intervention to the mental health field.
Id. at 844, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 148. The court then went on to note that the diagnostic criteria set forth
in the DSM-III were validated during field trials carried out by professionals from the disciplines
of psychiatry, psychology, clinical social work, and psychiatric nursing. Psychologists and clinical
social workers served on several of the advisory committees which developed DSM-III and served
as consultants to the task force which compiled it. In fact, a social worker served as co-principal
investigator and project coordinator for the reliability study and field trials of the DSM-III, Id. The
court further noted that throughout DSM-III references are made to utilization by "clinicians," not
exclusively by psychiatrists. Id. Thus the court held:
It is clear, that if one is to accept DSM-11i as a valid and reliable guide, then one must
accept that properly trained psychiatrists, psychologists, clinical social workers and
psychiatric nurses are qualified to apply its diagnostic criteria in their diagnostic
assessment of patients. I find no merit in any arguments that the application and use
of the DSM-I I I diagnoses should be limited to physicians and psychiatrists.
Id. Other courts have recognized that properly qualified experts other than psychiatrists can testify
concerning mental condition. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 396 So. 2d 1037 (Ala. 1981) (allowing testimony
of psychiatric social worker regarding mental disorder); People v, Giles, 192 Colo. 240, 557 P.2d
408 (1976) (psychiatric social worker may give opinion as to a person's mental condition); State v.
McDonald, 89 Wash. 2d 256, 571 P.2d 930 (1977) (psychiatric social worker permitted to testify
regarding mental condition).
97 See Dix & Poythress, supra note 365, at 975-84.
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Accordingly, nurses and social workers with substantial training and expertise in the
field of rape counseling should be recognized as proper experts to testify regarding rape
trauma syndrome. The Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly recognize that a witness may
be qualified as an expert through training, knowledge or experience and not solely
education. 372 To refuse to allow such testimony could lead to the anomalous result that
the opinion of a rape trauma counselor based upon an interview of the complainant
shortly after the event when the complainant has voluntarily come to the rape counseling
center could be inadmissible, while the opinion of a psychiatrist based upon an interview
weeks or months after the alleged rape and perhaps undertaken at the request of the
prosecution would be admissible. The former testimony would appear to be clearly more
reliable concerning the immediate post-rape symptoms exhibited by the victim.
D. Is the Issue of Consent in a Rape Case a Proper Subject for Expert Opinion?
The issue of whether in an individual case expert testimony on an issue is warranted
depends upon whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This "helpfulness" standard is further explained
in the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702:
Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is
to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier of fact. "There is no more
certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common
sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine
intelligently and to the hest possible degree the particular issue without
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject
involved in the dispute." .. When opinions are excluded, it is because they
are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time.''
In a rape case where consent is the main issue, usually the case will come down to a
contest of credibility between the complainant and the defendant. There will usually not
he any other eyewitness testimony available. Our system assumes the jurors are able to
"intelligently" decide such a contest. Indeed, assessment. of witness credibility is perhaps
the premier ability generally attributed to jurors, and jurors have performed such
assessments in rape cases for centuries without the benefit of expert testimony. However,
it seems that jurors will be able to make their determination of what actually happened
to the "best possible degree" if they have the benefit of probative, easily understandable
expert testimony that gives them information beyond their common knowledge and
experience. Thus, on its face, rape trauma syndrome evidence appears to be a proper
subject for expert testimony.
The foregoing analysis assumed that jurors were able to "intelligently" decide rape
cases. However, there is reason to believe that this is not true, which provides a more
compelling reason for allowing "remedial" expert testimony. Many scholars believe lay
jurors are often not able to decide the issue of consent in a rape case "intelligently" on
372 See FED. R. •vm. 702.
"3 FED. R. Evto. 702 advisory committee note (quoting Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 \TANI), L. REV.
919, 418 (1952)).
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the basis of evidence traditionally available to the prosecution in rape trials:374 One study
has demonstrated that jurors often have the preconceived notion that a woman who is
raped has "brought it on herself" and thus tend to acquit or convict on lesser charges
much more frequently than with respect to other criminal charges." In addition, the
"rape myth," 376 prevalent in American society, may also improperly influence the jury.
Surely resolution of rape cases on such a basis is not intelligent or a determination of
the issue to the best possible degree. Accordingly, rape trauma syndrome testimony
which is probative evidence on the key issue of consent "will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 377 Nonetheless, three courts
have held that the issue of consent in a rape case is not a proper subject for rape trauma
syndrome expert testimony. -
The broadest such holding appears to be in the Saldana 378 case where the best
reading of the court's opinion on this point — that "jurors of ordinary abilities are
competent to consider the evidence and to determine whether the alleged crime oc-
curred" — is that the court believed that jurors were competent to make the determi-
nation of whether the intercourse was not consensual on the basis of evidence tradition-
ally available to the prosecution in rape cases. The research shows this conclusion to be
incorrect.379 Further, there are many issues that jurors are presumed to be competent
to decide without expert testimony, but this has never been seen as a bar to expert
testimony that will assist the jury to decide that issue. 38°
A second and slightly more narrow reason found by the California Supreme Court
in Bledsoe38 ' and the Kansas Supreme Court in Bressman 382 to render rape trauma syn-
drome testimony without value in assisting the jury to reach a determination on the issue
of consent, is that the jurors are fully competent to weigh the evidence concerning the
post-rape behavior and emotional condition of the complainant, and decide whether it
is indicative that a rape occurred, without the need for expert testimony to further
explain or comment upon the evidence. This holding can be shown to be incorrect by
referring back to the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, under
which the test for expert testimony is not only whether the untrained layman will be
3" See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 880-81, 538 P.2d 247, 258, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
129-30 (1975); State v. Bashaw, 296 Or, 50, 53-55, 672 P.2d 48, 49-50 (1983); Berger, Man's Trial,
Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the' Courtroom, 77 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977); O'Neale, supra note
343, at 142-43; Note, A Feminist View, supra note 350, at 338-43.
37 '	 KALVEN & H. ZE1SEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249 (1966) [hereinafter cited as THE AMERICAN
JURY].
376 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
377 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note.
376 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
379 See THE AMERICAN JURY, supra note 375. The Kalven & Zeisel research was conducted prior
to the blooming of the women's rights movement. It would be interesting to see if attitudes have
changed as a result of that movement. A cover story in a recent popular news magazine, without
engaging in anything approaching empirical research, indicates that jurors are much less prejudiced
against rape complainants than previously was the case. See Rape and the Law, NEwswEEK, May 20,
1985, at 60.
"" See, e.g., Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967); Miller v. Pillsbury
Co., 33 111. 2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965); C. McCoRmicit, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
381 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
'" 236 Kan. 296, 689 P.2d 901 (1984).
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qualified to intelligently determine that issue without expert testimony, but whether the
layman would be qualified to determine the issue to the best possible degree without the
expert testimony. Although jurors may be able to evaluate evidence of the complainant's
behavior and emotional condition after the alleged incident without expert guidance, it
seems obvious that the testimony will be more meaningful if it is explained to the jury
that the behavior falls into a recognized psychological category which has been deter-
mined to result from the crime with which the defendant is charged, rape. The proper
mode of dealing with such evidence is demonstrated by the Oregon Supreme Court in
State v. Middleton," 3 when it dealt with the closely related issue of typical behavior of
sexually abused children. The court stated:
Perhaps the jury itself would have been capable of deciding whether the
daughter's behavior actually fit the pattern described by the experts. How-
ever, as said in 4 Weinstein's Evidence 702[02] (1981), there is no bright line
separating issues within the comprehension of the jurors from those that are
not. Generally the admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of
the trial court. .. . If a qualified expert offers to give testimony on whether
the reaction of one child is similar to the reaction of most victims of familial
child abuse, and if this would assist the jury in deciding whether a rape
occurred, it may be admitted."
Similarly, with respect to rape trauma syndrome testimony, expert testimony would assist
the jury in deciding whether a rape occurred and thus such testimony may, and in the
trial court's discretion should, be admitted.
Finally, the Bledsoe court's statement that rape trauma syndrome evidence does "little
more than provide the jury with information that it already had or that was not particularly
pertinent to the facts of this case" 385 suggests that rape trauma syndrome evidence does
not tell the jurors anything that they do not already know. In this instance, the California
Supreme Court was in error. Although most jurors undoubtedly believe that rape is a
traumatic experience, there is no reason to believe that jurors understand the results of
the trauma or that the results tend to fall into a general pattern. In fact, there appears
to be no support for the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in State v. Myers 386 that
jurors are more ignorant and in need of more assistance with respect to the behavior of
sexually abused children than they are with respect to the behavior of adult rape victims.
The research tends to indicate that jurors are quite uninformed with respect to adult
rape victims,3" and in fact may be at even a greater disadvantage than they are with
respect to sexually abused children due to certain incorrect preconceptions about adult
rape victims which cloud an intelligent resolution of the issue.
E. Is Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence Unfairly Prejudicial?
According to the Advisory Committee's note to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the
term "unfair prejudice" means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." There have so far been no
983 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
".' Id. at 437, 657 P.2d at 1220-21 (citations omitted).
"5 36 Cal. 3d at 252, 681 P.2d at 301-02, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (emphasis added).
' 86 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
3ry7 See supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text.
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arguments made by defendants that rape trauma syndrome evidence is unfairly preju-
dicial because it appeals too much to the emotions of the jury. However, another type
of unfair prejudice sometimes raised with respect to 'expert testimony, and particularly
expert testimony that is deemed to be "scientific," is that when evidence is presented
through an expert, the evidence is invested with an "aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness"'" or an unwarranted "scientific cachet."389 The essence of the argument
is that such testimony overawes the jurors to the extent that they uncritically accept such
evidence as conclusive on the point at issue without performing their proper function
of critically examining the evidence to determine the extent to which it in fact does prove
the point for which the proponent has offered it. The Saldana, 390 Taylor,s9 ' and Blelsoes92
courts held that rape trauma syndrome evidence does unfairly prejudice a defendant in
this manner.
It has been lamented by evidence scholars that there is a dearth of empirical research
on the question of whether jurors actually do tend to overvalue expert testimony." 3 The
traditional view of the courts has been that jurors may indeed have a tendency to do so.
However, the best a court can really do, given the lack of empirical research, is to make
an educated, common sense guess about how likely a certain piece of expert testimony
is to overwhelm the jury. The best educated guess with respect to rape trauma syndrome
testimony is that it will not have a tendency to be overvalued by the jury.
Rape trauma syndrome evidence will not "overawe" the jury because first, rape
trauma syndrome evidence does not involve the use of any mysterious machine or
process."4 Also, rape trauma syndrome evidence is not likely to improperly influence a
jury because it is nontechnical and easily understandable." 5 If a jury can truly understand
a piece of evidence, it seems likely that a jury will be able to fairly weigh its probative
value. Accordingly, it does not appear that rape trauma syndrome evidence is so invested
with a "special aura of reliability and trustworthiness" so as to render it unfairly preju-
dicial. For the same reasons, the evidence also does not have a tendency to confuse the
jury, as the Taylor court suggested."6 Furthermore, because the evidence goes to the key
question in the case, it also should not be excluded on the basis of the countervailing
consideration that it diverts the jury's attention from the main issue in the case — another
rationale suggested by Taylor in excluding the evidence."'
A second species of "unfair prejudice" that was cited by the Taylor court is that the
very term "rape trauma syndrome" itself is unfairly prejudicial because "[t]here are
inherent implications from the use of the term 'rape trauma syndrome,' for it suggests
that the syndrome may only be caused by 'rape' as the court in Saldana, empha-
sized."398 Thus, the Taylor court concluded that "Nile term itself connotes rape."y 99
"8 Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
"9 Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
39" 324 N.N.V.2(1 at 230.
39 ' 663 S.W.2d at 241.
rz 36 Cal. 3(1 at 252, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
39 ' See Symposium, supra note 312, at 218-19, 232-33 (comments of Paul Gianelli, James Starrs,
Michael Graham, Arnold Barnette, and Andre Moenssens).
394 See supra text accompanying notes 304-06.
395 See supra text accompanying note 310.
' 96 See Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241-42.
397 Id.
39' Id. at 240.
3" Id. at 241.
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Perhaps the court was suggesting that there can be other causes of rape trauma syndrome
other than rape, although the court did not specify what those causes might be, and
psychiatric and psychological literature likewise does not suggest what they might be. If
the court is simply concerned about the jury hearing the word "rape" issue from the
mouth of an expert witness, the court should be reminded that the trials where that will
occur will be rape trials where the term "rape" will be mentioned often. The term will
probably be mentioned more forcefully in other ways than it will through the testimony
of the expert, such as in the reading of the charging document to the jury, the prose-
cutor's opening statement, the testimony of the complainant, anti the prosecutor's closing
argument.
F. Does Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence Improperly Bolster the Credibility of the
Complainant?
Probably the second greatest stumbling block to rape trauma syndrome evidence
after the Frye test has been the defense contention that such testimony improperly
bolsters the credibility of the complainant. It is a general rule in most jurisdictions that
an expert witness is not allowed to express an opinion concerning the credibility of
another witness. 4w At least two exceptions to this general rule, designed to meet what
courts see as extraordinary cases, have recently developed. The first is with respect to
expert comment on the credibility of a child complainant in a sexual abuse case, given
the perceived extraordinary credibility problems involved with child witnessesJol The
second concerns eyewitness identifications, where courts appear to be becoming con-
vinced that extraordinary credibility problems exist that are not apparent to jurors
without such evidence.402 Given the jaundiced view held by many jurors regarding rape
complainants, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that rape constitutes another
extraordinary circumstance in which expert testimony regarding the credibility of the
complainant should be allowed. However, it is not necessary to go to that extreme to
find the most probative levels of rape trauma syndrome testimony not to be violative of
the general rule.
The first three levels of rape trauma syndrome testimony, that is, an explanation of
the general symptoms, a comparison of the complainant's symptoms to those of the
syndrome, and an opinion that the cause of the complainant's symptoms is rape, do not
constitute an improper bolstering of the complainant's credibility. There is no direct
assertion that the expert believes the complainant to be truthful. Admittedly, to the
extent that an expert believes a complainant's statements and bases an opinion on them,
the expert is indirectly "bolstering" the credibility of the complainant. However, as the
Oregon Supreme Court noted in State v, Middleton, Thriluch expert testimony will tend
to show that another witness either is or is not telling the truth. .. . This, by itself, will
not render evidence inadmissible." 403 Mental health experts have always been allowed to
base their diagnoses in part or in full upon their belief in what the subject tells them,
4" See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 40 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barnard,
490 F.2d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974).
40, See, e.g., People v. Ashley, 687 P.2d 473, 475 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
402 See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.
3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rpm. 236 (1984).
4°3 294 Or. 427, 435, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1983) (citation omitted). See also State v. Myers, 359
N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984).
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without having that testimony ruled inadmissible because it improperly bolsters the
testimony of the subject. For example, in a criminal case where the defendant has asserted
the deferise of insanity and has testified on his own behalf that he was insane at the time
of the alleged crime, it would probably never occur to a prosecutor to lodge an "improper
bolstering" objection to the testimony of a defense expert that, based upon what the
defendant told him, diagnoses the defendant as having been insane at the time of the
alleged crime.
The fourth level of rape trauma syndrome evidence, where the expert directly
comments upon the believability of the complainant by testifying that the complainant
did not fantasize the occurrence, does constitute a direct bolstering of the complainant's
testimony and should not be admitted in the jurisdiction following the rule that experts
cannot give opinions regarding the credibility of witnesses. As was previously noted, a
plausible case can be made for creating an exception to this general rule with respect to
rape complaints:1°4 Such an exception, however, appears unnecessary if the first three
levels of rape trauma syndrome evidence are admitted, because the most important and
reliable rape trauma syndrome evidence is presented through those three levels. Ac-
cordingly, it appears that courts which have held the admission of testimony on the
fourth level to be error are correct:10'
4" See supra text accompanying notes 401-02.
4V5 An interesting subsidiary issue with respect to bolstering credibility is the effect that rape
trauma syndrome testimony will have on the fresh complaint doctrine. The ''fresh complaint
doctrine" is a doctrine applicable to sex crimes prosecutions that permits the prosecution in the
case-in-chief to prove that the complainant made a prompt complaint about the offense to the
authorities or a third party. The doctrine permits evidence that might otherwise arguably be barred
by the rule that no bolstering can be made before a witness' credibility is attacked, or by the hearsay
rule. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 343, §§ 1134-1140; Note, The Admissibility of Extrajudicial Rape
Complaints, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 199 (1984). The only court to have examined a similar issue was the
Virginia Supreme Court in the pre-rape trauma syndrome case of Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219
Va. 516, 248 S.E.2d 784 (1984). In that case it was held that the examining physician's testimony
regarding what the complainants had told him went beyond what was allowed by the fresh complaint
doctrine. Id. at 518, 248 S.E.2d at 786. Virginia, like a majority of the states which recognize the
fresh complaint doctrine, limits the testimony to the fact that a prompt complaint was made, wilhout
allowing the details of the offense, including the identity of the assailant and the injuries claimed
to have been sustained to be testified to. See, e.g., Cady v. State, 455 So. 2d 101, 105 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1984); State v. Van Doren, 657 S.W.2d 708, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Broun v. State, 649
S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex Crim. App. 1983). In a majority of jurisdictions, the fact that a complaint
was made is not even considered to be hearsay because it is not being admitted to prove the truth
of the matter asserted, but merely to rebut any inferences that might be drawn from the failure to
complain. See, e.g., Matter of Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3c1 1098, 1120, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 802
(1984). Thus, it is a limited tool for bolstering the credibility of the complainant.
The Virginia Supreme Court was correct in realizing that the testimony of the doctor in that
case, which was a pale shadow of current rape trauma syndrome testimony, would tend to obliterate
the limitations on the fresh complaint doctrine. When rape trauma syndrome testimony is admitted,
the expert can recite the details of the alleged offense given to him by the complainant far beyond
the limits' of what is allowed by the fresh complaint doctrine. Further, the complainant may well
have made those statements long after the deadline for "promptness" under the fresh complaint
doctrine. The defendant's only solace in such a case would be a limiting instruction from the court
that the jury is not to treat the statements made by the complainant to the expert as substantive
evidence, but merely as the basis of the expert's opinion. The extent to which a jury can or will
comply with such a subtle instruction is questionable, although generally courts indulge in the
presumption that juries will follow such instructions.
Even though rape trauma syndrome testimony will tend to undermine the limits of the fresh
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G. Do Hearsay Objections Exist to Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence?
It seems fair to say that under any set of evidence rules closely akin to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, rape trauma syndrome evidence will not run aground on the shoals
of the hearsay rule. Any argument by a defendant that the out-of-court statements by
the complainant to the expert constitute inadmissible hearsay would be defeated by
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which allows an expert to formulate an opinion on the
basis of facts or data that are not otherwise admissible in evidence and relate those
otherwise inadmissible bases of his opinion to the jury. When such otherwise inadmissible
hearsay is admitted as the basis of an expert opinion, it is admitted for the limited
purpose of disclosing the basis for the opinion and does not constitute substantive
evidence of the facts asserted. 406 Accordingly, experts are not allowed to express an
opinion that one of the underlying hearsay statements is true and thereby convert
inadmissible hearsay into admissible opinion. .1117
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, there is no basis for treating statements made
by a patient for purposes of diagnosis and treatment any differently from any other
statements. They are equally admissible as the basis of the expert's opinion. Thus, the
courts have held that rape complaints testified to by experts such as an examining
physician, are proper bases of expert opinion and do not violate the hearsay rule. 4 "8
Consistent with these precepts, no court with evidentiary rules akin to the Federal Rules
of Evidence has held rape trauma syndrome evidence inadmissible on hearsay grounds.
Even in Kansas, which has a rule of hearsay law that a doctor cannot base an opinion
on statements made to him by a patient unless those statements are independently
admissible and admitted into evidence at trial,° rape trauma syndrome evidence has
not been barred by the hearsay rule since the complainant through her testimony can
independently put the necessary facts into evidence upon which the expert can base an
opinion. 41 "
Seemingly the only precedent that a defendant could rely on in seeking to have
rape trauma syndrome evidence declared inadmissible on a hearsay basis is the pre-rape
trauma syndrome case of Cartera v. Commonwealth. 41 There, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that opinion testimony of a physician that the complainants had been raped, which
was in part based upon out-of-court statements made by the complainants to him, was
inadmissible because it did not fall within the hearsay exception for statements for
complaint doctrine, this does not constitute a sufficient reason for its exclusion. A general principle
of evidence law is that if evidence is admissible for one purpose but inadmissible for another, it is
to be admitted for the permitted purpose and the jury instructed not to use it for the impermissible
purpose. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 380, § 59. Accordingly, even in jurisdictions following a strict
fresh complaint doctrine rule, rape trauma syndrome evidence should not be excluded because of
its practical conflict with that doctrine.
10" See, e.g., State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 7 n.1, 633 P.2d 410, 416 n,1 (1981); Matter of Cheryl
FL, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1119-20, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 802 (1984); Attorney Grievance Comm.
v. Northstein, 300 Md. 667, 678-79, 480 A.2d 807, 813 (1984).
407 See, e.g., Matter of Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1120, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 802 (1984).
418 See, e.g., State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 175-76, 471 A.2d 949, 954 (1984); Redfield v.
State, 240 Ga. 460, 461, 241 S.E.2d 217, 219 (1978).
409 See Klein v. Wells, 194 Kan. 528, 400 P.2d 1002 (1965).
410 See Marks, 231 Kan. at 655, 647 P.2d at 1300.
.1' 219 Va. 516, 248 S.E.2d 784 (1978).
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purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment.412 But under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the statement need not fall within that exception because it is being used for the
non-hearsay purpose of showing the basis of the expert's opinion.
H. Will the Admission of Rape Trauma Syndrome Testimony Lead to the EvisceratiOn of Rape.
Shield Statutes?
The argument that admitting rape trauma syndrome testimony would lead to the
evisceration of rape shield statutes arose from an unlikely source. The defendant in State
v. McQuillen" 3 argued that allowing defense experts in general to examine complainants
prior to trial in order to determine whether they exhibited rape trauma syndrome would
result in a substantial diminution in the protections of the rape shield statute. Although
it can hardly be supposed that the defendant who raised that argument had any great
solicitude for either the complainant or the rape shield statute, the argument does merit.
consideration.
The Kansas Supreme Court in McQuillen dealt with this issue by first noting that
under the statute, "fa] showing of relevancy is still necessary before the complaining
witness' prior sexual conduct may be admitted into evidence on behalf of the defen-
dant_"'"' The court then noted that even if the showing of relevancy is made, such
evidence "would not allow wholesale admittance of a victim's past sexual conduct, unless
that information was used by the state's expert to make his determination of rape trauma
syndrome."415 In practical effect, this means that the defense expert should not be
allowed to delve into the complainant's past sexual history, because there is no reason
for the state's expert to do so. The research does not indicate any relationship whatsoever
between prior sexual behavior and the existence or severity of rape trauma syndrome.
Thus, a defendant could not make the necessary showing of relevance which would
overcome the rape shield statute.
In summary, then, in any rape prosecution the prosecution should be allowed to
present any of the first three levels of rape trauma syndrome evidence through any
qualified witness. Prosecutors should not, however, use such evidence automatically, but
rather should give serious consideration in the circumstances of each case to whether it
is in the best interests of the state and the complainant to present such evidence. Such
careful consideration is necessary because the decision to use such evidence, as will be
argued below, should result in the defendant being given an opportunity to have his
expert conduct a psychological evaluation of the complainant.'" Such an examination
will merely add to the already substantial trauma that rape victims undergo in seeing a
complaint through the judicial system. In fact, the trauma inflicted by the judicial system
has been viewed as so severe as to be characterized as "the second assault."" The
prosecutor will want to be sure that a particular complainant has the psychic resources
to cope with such an examination.
412 Id. at 518, 248 S.E.2d at 786.
' + 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984).
414 Id. at 172, 689 P.2d at 830.
4,, Id.
."" See id.
4 " See J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT — RAVE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
(1981).
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VII. DEFENSE USES Of RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME EVIDENCE
The defense use of rape trauma syndrome evidence concerns whether, if the pros-
ecution chooses to present such evidence on the issue of consent, the defendant should
have a right to have the court order the complainant to submit to a pretrial examination
by a defense rape trauma syndrome expert. Two courts have answered this question
and have reached opposite conclusions. The Montana Supreme Court in State v. Liddell
held that the defendant had no such right, 4 "B while the Kansas Supreme Court in dictum
in McQuillen indicated that the defendant did have such a right 4 19 The Kansas Supreme
Court's position on this issue is clearly correct. It smacks of fundamental unfairness for
the prosecution to be allowed to have the complainant examined by an expert and the
expert then render an opinion on the basis of that examination, yet not allow the
defendant to have the opportunity to attack that evidence through access to the same
data available to the prosecution's expert. By way of analogy, when a defendant claims
insanity as a defense, there is no doubt but that the prosecution has a right to have an
expert examine the defendant. 420
The old argument that in rape cases psychiatric examinations of the complainant
should be widely available to a defendant has quite rightly fallen into disrepute and
should be discarded in jurisdictions where it has not already been so. 42 ' However, the
situation is different where the prosecution chooses to present psychiatric or psycholog-
ical testimony, one of the main bases of which is the psyche of the complainant. If such
evidence is injected into the case by the prosecution, the defendant should certainly have
a right to formulate an informed response.
But resourceful defense counsel are unlikely to be satisfied with a rule that limits
the defendant's right to such an examination to cases where the prosecution has chosen
to use rape trauma syndrome evidence. Defense counsel will argue that the nonexistence
of rape trauma syndrome is relevant on the issue of consent and thus the defendant
should have a right to have his expert evaluate the complainant in any rape case. if
courts adopted this approach, the development of rape trauma syndrome would have
the perverse result of reviving the discredited and dying practice of courts ordering
rape complainants to submit to psychological evaluations by defense experts. Yet, as was
4 ' 8 —... Mont. __, 685 P.2d 918, 924 (1984).
49 236 Kan. 161, 167, 689 P.2d 822, 827 (1984).
420 See, e .g. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL Law
§ 40 (1972).
42 ' Wigmore again is the main culprit: he argued "that the complainant woman in a sex offense
case should always be examined by competent experts to ascertain whether she suffers from some
mental or moral delusion or tendency, frequently found in young girls, causing distortion of the
imagination in sex cases ...... 3A J. WIC:MORE, supra note 343, § 924a at 747. McCormick agreed
as of 1972. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 288, § 45 at 95-96 (second edition). But by 1984, McCormick
had swung to the opposite viewpoint:
But Wigmore's positions that females who testify they have been sexually molested or
attacked may often report such matters falsely, and that a judge should always be sure
that the female victim-witness's social history and mental makeup are the subject of
examination and testimony by a qualified physician, have been the subject of pene-
trating critical analysis of the basis of these views.
C. McCokmicE, supra note 380, § 45 at 106-07 (third edition). See also Bienen, A Question of
Credibility; John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19
CAL. W.L. REV. 235 (1983); O'Nealc, supra note 343.
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pointed out above, the defense clearly has a valid point in arguing that if such evidence
can be found, it would be relevant.
The way out of this seeming conundrum was formulated by the Kansas Supreme
Court in McQuillen: the defendant has no right to have his expert examine the com-
plainant unless the prosecution will be presenting rape trauma syndrome evidence at
tria1.422 This correct result was reached, however, by incorrect reasoning. The court
decided that the nonexistence of the syndrome was not relevant because "Where are no
statistics to show that there is any value to a negative finding that the rape trauma
syndrome is not exhibited by the alleged victim." 425 It is difficult to understand how the
existence of the syndrome is probative of lack of consent, but nonexistence of the
syndrome is not probative to show that consent existed. Most women who have been
raped exhibit the syndrome. Accordingly, if a woman does not exhibit the syndrome,
that is some evidence from which a jury could conclude that she falls into the category
of women who have not been raped. The prosecution can then certainly point out the
reasons why the complainant falls into the small category of women who have been
raped yet do not suffer from the syndrome, such as extraordinary inner resources or
an extraordinarily strong support network. But this merely goes to decrease the weight
of the defense evidence, not to render it irrelevant.
The holding of the McQuillen court is supportable on another basis, however. There
exists no rule of law that a defendant has an absolute right to a court-ordered mental
examination of an opposition witness. Rather, the trial court has broad discretion in
determining whether to order such an examination, 424 Where, as with rape trauma
syndrome, the chances of turning up relevant evidence are speculative and the intrusion
into the personal affairs of the complainant is substantial, there is no reason to hold that
a court is always compelled to provide the defendant with the opportunity to unearth
such evidence. Fundamental fairness only dictates that the court assure the defendant
of that opportunity if the prosecution intends to use rape trauma syndrome evidence
against the defendant. 425
In summary, then, if the prosecution intends to use rape trauma syndrome evidence
on the issue of consent, the defendant should have the right to a court-ordered psycho-
logical examination of the complainant by a defense expert. The defendant should,
however, have no such right where the prosecution does not intend to present such
evidence.
422
	 Kan. 161, 172, 689 P.2d 822, 830 (1984).
423
424 See United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d
46 (5th Cir. 1978); C. McCoRmicx, supra note 380, § 45 at 106-09.
425 McQuillen, 236 Kan. at 172, 689 P.2d at 630. Theoretically, the Kansas Supreme Court may
have gone a bit too far in its holding when it indicated that a defendant cannot present evidence
that the complainant was not suffering from rape trauma syndrome until the state has first intro-
duced evidence that she was. This holding would prohibit the defendant from presenting such
evidence obtained from sources other than a compelled examination of the complainant. If indeed
the defendant can unearth evidence of lack of rape trauma syndrome from sources other than a
compelled examination of the complainant, it is not clear why such evidence should be barred. In
the majority of cases, however, the possibility is likely to be only theoretical since,evidence of rape
trauma syndrome, or lack thereof, will exist in the complainant herself or others who are not likely
to be sympathetic to a defendant, such as her family, her physician and her rape counselor.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The psychological reactions of rape victims have been the subject of behavioral
scientific study in this country for fifteen years. Over the last decade, this study has been
relatively intense. The results of the research have been remarkably consistent. Most
rape victims experience severe psychological symptoms for at least two months after the
rape. Many suffer much longer-term effects. The general symptoms are manifested by
more specific symptoms: a multitude of specific fears, including negative reactions to
environments similar to that in which the rape occurred; worsening relationships with
men, including disruption of sexual functioning; changes in eating and sleeping habits;
nightmares; unease at work; curtailment of normal social activities; and a decrease in
feelings of self-worth. The occurrence of these symptoms is predictable and recognizable
by a person who works with rape victims. These symptoms collectively are called rape
trauma syndrome. No causal factor other than rape has been found that consistently
produces the same recognizable pattern of symptoms. Particularly, consensual inter-
course has not been found to produce such symptoms.
Prosecutors have had mixed success in attempting to use rape trauma syndrome
expert evidence to prove lack of consent in rape prosecutions. Courts have found the
evidence inadmissible for a variety of reasons: it lacks general acceptance sufficient to
pass the Frye test for scientific evidence, it is irrelevant, it is not a proper subject for
expert opinion, it is unfairly prejudicial, and it is an improper bolstering of the com-
plainant's credibility. The courts which have allowed the admission of rape trauma
syndrome evidence have done so in varying degrees, and are not in agreement about
the qualifications necessary to make a witness an expert on the subject. The law regarding
the admissibility of expert testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome is in a state of
confusion.
The causes of this confusion can for the most part be identified. Part of the confusion
results from the failure of courts to delve deeply enough into the scientific literature to
assure themselves that rape trauma syndrome is firmly based in substantial empirical
research which has yielded the same results for the last fifteen years. Another part of
the confusion results from a failure to distinguish among the four levels of testimony
that can be given regarding rape trauma syndrome. Confusion also results from the
failure of courts to grapple with the question whether this "soft" scientific evidence is a
type to which a special test for scientific evidence should be applied. Finally, some
confusion may be attributable to the courts' failure to completely rid themselves of an
historical skepticism of rape complainants.
This article suggests that this confusion need not exist. Rape trauma syndrome
evidence presented through a properly qualified expert should be admissible to show
the general nature of the syndrome, that a complainant's symptoms match those of the
syndrome, and that the likely cause of the symptoms was rape. Such evidence is not of
a type to which the Frye rule should be applicable. But even if the Frye test is applied to
rape trauma syndrome evidence, it passes this test. Further, the evidence is relevant, a
proper subject for expert opinion, not unfairly prejudicial, not an improper bolstering
of the complainant's credibility, not violative of the hearsay rule, and not destructive of
the rape shield statutes. On the other hand, expert testimony explicitly affirming the
credibility of the complainant should not be admissible because rape trauma syndrome
experts have no special expertise in determining credibility, and such testimony would
result in an improper bolstering of the complainant's credibility.
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On the issue of defense use of rape trauma syndrome evidence, the article suggests
that if the prosecution intends to offer rape trauma syndrome evidence, then as a matter
of fundamental fairness the defense should have the right to have its expert examine
the complainant. But if the prosecution does not intend to offer such evidence, the
defense has no right to examine a complainant in order to attempt to show an absence
of the syndrome.
Due to the confused and inconsistent judicial treatment of rape trauma syndrome
evidence, the future of such evidence appears uncertain. Yet properly analyzed, the
admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence can be dealt with clearly and consistently
under traditional evidentiary principles.
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